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Abstract
During the last two decades community development corporations (CDCs) have expanded their inner city
revitalization efforts from affordable housing to other activities such as commercial real estate
development. In the City of Boston alone, CDCs have developed several commercial projects totaling
over 406,000 square feet of space. Although the scale and costs of these projects were different, they
have something in common: significant public subsidy to fill the gap between the cost of the project and
the value after completion. CDCs justify the public subsidy with the argument that commercial projects
revitalize distressed neighborhoods, creating jobs for local residents, improving the physical appearance
and business climate of the neighborhoods, increasing the variety of products available to residents, and
creating local wealth. However, must of the evidence about the impact of commercial development on
revitalization is anecdotal. Without a full understanding of how commercial real estate impact local
communities, it is difficult to justify these public investments.
This thesis proposes a framework to assess the impact of commercial development on inner city
revitalization using five impact indicators, these are 1) job and income creation, 2) fiscal impact, 3)
leverage of private capital, 4) physical improvement and overall revitalization, and 5) impact on capacity
building. This framework is utilized to analyze the impact of two CDC-sponsored commercial projects in
Boston. These projects are the JP Center in Hyde/Jackson Square and Egleston Center in Egleston
Square. This thesis demonstrates that the public benefits generated by both projects out weighted the
public investment. It proves that job creation and physical improvement are the most significant impact
on revitalization.
The thesis examines the two case studies through the tension between local constituents and CDCs when
developing commercial projects. That is, commercial projects require strong creditworthy tenants-
typically national tenants-to make the project financially viable. Without such tenants these projects
will not leverage private financing, which in turn will further increase the subsidy required. However,
attempts to bring national tenants to CDC-sponsored commercial projects are seen as threatening to
existing businesses and perceived as not contributing to local wealth creation. As a result, CDC-
sponsored projects face local opposition that counters the revitalization of the neighborhood. This thesis
asserts that CDCs can attract national tenants to anchor their commercial projects and strengthen local
businesses simultaneously. The thesis proposes alternative models to achieve both goals and spur the
revitalization of inner city commercial districts.
Thesis Supervisor: Karl Seidman, Senior Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Reader: Alvaro Lima, Senior Vice President and Managing Director, Initiative for a
Competitive Inner City
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The decay of neighborhood commercial districts
Urban neighborhood commercial districts were once the cultural, social, and economic
center of a community, hub to all sorts of retail and service businesses and to jobs for local
residents. But during the second half of the 1900s, neighborhood commercial districts were
dramatically transformed when businesses began a massive exodus to the suburbs. The once
vibrant retail and service commercial districts became plagued by vacant and border up
properties. The urban sprawl that transformed metropolitan areas after Word War II was most
responsible for the decay of the inner city commercial districts. The expansion of the highway
system and the increase use of automobile facilitated sprawl. Middle class and young families
moved to the suburbs during this period seeking newer houses and larger lot sizes. Many small
businesses followed their customer base and moved to the suburbs. Simultaneously, inner city
neighborhoods, as in the case of Jamaica Plain and Roxbury, changed their demographic
composition very rapidly with more and more low-income families moving in, predominantly
African Americans. Many of these families were encouraged to settle in neighborhoods like
Roxbury through redlining programs for first-time homebuyers such as the Boston Banks Urban
Renewal Group.
Even after their traditional customer base moved out, many businesses remained in the
inner city. But the rapid demographic changes brought instability and higher levels of crime
which coupled with the riots of the 1960s provided an incentive for the remaining businesses to
relocate to the suburbs. In the late 1960s and through the early 1980s, the growth of suburbs and
automobile use gave way to a new retail development concept-the shopping center and
shopping mall. These large retail complexes provide a central retail location serving various
suburban neighborhoods, have good access, and reduce the search costs for customers. Although
not all residents of the inner city had access to private transportation, many had no other choice
but to go to the suburbs to do their shopping.
As a result, neighborhood commercial districts lost the vibrancy they once had; vacant
storefronts and border-up properties became the norm, blight and distressed properties followed.
Over time, local residents established new businesses to serve the most basic needs of the
Chapter 1I Introduction and Context
community. But by then, the vitality of the commercial districts was gone and many of the new
entrepreneurs were as poor as the residents that they served. These new entrepreneurs lacked
business training and capital. External financing was hard to come by. With limited capital, low
purchasing power, and strong competition from shopping malls, discount stores, and national
retail chains, these businesses had higher prices, low quality products, and limited merchandise
selection.
Although federal, state, and local programs have tried to support these districts, the lack
of sufficient capital, the limited role of the private sector, the fragmentation of property
ownership, and the absence of linkages with broader revitalization efforts have hindered the
capacity of government programs to effectively help these districts and their businesses. The
National Trust for Historic Preservation asserts that the main problem of commercial districts is
one of perception:
The ultimate reason that investment is not taking place, however, is that the perceived
risk to the investor is not commensurate with the anticipated return. Often the necessary
remedy is some form of public intervention to reduce the [perception of] risk or increase
the return. At the same time it will probably be important to change the perception of the
amount of risk and the potential return. It is for this reason that an advocate must
understand and be able to communicate to owners and investors important variables in
the investment decision-making process such as available financing, special treatment for
historic structures and other available incentives. 1
For nearly four decades, community development corporations (CDCs) have been at the
front line of inner city revitalization, working with both the private and the public sector to
change the perception problems of the inner city. This thesis analyzes two CDCs-sponsored
inner city commercial real estate developments and the impact that these developments have on
revitalizing the commercial districts and spurring economic development in the neighborhoods.
Thesis Premise
Two premises are key to this thesis. The first one is that neighborhood commercial
districts are local engines of economic development and barometers of neighborhood vitality.
These districts provide necessary products and services which can make the neighborhood more
attractive to residents and to customers from other parts of the city. They reduce capital leakage
and attract external dollars from other neighborhoods. Commercial districts are engines of self-
reliance, since often the businesses in a district are small, resident-owned enterprises that employ
local residents. Neighborhood commercial districts are also barometers of neighborhood vitality
because they are usually the first physical contact with a community. Their vitality generally
reflects that of the surrounding community.
The second premise is that developing and maintaining commercial real estate properties
is fundamental to revitalize a neighborhood-and its commercial district-physically, socially,
and economically. Revitalization is measured, among other things, by the physical appearance
of a district and the ability to provide a pleasant environment that attracts customers. Good real
estate attracts and retains more businesses which are usually not willing or able to undertake the
real estate development themselves because of limited capital and increased investment risks.
Thus, by developing commercial real estate projects, CDCs eliminate blighted properties and
reduce vacant storefronts that make districts more attractive to businesses and customers.
What makes a vibrant Neighborhood Commercial District?
The greater Boston area has several vibrant neighborhood commercial districts, among
then Allston-Brighton, North End, Centre Street in Jamaica Plain, Davis Square, and Coolidge
Corner. Some of these districts serve primarily nearby by residents and employees such as Davis
and Central Square; other districts such as Harvard Square and the North End are destination
points drawing people from all of the metropolitan area. The physical design of these districts,
the mix of businesses, and the profile of the customers may be different. Yet all these districts
share some common characteristics; they are not only a source of goods and services for local
area residents, but also a place where social interaction occurs. Neighborhood commercial
districts are places where city dwellers leave the confine and privacy of their homes to engage in
social interactions at restaurants, local bars, or by way of acquiring goods and services.
Traditional neighborhood commercial districts provide stronger social interactions than suburban
shopping malls. Successful approaches to revitalize commercial districts try to exploit this
advantage, making districts more than just convenience places to shop. These approaches try to
create a sense of place that make each commercial district unique. The Main Street Program of
the National Trust for Historic Preservation has developed one of the most comprehensive
National Trust for Historic Preservation, Evaluating the Downtown Real Estate Opportunity, MainStreet Guideline. (1987).
approaches to commercial district revitalization that is now being implemented in many cities
throughout the country. This program has suggested several indicators to measure the vitality of
a commercial district. According to the Main Street Program, vibrant neighborhood commercial
districts share the following characteristics:
Growth Potential, Stability and Safety:
- Growing population and income
e Diverse household incomes
e Diverse ethnicity and race
e Low crime incidence, good policing, and the perception of being safe
Commercial Vibrancy and Business Mix:
e Good appearance, clean and attractive
e Well maintained landscaping and green areas, public parks
e Good balance of foot and car traffic, safe to foot traffic
e Strong and growing businesses
e Adequate business mix and competition (good balance of small, medium, and large
businesses)
e Adequate diversity of products and services
e District attracts outside buyers
* Strong presence of brand retailers (well recognized, typically national retailers)
e Significant local ownership of properties and businesses
e Employment of local residents
e Adequate presence of institutional services, such as government agencies, non-profits,
educational institutions
e Active business, non-profits, and civic associations that participate in the
development of the district
e Low vacancy rates (less than five percent)
Infrastructure:
e Good public infrastructure: paved streets, lighting, sidewalks, utilities
e Buildings in good physical shape
e Adequate parking facilities
e Good presence of financial institutions, retail banking
e Business access to financing, training, and technical assistance
e Good relations with public officials
e Sound environment
Although this thesis does not focus on the design characteristics that make vibrant
commercial districts, some of the indicators listed above, particularly those under the category of
"commercial vibrancy and business mix" are used in this thesis to measure the impact of CDC-
sponsored commercial real estate projects on commercial district revitalization.
CDCs' involvement in commercial real estate and district revitalization
During the last two decades community development corporations have expanded their
efforts from housing development and organizing to more comprehensive neighborhood
revitalization efforts including economic development. Although most CDCs have been active
in economic development in the last few years, others have been doing so since the early 1960s
when the CDC movement began. According to the National Congress for Community Economic
Development many of the original CDCs of the 1960s were focused on economic development,
but shifted focus to affordable housing due to abundance of public and private sector support.
Neighborhood economic development strategies took a back seat to affordable housing efforts.2
However, in recent years many CDCs expanded their economic development activities. Several
factors account for the recent expansion of CDCs into economic development. Four factors that
explain the expansion of CDCs into economic development are briefly described below.
Housing development alone will not revitalize communities
CDCs, policy makers, and charitable foundations recognize that housing development
alone will not revitalize communities. Particularly those fraught with high levels of poverty and
unemployment. CDCs realize that the vitality of a neighborhood depends on the degree of
economic activity within the neighborhood and the ability of this economic activity to generate
income for residents.
CDCs' successful track record has imposed new expectations
CDCs' successful track record in developing affordable housing has imposed new
expectations and demands on them.3 As CDCs' track record in housing increased, their
credibility as effective instruments of neighborhood change also rose. This rising expectations
increase the demand for CDCs to do more than housing. CDCs' technical capacity has reached
2 National Congress for Community Economic Development, Moving into Economic Development: CDCs and Job Creation.
(1998).
3 According to the National Congress for Community Economic Development, CDCs have developed over half a million housing
units nationwide. Web Site http://www.ncced.org, (February 200 1).
new levels of competencies and professionalism that is acknowledged not only by the private
sector but government institutions as well.
CDCs are in many cases the only development alternative in the inner city
In many cases CDCs are the only development alternative in inner city neighborhoods.
They have engaged in commercial development in part because private developers have been
removed from the inner city in the last few decades, especially since the restructuring in the early
1980s of the federal housing programs. Such restructuring reduced the amount of funds available
to subsidize affordable housing and indirectly forced developers to use a myriad of housing
programs and loans to complete the financing of a project. In some cases as many as ten funding
sources are necessary to complete an affordable housing development.4 For the profit
developers, mending too many different financing sources have made affordable housing
unattractive. Commercial development, which has less financial support from the public sector,
is even less attractive than housing to for-profit developers. Further, it is widely accepted that
inner city commercial real estate development is riskier than similar housing development.
Inner city is underserved by retail and service business
CDCs realize that many low- and moderate-income neighborhoods are severely
underserved by retail and service companies. Due to this fact residents of these neighborhoods
either have to travel large distance to acquire the products and services that they need or pay
higher prices for inferior products and poor quality service. Harvard Business School Professor
Michael Porter reinforced this notion with his paper "The Competitive Advantage of the Inner
City," in which he argues that inner cities are ripe for business activity, specifically for retail and
services businesses.
The challenges of CDC-sponsored commercial real estate developments
Since the 1980s and more intensively in the 1990s, CDCs have undertaken more
economic development initiatives such a commercial real estate development, business
incubators, and small business assistance. Most of these programs are aimed at revitalizing their
neighborhoods, creating jobs for local residents, providing more and better products and
services, promoting local entrepreneurship, and creating wealth.
4 Herbert, Scott, Kathleen Heintz, Chris Baron, Nancy Kay, and James E. Wallace. Nonprofit Housing: Costs and Funding: Final
Report. (1993). Prepared by Abt Associates Inc., for U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
The 1998 survey of the National Congress for Community Economic Development
reveals that CDCs have developed over 71 million square feet of commercial and industrial
space in the United States. In the City of Boston alone, CDCs have developed over 406,000
square feet of commercial space,5 among them, the Lithgow building in Codman Square,
Egleston Center in Egleston Square, JP Center in Jackson Square, Pierce Building in Uphams
Corner, and Palladio Hall and Sargent Prince in Dudley Square. CDCs argue that these
investments have stimulated neighborhood economies and spurred commercial revitalization by
attracting other businesses and encouraging additional investments.
Although the scale, costs, and target tenants were different, all these CDC-sponsored
projects had some common issues: significant public subsidy, difficulty in raising private equity,
and sometimes difficulty in attracting creditworthy private tenants, such as national retail and
service companies. All of these issues are strongly interconnected and are briefly discussed
below.
The Public Subsidy Issue
Most CDCs-sponsored commercial development projects require significant public
subsidy, in some cases as much as 50% of the total development cost. CDCs and public officials
justify this public investment based on the belief that commercial development increases the
number of jobs for local residents, revitalizes the neighborhood by eliminating blighted
properties, and creates multiplier effects by attracting further investments from private and
public sectors, such as small business owners and property owners. Fiscal improvement is also a
direct benefit of a commercial development, since property values and property tax rates are
higher for commercial properties.6
However, there is not much research confirming the economic impact of commercial
developments in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and explaining to what extent CDCs
are effective developers of commercial properties.7 Also, subsidy funds for commercial
development are scarce and they are low in the list of public priorities due to other pressing
5 Ford Foundation, Seizing Opportunities: The Role of CDCs in Urban Economic Development. (1999).
6 For example, in the City of Boston the property tax rate for commercial properties is nearly three times higher than for
residential. The City of Boston's commercial tax rate for fiscal year 2001 is $30.17 per $1,000 of assessed value, whereas the
residential tax rate is $10.56 per $1,000 of assessed value. Source: City of Boston Assessing Department.
7 Jean Cummings and Denise DiPasquale compared the effectiveness of non-profit and for-profit developers in a study of the first
ten years of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit using 2,554 projects. They found that affordable housing developed by
nonprofits was 20 percent more expensive and the size of the projects were typically smaller than those developed by for-profit
companies.
social needs affecting low-income communities. The primary federal funding programs for
commercial developments have been Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), Office
and Community Service Grants (OCS), and Economic Development Initiative Grants (EDI).
However, most of these programs have had limited funding to distribute throughout the nation,
and they are not specifically targeted for commercial development as the Low Income Housing
Tax Credit is for affordable housing. The end result is that CDCs commercial development
projects have had to compete for financial support with other community development
initiatives.
Even CDCs acknowledge that the "neighborhood commercial development and economic
development need a constituency in order to become a public policy priority and attract the
necessary level of public subsidy and support."8 A principal argument against subsidizing inner
city commercial real estate projects is that the subsidy requirements are too large to justify and
that the projects' impact is not commensurate with the subsidy requirements. But, how do these
projects help revitalizing the inner city? Is the impact of a project commensurate with the public
investment? Are there benchmarks to determine when the expected impact of a project justifies
the subsidy needed? These are the fundamental issues that this thesis addresses. By carefully
analyzing the impact of two CDC-sponsored projects, this thesis will develop a framework to
measure the cost and benefits of inner city commercial real estate projects.
The Private Equity Issue
CDCs' principal barrier to raise private equity for inner-city commercial developments is
the lack of incentives to entice private investors. The success of CDCs in raising private equity
for commercial development has been limited and sporadic as opposed to affordable housing
which has depended on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC).9 The LIHTC has been
credited as a successful model of promoting private equity investment in affordable housing.
Private investors not only provide the equity capital in the project, but are also responsible for
monitoring to ensure that the project meets all the eligibility requirements to maintain the tax
credits. Since investors have a vested interest in ensuring that the project do not fall into
financial or physical distress they impose the strict financial standards applicable to the private
8 Notes from a meeting convened by the Local Initiatives Support Corporation on March 22, 2000. CDCs, lenders, funders,
policy-makers and consultants attended the meeting to discuss inner city commercial development.
9 Even federal funding to support affordable housing development suffered major cutbacks and restructuring during
the early 1980s.
sector. However, a similar vehicle to the LIHTC has not been available for inner-city
commercial development until recently.
In the final legislative session of 2000, President Clinton enacted the Community
Renewal and New Markets Act of 2000 which provides up to $15 billion in tax credits over five
years to encourage private sector investment for loans, equity, and other forms of credit to
community businesses and projects. The New Markets Tax Credits, as it is known, allows CDCs
to sell equity participation to private investors-typically through a syndicator-and to provide
the same with tax credits. It is expected that the New Markets Tax Credit will alleviate both the
lack of public subsidy (since tax credits are an indirect subsidy) and the lack of private equity
investment in inner city commercial developments. However, as private investors take
advantage of the New Markets Tax Credit, they are expected to be more rigorous when
evaluating CDCs sponsored commercial real estate projects for two reasons: First, CDCs
expertise in commercial development is relatively limited, and their network of support for
commercial development is also limited.' 0 Second, historically, there has been a shortage of
affordable housing and so the demand for this product has not been an issue for investors of
LIHTC, whereas there is not clear evidence of a strong demand for commercial space in inner
city communities. Commercial development is driven by the potential tenants, and so substantial
pre-leasing of a project is a prerequisite for financing commitment.
The Tenants Issue
The third issue is the difficulty in attracting creditworthy private anchor tenants that will
facilitate the underwriting of the project and provide long-term financial stability." So far, only
a limited number of creditworthy businesses have anchored inner city commercial projects. Most
of these tenants fall into the convenience services category. These businesses are typically bank
branches, fast food operations, pharmacies, and supermarkets. They provide area residents with
basic goods and services, and may attract shoppers from other areas. They are also essential to
attract other businesses into the inner city. Nonetheless, a commercial district can only support a
limited number of these tenants. Neighborhood commercial districts need clothing stores,
10 By network of support I refer to those institutions and individuals that provide support to a specific activity such as the trade
associations, foundations, intermediaries, consultants, and staff from which CDCs can draw technical assistance, financial
resources, and contacts.
" Generally financial institutions and investors consider creditworthy tenants as those well-established companies with strong
financial performance, good growth prospects, and good access to capital. This implies existing businesses, typically publicly-
trade companies, instead of start-ups.
bookstores, and ice cream parlors as they need supermarkets, pharmacies, and fast food
restaurants. Diversity of retail and service businesses is generally a pre-requisite for a
commercial district to be vibrant and successful.' 2 Ideally, a commercial district should fulfill
the residents' retail and service needs so that residents do not have to travel long distances to
acquire products and services.
The dependency on limited number of national tenants is reflected in Nuestra's
experience during the development of Palladio Hall in Dudley Square. During the
predevelopment process, Nuestra CDC negotiated with US Trust Bank to lease the main retail
space of the building for a new a branch of the bank. Negotiations broke apart when Citizens
Bank announced the acquisition of US Trust. Citizens Bank has had for years a well-located
branch in Dudley Square.
Modem theory of retailing may explain why only certain types of tenants locate in
neighborhood commercial districts. Retail theory sustains that neighborhood commercial
districts are more likely to attract "convenience" retailers; those providing basic goods and
services such as supermarkets, pharmacies, hardware stores, and banks. Whereas "comparison"
retailers, such as clothing stores, tend to cluster together to reduce the search costs of customers.
Retail theory sustains that shopping malls attract a mix of comparison retailers that provide
customers with a superior and cost-effective shopping experience. Further, because ownership
of the mall is concentrated, property owners have a strong incentive to find the tenant mix that
optimizes sales for all tenants and thus for the mall. Whereas, property ownership in commercial
districts is highly fragmented which hinders coordination among property owners to attract the
best tenant mix for the district. Yet some commercial districts such as Harvard and Central
Square appear to attract good national tenants, probably due to a different demographic
composition relative to inner cities.
Boston planners have also argued that Dudley Square is an ideal location for (backup)
class B office space, due to Dudley's proximity to the tight downtown office market, the
availability of medium size office buildings, and the easy access to and from the expressway and
airport. To date, no office tenant from the downtown market has shown interest in Dudley,
except for a few government agencies. In fact, the four buildings in Dudley Square under
12 Nonetheless, some commercial districts are successful by pursuing a specialized retail niche strategy such as a garment district
or a specialty food restaurant village. Two examples of these specialized districts in Boston are Chinatown and the North End.
development are depending on public sector tenants. These public tenants are relocating to
Dudley as part of a public policy effort to revitalize the commercial district." CDCs, developers,
and public officials argue that without these public tenants Dudley Square's distressed buildings
would not get renovated since private sector tenants will be unlikely to take the first steps of
investing in distressed commercial districts. The argument is that once the district is physically
revitalized, private sector tenants will be more confident to invest in neighborhood commercial
districts.
Developing commercial properties with local businesses' 4 as anchor tenants creates
financing problems for proposed projects. Many of the local businesses are not perceived by
lenders as strong tenants since they lack the financial capacity to guarantee a long-term lease.
Typically, lenders require developers to lease or pre-lease 50% to 80% of the space as a
condition for a financing commitment. But inner city commercial developments can take over
three years from conception to completion and small businesses do not have the planning
capacity to commit to lease space that far in advance. In addition, community development
practitioners argue that the community approval process add costs to the project that inevitably
require higher rents which cannot be absorbed by local businesses. As an example, the
community approval process at Egleston Center took over seven years. In addition, the
community planning and approval for Egleston Center established design guidelines suitable for
an urban environment but which were so unique that no economy of scale could be achieved. In
the end, the community approval process increased project cost thereby necessitating a
concomitant increased in rents. Ultimately the trade-off was a smaller scale project which
required national tenants in order to support t higher rents. As stated by a former staff member
of a CDC, "if the goal is to attract local businesses, then the building design has to come up at $7
to $10 per square foot, not $16." Evidently, national tenants are needed to anchor these projects
in order to secure private financing. However, attracting national tenants generates a tension
between CDCs and local constituents. This tension emerges because local businesses feel
threatened by national competitors. Their response is to challenge the commercial revitalization
13 The four buildings are, the two Ferdinand buildings which will be leased by the State Department of Public Health, the
woolworth building which will be leased by the Boston Empowerment Center, and the Old Boys & Girl Club building which
was recently completed and leased by the Social Security Administration.
14 It is important to clarify that local businesses do not necessarily means businesses owned by neighborhood residents. Many
community development practitioners, including CDCs, refer to local businesses as those owned by independent entrepreneurs
efforts of CDCs. In such cases the issue for CDCs is how to balance the need to attract larger
national retailers to make the project financially feasible while at the same time promoting the
survival and growth of local businesses.
In summary, the CDC movement began with grass root organizing efforts aimed at
neighborhood revitalization. CDCs have clearly done that successfully. Implicitly,
neighborhood residents and community leaders expect CDCs to continue strengthening local
control by developing commercial properties that house and foster local entrepreneurship.
However attempts to make commercial real estate development in inner city neighborhood
feasible are seen as threatening to existing businesses. Since commercial development projects
are critical for district revitalization it is incumbent on CDCs to seek strong creditworthy tenants
to make the project financially viable. Without such tenants these projects will not leverage
private financing, which in turn will further increase the subsidy required to make the project
feasible from a public sector standpoint. Thus, for commercial development to happen, CDCs
not only have to address the underwriting requirements of lenders, but also the concerns of local
constituents. In addition to analyzing the impact on neighborhood revitalization of two
commercial projects, this thesis evaluates the two case studies through the lenses of the tension
between the CDCs and local businesses. The following case studies analyze and evaluate how
two CDCs managed this tension with local constituents and serve as preamble to put forth some
general approaches as to how CDCs can meet competing needs-the need to attract national
anchor tenants and the need to strengthen local businesses.
The overriding theme of this thesis is whether or not commercial real estate development
has net positive effect on revitalizing neighborhood commercial districts. The thesis proposes a
set of indicators to measure impact and tests those indicators in two case studies. Using two
case studies in Boston, this thesis explores the following research:
1. What is the impact of inner city commercial real estate projects?
2. Is the impact commensurate with the amount of subsidy needed for these projects?
3. Is there evidence that inner city commercial development enhances neighborhood
revitalization and economic development?
that are not part of a national retail chain. In many cases the owners do not live in the community where the businesses are
located. Even the Main Street Program blurs the distinction between independent and resident-owned businesses.
The thesis focuses on two case studies: (1) the JP Center in Hyde/Jackson Square which
was the product of a partnership between a private developer and the Jamaica Plain
Neighborhood Development Corporation (JPNDC or NDC); and, (2) Egleston Center in Egleston
Square, which developed by Urban Edge Housing Corporation (Urban Edge). In addition, the
thesis makes references to other CDC-sponsored projects, to contrast strategies to similar
challenges faced by these projects.
Thesis Outline
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 makes the case for commercial real estate
developments sponsored by CDCs. The chapter discusses the linkage between community
development, revitalization, and commercial real estate development. Chapter 2 also reviews
debates about the tension between real estate development and empowerment. Chapter 3
proposes five indicators to measure the impact of these projects. This chapter outlines the
research methodology that was used for the two case studies. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the case
studies of JP Center and Egleston Center respectively. The case studies provide the context of
the neighborhood and the CDC, the history of the development, and the cost-benefit analysis.
The case studies also describe how commercial development generated some tension between
the CDCs and their local constituents. Chapter 6 expands the analysis and provides concluding
remarks.
The Case for Inner City Commercial Real Estate
This chapter makes the case for CDC-sponsored inner city commercial real estate
development as a key component of a comprehensive neighborhood revitalization strategy. 15 In
particular, it discusses the types and causes of revitalization, the linkage between commercial
real estate and revitalization, and the resulting impacts on the CDC's mission and relationship
with its constituents. More specifically, in this chapter, the following questions are addressed:
e What are the goals of neighborhood revitalization and community development?
e How does commercial real estate achieve the goals of community development?
e What are the implications for CDCs when participating in commercial development,
especially with respect to potential tensions created between development and
empowerment
The linkage between neighborhood revitalization and community economic
development
What is neighborhood revitalization?
Neighborhood revitalization is a widely used term in the community development field
but frequently with different meanings. In his book "Neighborhood and Urban Development,"
Anthony Downs dedicates a chapter to the topic of neighborhood revitalization in which he
argues that revitalization efforts improve housing, population composition and the city property-
tax base.16 In addition, Downs describes two types of neighborhood revitalization that need
further definition and discussion: (1) gentrification, and (2) incumbent upgrading.
Gentrification occurs with little or no direct intervention from the public sector. Rather,
is caused by the spontaneous initiatives of middle- and upper-income individuals who are
attracted to a neighborhood because of amenities, such as proximity to waterfront areas, public
parks and public transit. These individuals buy distressed properties and renovate them through
a combination of their savings and conventional mortgage financing. As a result of their
individual investments, property values increase, which in turn attracts additional high income
individuals, real estate brokers, investors, and speculators. Meanwhile, the increase in property
taxes translate into better public services, such as trash collection, and better infrastructure in the
form of parks, street lighting, and sidewalks. All of these property, service and infrastructure
15 For the purpose of this thesis, the terms neighborhood and community are used interchangeably.
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improvements continue to translate into rising property values, which in turn translate into higher
rents. In the process, low-income individuals already living in the neighborhood can no longer
afford the increase in rents and have to move out. Other low- and moderate-income individuals
who felt fortunate enough to own their own homes soon realize that their property taxes are
increasing as property values throughout the neighborhood increase. Eventually low-income
homeowners, often living on a fixed income, can no longer afford the high property taxes and are
forced to sell.
As a result, new businesses move in to serve the retail and the service needs of the new
residents and commercial property prices rise along with the residential values. Local businesses
that had survived years of neighborhood decline soon realize they can no longer survive in a
rising rent environment and a declining base of their traditional customers. They must either
adapt to serve the needs of the new residents or move out. More often than not, these businesses
lack the capital and know-how to make the transition to serving the needs of the new residents.
Thus, residential gentrification is followed by commercial gentrification, which in turn keeps
encouraging more housing gentrification as the new businesses make the neighborhood more
attractive to higher income individuals. Through this process, the neighborhood is revitalized and
vibrancy is regained with little or no public funds. However, there is a cost: the displacement of
low- and moderate-income residents. The social fabric of the neighborhood and its social
networks are distorted and destroyed. Therefore, gentrification, as a revitalization strategy, does
not address the original social problems that affected the neighborhood. Although public funds
are not invested, this type of revitalization is not necessarily efficient. Poverty and other causes
of neighborhood decline do not disappear. Instead, they just get shifted elsewhere; sometimes to
another neighborhood in the same city; sometimes somewhere in the region. From a city-wide or
regional perspective this revitalization may very well be a zero-sum gain.
The second type of revitalization, incumbent upgrading, occurs when low- and moderate-
income residents actively participate in the renovation of the housing stock and in addressing the
social needs of the community. Since the residents lack the financial resources to undertake the
revitalization themselves, the public sector contributes most of the initial resources in the form of
subsidies that improve the physical and social conditions of the neighborhood. Public funds are
16 Downs, Anthony, Neighborhoods and Urban Development. Brookings Institution (1981). Chapter 6, pages 72-85
used to renovate public housing, provide low-interest loans to homeowners and commercial
property owners, provide technical assistance to small businesses, improve business fagades,
prevent crime and drug abuse, prevent school drop outs, improve public schools, and many other
forms of assistance. This type of revitalization is often spearheaded by community-based
organizations, which leverage additional private capital for this purpose.
Downs argues that, regardless of the type of revitalization, the increase in the average
cost of housing is an inherent outcome of the revitalization. He contends that displacement of
low-income people who cannot afford the increase in housing cost is also inevitable, at least in
non-subsidized housing. Downs painstakingly describes the causes, costs and beneficiaries of
revitalization. According to Downs, free market dynamics sort out where people can afford to
live. Nevertheless, he recognizes that the market may not provide enough housing for the poor
who could suffer the most from displacement. The following quote by Downs summarizes his
views:
When housing markets are very loose, the social advantages of revitalization outweigh
the costs of displacement enough so that society--and the more affluent new comers--can
adequately compensate the displaced. When housing markets are very tight, the social
costs of displacement may be so large that adequate compensation is not possible.17
In chapter 5 and 6 of this thesis will explain that both types of revitalization have been
taking place to different degrees in Jamaica Plain and in Egleston Square. This is because the
successful revitalization work of the Jamaica Plain NDC and Urban Edge, coupled with the
housing crisis in Boston, has resulted in spontaneous gentrification. Given this situation, the
question that practitioners of community development should ask is what should the goals of
neighborhood revitalizations be? Furthermore, practitioners must ask who should benefit from
revitalization? These policy issues and decisions are discussed in detail below.
The goals of neighborhood revitalization
The goals of community revitalization involve improving the two fundamental aspects of
a neighborhood, its physical environment and its social fabric, without displacing existing
residents. Both are equally important and interdependent. Improving the physical environment
involves the "hardware" of the community; that is, its housing stock, commercial activity,
infrastructure and transportation access, recreational places and other physical aspects that make
the neighborhood attractive to residents and visitors. On the other hand, improving the social
environment or "software"of the community entails improving the quality of life, meaning the
degree of emotional, intellectual and cultural satisfaction in people's everyday life. Such a
comprehensive view of revitalization recognizes that neighborhoods are not static. Residents
move in and out of neighborhoods because they want to, not because they are forced out by real
estate market dynamics. In fact, this view recognizes that increasing the income mix is desirable
and should be pursued, but not at the expense of displacing the poor.
How can revitalization occur, without displacing the poor?
The answer to this question lies in the need to simultaneously raise the income and
wealth of existing local residents so that they can afford to stay in the revitalizing neighborhood.
Thus, poverty alleviation, meaning raising income and increasing the wealth of existing
residents, should be one of the ultimate goals of revitalization. Housing development and
physical improvements alone cannot achieve these goals. This means that an economic
development strategy is a critical component of any revitalization effort. Without it, low-income
residents can be victims of a revitalization policy with good intentions, but bad results.
Therefore, a neighborhood revitalization strategy necessitates the improvement of community
"hardware" in combination with the economic well-being of existing low-income residents.
The linkage with economic development
Providing quality affordable housing is still one of the most pressing needs in many
inner-city neighborhoods, especially those of Boston, which has recently experienced an
unprecedented shortage of housing. Increasing housing cost erodes the disposable income and
savings of many families as more of their income is used to pay for housing. However, housing
development is not sufficient by itself to revitalize communities. Revitalization also depends on
the creation of jobs for community residents and the growth and new formation of businesses.
Economic development is necessary to promote stronger and wealthier neighborhoods, thus
facilitating revitalization of both the physical place and its human capital. Working in a
neighborhood context entails addressing the different needs of its residents. The 1994 master
plan for Dudley Square in Roxbury recognizes the linkage of revitalization, business growth and
economic development: "The interdependence between residents and businesses is a critical
component to successful economic development and the success of the community's viability as
"7 Ibid. Chapter 6, page 85.
a whole."' 8 John Blair articulates this linkage more dramatically, explaining how housing and
business decline feed each other in a degenerative way:
There is a vicious cycle between business development, housing, and neighborhood
change. As the population declines, businesses lose customers and are more likely to fail.
As neighborhood businesses close, the area will likely become less attractive for
residents. Furthermore, the closure of neighborhood businesses results in local job loss.19
CDCs recognize the link between revitalization and economic development
The importance of economic development today is reflected in virtually every CDC
mission statement that serves as a reference to this thesis. For example, the mission statement of
Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation states that the organization is aimed at
"revitalizing the Jamaica Plain neighborhood through a comprehensive strategy" that includes
economic development. Urban Edge's more broadly states that its mission is to "help develop
and sustain stable, health and diverse communities." However, it adds that "the promotion of
equal employment opportunity, access to housing, and employment for local and minority
residents" is integral to Urban Edge's projects and activities. Likewise, Nuestra CDC's mission
states the organization is devoted "to building the wealth and enhancing the physical, economic,
and social well-being or Roxbury." As shown by these excerpts, these organizations have been
engaged in economic development for over six years and have made this activity a top
organizational priority in their revitalization strategies.
How does commercial real estate meet the goals of neighborhood
revitalization and community economic development?
Commercial real estate cuts across at least two critical activities of neighborhood
revitalization: (1) physical improvements, and (2) economic development. According to Blair,
most community economic development strategies, even if not explicitly articulated, have three
objectives: job and income creation, physical improvement and fiscal improvement. 20 Job and
income creation is typically the first and most important priority of an economic development
strategy. This is because income and wealth cannot be generated unless people have jobs and/or
some income producing investment, such as a business.
18 City of Boston, Dudley Square District Development Plan. (1994).
19 Blair, John P., Local Economic Development, Analysis and Practice. Sage Publications, (1995).
20 Ibid. Page 168.
Benefits of commercial real estate development
Commercial developments improve the appearance of the neighborhood, attract new
businesses, expand existing ones and reduce the perceived capital investment risk. These
developments help stabilize the neighborhood, inducing further investment from property
owners, investors and lenders. Commercial developments, especially those sponsored by CDCs,
help the neighborhood economy in many ways:
e Improving the business climate by making the neighborhood more attractive,
e Ensuring an adequate supply of space for existing and new businesses,
e Increasing the variety and mix of businesses, products, and services,
e Fostering healthy competition that raises the quality and reduces the prices of goods
and services,
e Helping attract employment-generating and anchor businesses by building space to
suit their needs,
* Reducing vacant properties that are often focal points of crime, drug and alcohol
abuse,
e Allowing the formation of business clusters that enjoy some competitive advantages
in the community, and
- Signaling the investment potential in the community to outside investors, lenders, and
government agencies.
Jeremy Nowak proposes commercial development from a broader view. In the following
statement, he suggests commercial development should be part of a community development
strategy to link local businesses with the regional economy:
Where locational, consumer, and entrepreneurial opportunities exists, commercial and
industrial development should be pursued for three reasons: (1) as part of the local
community development emphasis on rebuilding the physical assets and maximizing
local tax ratables; (2) as part of an effort to create linkages or associations between the
neighborhood and outside companies, franchises, suppliers, and distributors that may be
linked to new businesses; and (3) create a pipeline of local jobs that can be used to
develop job skills and relationships for later employment. Local commercial and
industrial establishments should be viewed as part of a chain leading to external
employment and business opportunities.2'
21 Nowack, Jeremy, Neighborhood Initiative and the Regional Economy. Economic Development Quarterly, (Vol.11, No.1,
February 1997). Page 7.
Businesses need adequate space for them to operate and grow
Commercial real estate is a significant long-term capital investment that most businesses
do not have. Even those businesses that could invest in real estate are often better off using their
capital for the acquisition of merchandise and equipment, or the increase of their marketing
efforts. In many cases, they do not have the expertise and the economies of scale to develop
commercial properties. Furthermore, it is not necessarily efficient for businesses to develop real
estate, as they will likely be more successful by concentrating their efforts on the management of
their core business and the risk they know best. This view suggests that they should pass the real
estate risk over to those who can manage such risk more effectively.
Models of community development and relationship to commercial
development
In the following sections I describe long-standing debates about approaches to
community development and their relation to commercial real estate.
Project vs. Programmatic Approach
The first debate about approaches to community development is known as the "project
vs. programmatic approach." A project approach is one in which community development
groups undertake a project-by-project effort to revitalization, identifying a key problem or need
and developing strategies to tackle that specific problem. Commercial real estate development is
a project approach to economic development and revitalization. The CDC targets a property,
sometimes the most physically distressed in the area, and renovates it. With few exceptions, the
CDC does not engage in extensive planning efforts for the neighborhood at large, such as
evaluating land use patterns, industry clusters, competitive advantages, and other aspects that are
found in a comprehensive economic development and revitalization plan. Instead, the CDC,
acting alone, focuses on a particular property, its best commercial uses, its costs and the expected
community benefits. The expectation is that a project will act as a catalyst for other investments
to follow but no specific links are analyzed, implemented or specifically planned at that time.
In contrast, a programmatic approach is more comprehensive and systematic that looks
at the revitalization of the neighborhood as a whole unit. An example of this approach is Urban
Edge's Egleston/Jackson Strategy, which was the result of a three-year planning process that
included housing rehabilitation, public infrastructure and a variety of commercial development
projects along a mile-long corridor connecting Jamaica Plain and Roxbury. The plan included an
ambitious agenda that the CDC could not implement alone. It required the active participation of
various entities with specializations that could implement different aspects of the plan.
Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. The most obvious disadvantage of a
project approach is that it lacks a comprehensiveness effort to many of the issues affecting a
community. Thus, its ability to revitalize the neighborhood may be limited and opportunities
may be lost. However, the advantage of a project approach is that it allows its sponsors to
specialize in one issue of the neighborhood, building expertise and capacity to effectively
address that issue. Unlike the project approach, the programmatic approach more
comprehensively addresses issues such as physical blight, safety and overall economic and
physical development. An example in Boston is the Main Street Program, which is being
implemented in 19 neighborhood commercial districts. However, a comprehensive approach
always necessitates the cooperation of organizations that can effectively tackle on issue since it is
unlikely that one organization can effectively do all the work on its own.
Placed-based vs. People-based
Another model of community development is known as "place-based vs. people-based
approach. " Place-based strategies are those that seek to improve the physical environment by
focusing on improving the housing stock, commercial buildings and storefronts, transportation
access and infrastructure. Imbedded in these strategies is the belief that improving the physical
environment of the neighborhood improves the quality of life of its residents.
People-based strategies focus on the individuals in the neighborhood by improving their
skills so they can have better access to economic opportunities in the form of jobs or
entrepreneurship. Under such a strategy, the assistance or work is directly provided to the
individual. One of the beliefs of advocates of this strategy is that the concentration of poverty
must be reduced to revitalize inner cities. This is partially accomplished by providing affordable
housing opportunities throughout a metropolitan region in mixed-income neighborhoods
There is a general sense that CDCs have been practicing place-based strategies because
of their focus on housing. However, it can be argued that CDCs have mingled both approaches
to community development, often creating some friction in the act (which is discussed later in
this chapter). For example, multifamily housing development is a place-based strategy, yet CDCs
have been doing more than multifamily housing for years. Many CDCs have been
simultaneously involved in such diverse programs as employment and training programs, crime
prevention, school dropout initiatives and leadership development efforts. The degree of CDC
involvement in other neighborhood revitalization initiatives is a function of the neighborhood
context and the capacity of the organization. For example, the Fenway CDC has been
significantly more in employment and training programs than Dorchester Bay or Codman Square
NDC. This is in part because there are less housing development opportunities in Fenway
relative to the opportunities in Dorchester.
The relevance of the "place vs. people" debate centers on the fact that the goals and
outcomes of each strategy are substantially different. In a place-based approach, success is
measured, for example, by the number of housing units developed, the amount of commercial
square feet renovated or built, and/or the number of new businesses expanded or attracted.
Although these outcomes may improve the quality of life, they do not necessarily translate into
increased economic wealth for the local residents. By contrast, the success of people-based
strategies is measured by the level of employment, income, wealth, and quality of life.
Each strategy has been fairly criticized. One of the arguments against place-based
strategies is that, under such an approach, practitioners too often focus on inward inner city
development and fail to link the inner city to the mainstream regional economy. Another
criticism is that improvement of the physical environment may not improve the economic wealth
of residents or alleviate poverty, especially if the residents do not have an economic interest in
the development and are only treated as consumers. Urban economist William Wheaton argues
that place-based strategies are ill conceived and that economic development practitioners should
spend less time trying to create jobs in the inner city because the main problem of inner cities is
that resident skill level and mobility are low. Low skills limit the ability to access jobs, whereas
low mobility limits the availability to get any job, regardless of where jobs are located. Wheaton
argues that mobility is low because of limited access to public and private transportation2 2 and
because those who own homes in the inner city do not have enough equity to allow them to move
elsewhere. More specifically, Wheaton states that "fundamentally, they are stuck in
22 A 1998 report from the Department of Housing and Urban Development documents the spatial mismatch between low-income
unskilled residents and location of entry-level jobs. The reports states that in Boston 98% of welfare recipients live within one-
quarter of a mile of a bus route or mass transit stop, but only 32% of potential entry-level jobs in the Boston metropolitan area are
within this distance. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, The State of America's Cities (1998), page 13.
neighborhoods with concentrated poverty." 23 He therefore believes that the way to revitalize
inner cities is to upgrade the skills of residents and increase their mobility, adding "once that is
done, the inner city will take care of improving its own physical environment".
The People-based strategy is not free of criticism, especially when it is applied alone.
One of the most important criticisms is that it is too expensive and unrealistic to devise a
program that can both upgrade resident skills and simultaneously match individual residents with
employment opportunities elsewhere. Increasing individual mobility may help a few residents,
but may not change the mobility of the most disfranchised residents, such as those living in
public housing. Lack of affordable housing opportunities in wealthier neighborhoods, combined
with persistent housing market discrimination, prevents the de-concentration of poverty. The
result of a strategy to increase residents' mobility and disperse poverty can exacerbate the
conditions of those left behind. De-concentration alone may not be desirable. As explained by a
report of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, "minority families [which
comprise most of urban low-income neighborhoods] are far more likely than whites to live in
high-poverty neighborhoods even if they are not poor themselves."2 4 Consequently, those who
are not poor could contribute to the revitalization of their neighborhoods more by staying in their
neighborhoods than by moving out. However, recent reports of the 2000 U.S. Census show that
suburbs have become more racially and ethnically diverse as more minorities moved to suburbs
seeking better jobs, schools and quality of life. Based on Census data, US Today reported that
"in 2000, one out of four suburban residents was a minority, up from about one in five 10 years
earlier."25 Middle-income and professional minorities are more likely to move to the suburbs
than very low-income minorities. Thus, a de-concentration policy could yield the opposite
results, as the poorest of the poor may be left behind.
Combining people-based and place-based strategies is not only adequate but also necessary
Upgrading residents skill (through a people-based approach) while simultaneously
attracting jobs into the inner city (place-based strategy) seems to be a more realistic approach
than either strategy independently. For instance, economic development practitioners cannot
assume that a commercial development will necessarily translate into jobs for local residents.
They have to ensure that local residents have access to the jobs created by the development. One
23 Interview with Prof. William Wheaton, 11/6/2000.
24 Ibid, page 10.
of case study serves as a primary example. The Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development
Corporation (JPNDC) sponsored a 66,000 square feet development that houses a new regional
supermarket chain and expanded a community health center. In partnership with a private
developer, JPNDC undertook the project to eliminate a blighted and contaminated site, provide
needed goods and services in the community, and create jobs for local residents. To ensure that
residents had access to those newly created jobs, JPNDC sponsored various job readiness
workshops and created a referral network with the supermarket's administrators. As a result,
65% of the initial 200 supermarket employees were local residents of the Jamaica Plain, Mission
Hilland Roxbury neighborhoods. By doing so, JPNDC improved the physical environment of the
neighborhood, as well as the economic well-being of the local residents.
CDCs and the regional perspective
One of the problems with the regional approach debate in regards to CDCs is that it
assumes that CDCs operate completely isolated from the regional economy. That view is far
from reality; at least it does not represent the CDC field of the 1990s and new millennium.
CDCs are now more connected to the mainstream economy than ever before, yet more progress
could be made to continue strengthening these linkages. For example, in Boston, a city with a
rich culture of community participation and involvement, CDCs are active in virtually all public-
private initiatives. Their involvement is either directly through a CDC staff participation or
through the Massachusetts Association of CDCs (MACDC). In addition, CDCs are actively
involved with the Massachusetts Banking Council, the Boston Private Industry Council, Fleet
Bank Community Advisory Board the Empowerment Zone Board, and the Boston Federal
Reserve Bank's Advisory Board. CDC staff and directors frequently serve on the board of
directors of major institutions. For instance, Marvin Gilmore, Executive Director of the Boston
CDC, is a board member of Boston's Medical Center, the largest hospital in the Roxbury
neighborhood. This position and the corresponding business and community relationships allow
him to understand the strategic direction and trends of a key industry in the city.
The efforts to link the neighborhood with the region's economy is reflected in the
following comment from a staff member of a CDC: "our director now spends more time in
Downtown meetings seeking resources, advocating, and representing the neighborhood that in
25 USToday.Com, Racial diversity grows in suburbs, Associate Press, 6/25/01.
local organizations."26 MACDC also plays an active role in advocacy efforts and creating
alliances with nonprofits that tackle neighborhood, metropolitan and statewide issues. The point
is that a CDC involvement in all these efforts feeds the community development system with
information about the regional economy, as well as the policies and trends that may impact the
local neighborhood. CDCs staff and board use this information in their decision making process.
In addition, the relationships that CDCs establish allow CDCs to connect local businesses to
regional opportunities, and to attract additional resources to their communities. Further, a rich
institutional environment supports CDC revitalization and economic development efforts. The
concentration of academic institutions in Boston provides CDCs with a great deal of research,
analysis and best practice models. Furthermore, consultants and organizations such as the
Initiative for a Competitive Inner City help CDCs check their efforts against market realities.
Evidence of CDC comprehensiveness
The fact that CDCs typically work at the neighborhood level does not mean they ignore
the regional context. For their efforts to succeed, CDCs realize that they must be broad in their
analysis, but focused in their execution. CDCs comprehensiveness occurs in many ways. One
example is illustrated by the disposition process that involved two city-owned parcels in
Egleston Square. One parcel was owned by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA); the
other was owned by the City's Department of Neighborhood Development (DND). Each agency
was trying to attract a pharmacy chain into the neighborhood without coordinating the
negotiation and disposition of the parcels with the other agency. This was because each city
agency was unaware of the efforts of the other. Fortunately, Mossik Hacobian, Executive
Director of Urban Edge, called the directors of each agency to encourage them to coordinate
efforts. The director of the BRA at the time acknowledged to Mossik that the staff of each
agency was working on so many neighborhoods and projects that they could not plan projects in
a comprehensive manner. She further acknowledged that the focus of each CDC on its
neighborhood and the related activities of City Hall allow each CDC to view what is happening
in a more comprehensive manner.27
Nonetheless, there is validity in the argument that CDC efforts do not have the scale and
political muscle to change the structural conditions that cause inner city poverty. Such
26 Interview with Robert McArthur.
27 Interview with Mossik Hacobian.
conditions include suburban flight and discriminatory housing practices that concentrate poverty
in the inner cities. However, given the negative experiences of large-scale inner-city urban
renewal programs of the 1950's and 1960's, most inner city communities are not willing and nor
are they ready to undertake large structural changes that can significantly improve the stability of
their neighborhoods or the political structure of their region. Given these circumstances, an
incremental neighborhood approach is not only the most politically feasible alternative, but it is
also the most desirable one, provided the speed of neighborhood decline is not higher than the
incremental efforts to reverse that decline. Otherwise, any incremental efforts will be doomed to
failure. Fortunately, over the past decade, inner-cities in the United States have experienced
inner city revitalization that has outpaced decline.
Implications for CDCs of developing commercial real estate projects
How do commercial projects change the mindset of a CDC and what is the
impact/contribution to a CDCs mission?
As a revitalization and economic development strategy, commercial real estate requires a
mindset that is different from affordable housing development in two respects: (1) opportunity
versus subsidy, and (2) calculated risk versus assurance of safety. In the case of affordable
housing development, the fundamental issue is affordability, whereby subsidies are needed to
bridge the gap between the cost of developing and operating the project and the rents that low-
income people can afford. The existence of affordable housing programs presumes there is on-
going gap between housing cost and household income, thus necessitating on-going subsidy to
remedy the gap. In comparison, the primary issues in commercial real estate and economic
development are to provide entrepreneurs with access to capital, technical assistance and
networks, and to foster a healthy business climate as measured by profits. Local entrepreneurs
need assistance to develop their skills, access financing and connect to mainstream networks of
larger businesses and institutions. Subsidizing a disadvantaged entrepreneur during the early
stages or during key hurdles is necessary to level the field and to build entrepreneurial capacity
in the inner city. However, ongoing subsidies to businesses are counterproductive. Businesses
create value by offering products and services that people want, by satisfying customers with
quality and competitively priced products, and by generating profits. On-going subsidies can
keep alive inefficient businesses that add little value to the community. Business by its nature is
competitive. Competition makes stronger businesses and skillful entrepreneurs. Such
competition ultimately benefits consumers as businesses are encouraged to increase quality and
reduce prices of goods and services. That said, competition also means that some entrepreneurs
will succeed while others will not. The challenge for a CDC is to determine how to inculcate
this mindset in its staff and the community, both of whom may be used to a more supportive and
less laissez-faire CDC role in community development. For example, under the newly emerging
CDC model, the role of the CDC in commercial real estate is to provide access to space, capital,
and other resources to businesses, but not to guarantee success as it implicitly guarantees
affordable housing units to low-income renters. This new CDC role assumes and supports the
view that business necessitates an opportunistic and entrepreneurial mindset, not one of
entitlement.
The other primary difference between housing and commercial development is the
mindset of safety versus calculated risk. In affordable housing, ensuring the financial health of a
project is critical. Housing subsidies in the form of Section 8 vouchers or low-income housing
tax credits provide the necessary bridge to fill the gap between cost and rents. In commercial
development, the risk of a business' tenant failing is much higher and the losses to the project
can be significantly steeper. A private developer may mitigate risk by leasing space to
creditworthy, financially stable tenants. However, if the true goal of neighborhood-based
commercial real estate development is to revitalize a neighborhood by increasing the physical
environment and economic wealth of its own residents, then taking risks with small, locally-
based neighborhood businesses is necessary. This policy does not preclude a combination of
tenants that may include creditworthy companies from outside the neighborhood. However, it
does require practitioners to be willing to take calculated risks to achieve the larger goal of
promoting local businesses.
The tension between development and empowerment
Introduction to the debates
The debate over the tension between development and community empowerment is over
25 years old. In 1975, Stan Holt wrote about this tension, arguing that housing development and
28
community organizing were not compatible. The premise of this debate is that empowering
people is the first task of community development, and that organizing leads to empowerment
28 Holt, Stan. What every community organization should know about community development. Just Economics (1975), page 7.
and self-determination. The fundamental nature of the conflict between organizing and
development is that organizing relies on confrontation between those who have resources (in
terms of economic and political power) and those who do not. In contrast, development relies on
partnerships with those whose resources and political influence are needed. In that sense, Holt
argues that development undermines organizing and thus does not achieve the community
development priority of empowerment.
One of the most recent debates over the tension between the CDCs and their community
development agenda was raised by Randy Stoecker in his paper The CDC Model of Urban
Redevelopment. A Critique and Alternative.29 In the paper, Stoecker focuses on two main issues.
First, he claims that CDCs cannot truly do organizing because they are controlled by outside
resources. According to Stoecker, there is an inherent tension between the interest of the
community and the interest of capital, and he explains that: "[a] community's tendency is to
preserve neighborhood space as a use value for the service of its members." By contrast, he
claims that capital's tendency is to convert space into exchange values that produce profits.
Stoecker's solution is to strengthen grassroots organizing efforts to pressure sources of private
capital and government agencies. The second issue he raises is that CDCs are too small to be
effective and that spreading the already limited funding among many CDCs furthers this
ineffectiveness. His solution is to reduce the number of CDCs, and thus increase their size and
their service areas so as to achieve greater economies of scale and overall impact.
Prior to Stoecker, Ricanne Hadrian wrote a master's thesis and dedicated her career to
demonstrate that organizing and development, while often in conflict, can be combined in a
synergistic fashion to accomplish community development goals. Hadrian's thesis begins with an
historical perspective of community development, asserting that community development grew
in response to two impetuses with differing mandates:
First, the failure of the market to provide affordable housing for low income people and
combat deterioration and displacement, and second the growing belief.. .that residents
have an inherent right to be involved in the community development of their
neighborhoods. The first impetus--the need to fill the gap left by the market--is fairly
straightforward. Product-oriented in mandate, it is relatively easy to gage and measure.
The second impetus--the movement to a more "bottom-up" instead of a "top-down"
29 Stoecker, Randy. The CDC Model of Urban Redevelopment: A Critique and Alternative. Journal of Urban Affairs (Vol. 19,
No. 1, 1997), pages 1-22
model of community development-is more complex. It is process-oriented in mandate,
and much more difficult to measure and "get a handle on." 30 [emphasis added]
Hadrian defines empowerment as "processes through which people can take control of
their lives and neighborhoods." In addition, she defines empowerment along three different, yet
interconnected, levels: political, economic, and personal/psychological. The first level is fairly
clear. Political cmpowerm.ent occurs when residents influence and have control over the
decision-making process that affects their neighborhoods and lives. On the other hand,
economic empowerment occurs when "people have access to or control over the institutions that
provide resources, products, and services." Lastly, Hadrian defines personal/psychological
empowerment in terms of quality of life, as measured by emotional satisfaction, self-stem and
the like.
The challenge of empowering residents and addressing the neighborhood gaps in
housing, commercial properties, and businesses, require capital, expertise, and other resources
from outside the neighborhood. By definition, poor neighborhoods have limited internal
resources. Thus, attracting capital and other resources inhibits control of local residents over the
institutions that provide resources, products, and services.
Commercial real estate magnifies the tension between development and empowerment
In affordable housing, the tension between development and empowerment is somewhat
ameliorated because the main beneficiaries of the "product-oriented mandate" are low-income
people. Thus, CDCs articulate that developing affordable housing empowers low-income people
by providing them with decent housing that boosts their self-stem, and by increasing their
disposable income. However commercial real estate exacerbates the development-empowerment
tension, not only because capital providers influence the nature of the project, but also because
the businesses on the property are not always owned by local residents. Even if the tenants of
commercial projects are small and minority-owned businesses, the owners may not reside in the
community. To address this on-going tension and debate, the need to educate constituents about
the benefits of commercial real estate was echoed by CDC staff during a meeting with LISC and
other funders:
30 Hadrian, Ricanne A. Combining Organizing and Housing Development: Conflictive Yet Synergistic. MIT Master's Thesis.
(1988), page 14.
Economic development lacks a constituency. The point has not been made to the pubic
and to elected officials that commercial and industrial real estate development in inner
city neighborhoods is an important activity. Without that level of advocacy, it will
continue to be difficult to raise public awareness and support for non-residential real
estate development projects.
Further, Leslie Belay of the Episcopal City Mission, a funder of CDC programs, added that
articulating the social benefits and objectives of commercial real estate is important to attract
non-traditional investors. She said, 'faith-based organizations, in particular, are clearly
concerned about risks, but they fare] equally concerned about social missions and objectives. "32
The degree of community participation is a function of the neighborhood context
Most community development supporters and practitioners agree that neighborhood
revitalization is more effective when residents are empowered and when residents take control of
development. However, these supporters and practitioners also agree that there is a gap between
ideology and practice. Further, some community development supporters prefer not to prescribe
a particular participatory approach to empowerment and revitalization. They argue that, in some
cases, residents are participants in a process that the residents do not necessarily control, and yet
revitalization occurs without displacement. These supporters argue that the degree of
community participation is a function of the neighborhood context.
The question arises as to why practitioners take such different approaches. Some
practitioners still believe that their technical competency enables them to make better decisions.
They engage residents to get community inputs and validate a particular planning strategy and
process. Other practitioners are interested in the outcomes, rather than the process. Their
motivation is to get things done as soon as possible. These practitioners typically have skills that
bring measurable and tangible results to their communities. However, they may not be as
committed to "bottom-up" development. Such practitioners may see participatory processes as
highly political, slow and constraining. They argue that community institutions have to be
entrepreneurial, responding quickly to changes in the neighborhood and to funding opportunities.
To these practitioners, a bottom-up planning process is too slow , often because citizen
participants need time to learn the issues and the myriad of alternatives to tackle relevant issues.
In addition, they often see these planning processes as resulting in lost funding opportunities or
31 Meeting notes from Commercial Real Estate Charette coordinated by LISC, March 22, 2000.
creating expectations about resources that are not available. As an argument against continued
planning processes, these practitioners argue that their constant involvement with the community
ensures that their strategies and projects reflect what the residents need and want, as well as what
it is politically feasible.
LISC staff members recognize that the practice of community development is not
consistent and that practitioners and community institutions make diMerent choices on how to
operate. In this sense, LISC has decided to use its resources to support multiple approaches to
community development. Matt Thal, who practiced bottom-up planning when he was director of
a local CDC, has had to change his stance so that he can work with a rainbow of community
development ideologies and practices. To summarize this view, he states, "It has been necessary
for me to be more broad in my views about what constitutes effective planning strategies. My
job has required me to seek effectiveness rather than ideology and process. We choose to work
within the process that each organization wants to support."33
Changing the conditions of a neighborhood will likely draw some opposition
The most genuine community organizing and participatory processes cannot always
guarantee full support and consensus on an issue. People naturally have different conceptions on
how to deal with a problem. Part of the reason for these differing conceptions reflects that
sometimes what is best for the community at-large is not in the best interest of some residents.
Nuestra CDC experienced this problem when trying to renovate a city-owned two-family house
that had been vacant for years. The property abutted the back yard of a long-time resident and
local business owner. An outspoken, energetic, and well-respected individual, this resident-
owner had an excellent relationship with Nuestra CDC and its executive director. He
continuously supported Nuestra's activities, and vigorously criticized those who opposed the
CDC's efforts. However, when Nuestra proposed the renovation of the house abutting his home,
this once supportive resident-owner switched sides and vehemently opposed the organization's
proposal. Instead, he promoted the idea of a community garden on the site. Nuestra surveyed
other abutters and found strong support in favor of renovating the property. Nevertheless, the
resident-owner tried to block Nuestra's efforts by submitting a counter proposal to the City.
Then, when Nuestra was designated as developer for the site, he threatened to take the CDC and
" Ibid.
3 Interview with Mat Thall in the Fall of 1999 about community development practices.
the City to court. Needless to say, Nuestra tried hard to persuade the once supportive resident-
owner using the personal rapport the staff had with him. However, the efforts were fruitless. As
one Nuestra staff member anonymously confessed, "the man would not listen, he had another
idea for the property and would not compromise." Sadly, given the housing shortage in Boston,
the house was never renovated.
This "Not in My Backyard" or "NIMBY" example is not umque. CDCs are used to this
sort of opposition. In fact, both projects that serve as case studies to this thesis draw opposition
at some point during the development process. CDCs have learned that even the most open
participatory and community-driven processes do not prevent the opposition that is likely to
occur. They know that leadership inherently draws criticism and that for neighborhoods to
improve, they are forced to participate in the politics of "muddling through."
CDCs staff and board composition changes as the need for specialized skills increase
The complexity of CDC activities (such as affordable housing, commercial real estate,
and economic development) requires a skill set that is not abundant in low-income communities.
Hence, CDCs often recruit their staff from their sources of capital, such as lending institutions,
foundations, intermediaries and government. In many CDCs, the visionary and passionate
activists of the 1960's have been replaced by skillful technocrats. These new community
development practitioners have the best interest of the community at heart, but they sometimes
lack the necessary inner passion of the original community development movement. These
technocrats provide CDCs with technical and political skills, and access to resources. However,
unlike many of their predecessors, they also often bring a new bottom-line and opportunistic
culture that detaches the CDCs from their broader mission.
There are direct implications for CDC governance as board members are recruited to
match and direct the staff. As more technically-competent staff is recruited, the gap in technical
knowledge and values between board and staff increases. This creates a communication gap that
leads to frustration on both sides. Naturally, the staff begins to recruit board members with more
technical knowledge and with whom communication is easier. However, as with the staff, such
skillful board members are not abundant in the community. The result is a professional board
that is not necessarily in touch with the community that its serves.
3 Two consecutive fires that began at night, while the house was being renovated, significantly damaged the structure and made
the renovation not worth pursuing.
The regional approach may indirectly disempower local communities
CDCs have been collaborating with other organizations on city, regional, and statewide
community development issues. These collaborations involve advocating for state legislation,
negotiating with banks, securing funds from insurance companies, and other activities. Although
these collaborations are necessary, CDCs are often required abandon any focus on the specific
needs of their neighborhoods in order to work on common broad regional efforts that they hope
will ultimately help their community. The art of accomplishing regional-wide change is based on
compromise. Building regional coalitions requires building consensus. Thus neighborhoods may
need to sacrifice their particular agenda in other to reach agreement on issues that benefit all the
communities involved.
Is CDC consolidation realistic? and is that the answer?
Stoecker argues that CDCs are too small to be effective and that they compete for limited
funding. As discussed earlier, his solution is to reduce the number of CDCs and thus increase the
size of CDCs and their service areas. However this proposal is inadequate to resolve
inefficiencies and overlapping problems. The challenges in consolidating the number of CDCs
include: (1) who gets to make such decisions, (2) what are the criteria, and (3) how is
consolidation implemented. Due to the natural tendency toward self-preservation, each CDC is
unlikely to make such decisions and will probably offer resistance. Thus, these decisions require
a large-scale external intervention that will be politically charged and likely runs counter to the
bottom-up approach that serves as a basic principle for the community development movement.
CDCs are organizations created by neighborhood residents to help them in the revitalization of
their communities. In principle, it is up to neighborhood residents to decide whether or not their
communities need fewer CDCs.
Stoecker also proposes citywide CDCs. However, such a proposal may not be feasible
in cities with neighborhoods of different ethnic and social backgrounds. If CDCs were to serve
many distinctive neighborhoods, they will cease to be community-based organizations and will
act more as private housing developers. Citywide CDCs will lack a defined constituency and will
loose their moral mandate. They will distance themselves from the most problematic
neighborhoods and seek the most practical real estate projects without a revitalization agenda in
mind. In the end, such CDCs will likely lose community support because residents will perceive
them as outsiders with no long-term commitment to community revitalization. It can be argued
that larger CDCs may be more technically competent and efficient. However, their size reduces
one of their main "competitive" advantages: a small organizational structure allows them to
respond quickly to local issues. In contrast, larger CDCs often become more distanced from
their various community bases. This is because larger CDCs have many more interest groups to
represent. As a result, they become much more political and accommodating in their dealings,
and may abandon the truly dis-empowered who are less likely to demand attention through
political means. As part of this change, larger CDCs also continue to accumulate more resources,
power, and leverage that ultimately put them in a more favorable and persuasive position when
negotiating with small grassroots organizations. In the end, the result can be a more
bureaucratic approach to community development that reduces effectiveness at the neighborhood
level.
Summary
The CDC movement is relatively young and has experienced most of its growth during
the last two decades. In a relatively short period of time, CDCs have successfully tackled urban
problems that have been with American cities for too long to remember. CDCs have been be
more effective than previous community development approaches amid limited funding and
resources. They have proven to be lead agents of physical and social change in poor urban
neighborhoods. In addition, they have demonstrated the potential and success of community-
based efforts and local accountability when combined with an entrepreneurial, opportunistic and
self-sufficient approach to real estate development. This is a powerful way to revitalize
communities. However, one must not romanticize the relationship between CDC development
efforts and organizing initiatives that lead to resident empowerment. There will be tension
between both efforts, but such tension and conflicting interests can yield the best results for the
community if properly addressed by the CDCs. This will be one of the aspects that are discussed
in chapters 4 and 5, which evaluate the case studies.
How do you measure the great feeling of community residents when they walk out of
their homes and see a nice-looking building and a vibrant commercial district where
before was blight? Keith Hunt, Assistant Director, Office of Business Development, City
of Boston Department of Neighborhood Development "
The previous chapter made the case for commercial real estate as a legitimate and
essential inner city revitalization strategy. This chapter explains the importance of comparing
the cost and benefit of commercial real estate projects in the inner city and suggests a
methodology to do such cost-benefit analysis. This chapter answers the following questions:
* Why is measuring the impact of commercial projects important?
e What are appropriate indicators of neighborhood impact? And how can impact be
measured?
Why is analyzing the impact of commercial projects important?
Commercial development is a place-based strategy that improves the physical appearance
and commercial vibrancy of a neighborhood, attracts new businesses, and improve the variety of
goods and services available. Commercial developments also create jobs and foster
entrepreneurship opportunities for local residents. However, community development
practitioners cannot assume that a commercial real estate project automatically accrues all these
benefits to a neighborhood and its residents. Not all commercial projects necessarily create jobs
for local residents or revitalize the community. Although this does not seems to be the case with
projects sponsored by CDCs, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation recognized as much
when it noted that much of the evidence on the contribution of commercial development to
revitalization is anecdotal. Further, there is often the perception that the costs of these projects is
not commensurate with the benefits. A recent document from LISC underscores the importance
of measuring project impact when it noted, "LISC is undertaking this research in an effort to
determine and document whether substantial public and philanthropic investments in
neighborhood commercial real estate projects have produced discernable, measurable net
3 Interview with Keith Hunt
Chapter 3 Measuring Project Impact
positive impacts and the neighborhood and/or citywide level."36 The following section provides
compelling reasons for measuring the impact of commercial development.
Commercial real estate projects have many stakeholders
CDCs serve many constituencies sometimes with different expectations of the CDC's
work. Among these constituents are:
e Community residents and leaders, small business owners, and other community based
organizations that represent the base of CDCs' support and legitimacy, their moral
support is pivotal for CDCs to undertake projects on behalf of the community,
e Government agencies and elected public officials, which provide most of the subsidy
required by CDCs for commercial developments,
e Charitable Foundations, intermediary lenders such as Local Initiative Support
Corporation, Neighborhood Reinvestment Corp., and others that provide grants and
favorable loans,
e Private sector companies such as commercial banks and insurance companies, which
are the main source of private financing, and
e Other non-profit institutions such as universities and trade associations that are a
source of information, referrals, and networking support.
Investors of CDC projects care for the financial return as well as the social benefits
Although CDCs may not be cognizant of government agencies, public officials,
foundations and private lenders essential constituencies, the fact is that these institutions are
stakeholders of CDCs' work. They provide not only the needed financial support to make
commercial real estate projects possible but are also important keepers of the public trust hence
their interest in measuring the performance and return on the investment of the public funds they
provide to these projects.
For many of these stakeholders measuring the impact of commercial developments is
important for at least three reasons:
1. The benefits of commercial projects are not always clear to local constituents. Measuring
the impact of the projects is important not only to those who provide funding and who
what to see the result of their investment, but also to those who lend their support, i.e.
community residents and leaders, business owners, and other community-based
organizations. As I will explore in later chapters, CDCs are increasingly facing a tension
36 Local Initiatives Support Corporation, Request for Proposals for Study of the Impact of CBO-sponsored Commercial Real
between their commercial real estate development projects, the community development
agenda, and their grass-roots constituency. Most Boston CDCs are mature and strong
organizations with excellent track records of accomplishments. But their success and
strengths often puts them at odds with the community they represent. As stated by
various small business owners interviewed for this thesis, "CDCs' motivation for doing
commercial development projects is to collect big development fees." This type of
perception makes even more important for CDCs to measure and explain the impact of
their developments on revitalizing the neighborhood.
2. There is a general perception that the public investment exceeds accrued benefits.
Commercial real estate projects are highly visible and there is a general perception that
they require subsidies which compete with other community development needs. The
financial return of the project is far less important to public funders than indicators
which demonstrate the project's impact on achieving a healthy and growing local
economy. CDCs should not take for granted that a commercial development creates
significant impact and multiplier effects in the community without trying to prove such
impact. They need to prove in a rigorous manner the fiscal and economic benefits of
these projects so that they can articulate these benefits when seeking approval for new
projects, raising funds, or reporting their performance.
3. The impact of commercial developments is often difficult to establish. The link between
a commercial development and its impact on revitalizing a commercial district or a
community is typically indirect and difficult to measure. Many other factors in and
around the neighborhood can contribute to the revitalization of a district independently
of a particular. For example, a period of economic growth increases job opportunities
and income, which in turn boosts consumer spending in a commercial district; a new
police program to control crime may eliminate gangs and foster the sense of safety in
residents and business owners; gentrification changes the demographics of a
neighborhood and thus changes the income and spending patterns of residents. As, I will
explain in the following chapters, some of these conditions are present in the two case
studies I analyzed. It is difficult to isolate the project impact from other factors.
However, CDCs can implement various mechanisms to measure the direct and indirect
impact of their commercial developments.
Estate Developments, June 19, 2000.
Methodology
The fundamental reason for measuring the impact of CDC commercial real estate projects
is that these projects are typically subsidized with public funds under the premise that they
generate significant benefits that outweigh the subsidy and that the projects fulfill the goals for a
more equitable society. Commercial real estate projects that are privately financed do not need
to take this consideration in their cost-benefit analysis. In such cases, the return on the
investment is the most important indicator of project success. However, when public subsidy is
needed, one must ask the following questions:
e What are the expected benefits of the project vs. the subsidized costs?
e How are benefits measured?
- What benchmarks are needed to determine if the accrued benefits are commensurate
with the subsidy needed?
The current literature suggests two methods to evaluate the merits of subsidizing a
commercial project. One approach is to compare public costs with expected public benefits. This
is the primary topic of the thesis. A second method is to compare project costs and benefits on a
relative basis with other projects that have received public subsidies. By comparing projects
benchmarks are established making it possible to determine costs and benefits even when two
neighborhood commercial projects are not similar.37
Chapter 2 describes three objectives of community economic development strategies
proposed by John Blair. There are job and income creation, fiscal improvement, and physical
improvement. These three objectives are used as impact indicators in this thesis for CDCs-
sponsored commercial real estate projects. In addition, I am including two more indicators of
impact that practitioners consider as important benefits of these projects. The following five
indicators include direct and indirect impact of the project:
1. Job and income creation directly generated by the project during the first year of
completion based on the number of direct full-time equivalent jobs of the tenants and the
total payroll for those jobs. In addition, indirect jobs are estimated based on industry
3 For example, the rehabilitation of a historic building should be more expensive than the construction of a new building.
Different levels of environmental contamination can create significant subsidy differences between projects.
multipliers for Massachusetts. The payroll of indirect jobs is based on average salaries
for Suffolk County.38
2. Fiscal improvements measured by property taxes paid and to be paid to the City of
Boston.
3. Leverage effect measures the private financing that was leveraged for every dollar of
public subsidy.
4. Physical improvement and revitalization, measures the impact based on interviews with
business owners and community leaders who accessed the project's effect on district
business activity, crime, property values, variety of goods and services, and
psychological well being of the community.
5. Capacity building measures the ability of the project to create knowledge, skills, or other
assets that can be used to carry out other revitalization initiatives, this includes capacity
building of the CDC.
Measuring Job and Income Creation
Construction jobs
Construction jobs are based on actual reports from the City of Boston Department of
Neighborhood Development (DND). 39 Existing reports show the various trades, the total number
of workers, and the hours worked by trade. Since these workers are not hired for the entire year, I
estimate for both case studies a range of full-time equivalent jobs (FTE) by dividing the total
hours of workers' labor by a range of 30 to 40 hours per week times 48 weeks per year. That is
Total Hours of Labor Work/(30 or 40 hrs per week x 48 weeks per year). The 48 weeks takes
into account vacation time and holidays that are typical of full-time workers, whereas the report
from DND only includes actual hours worked.
Direct and Indirect Jobs Created
Direct jobs created and total payroll is based on information provided by each tenant or
the sponsoring CDC. When necessary the 1997 Suffolk County Business Patterns is used for
average wages for each particular industry, which is explained in the respective chapter. Indirect
jobs are estimated using the 1997 Massachusetts Employment Multiplier for the respective
38 Boston Redevelopment Authority's senior economist, John Avault, made a technical but important distinction during an
interview, that a real estate project does not "create jobs." Instead the project "accommodates" or "facilitates" the creation of
jobs by businesses leasing space in the project. For the purpose of this thesis, full-time jobs created by a commercial real estate
project refer to the jobs created by the tenants.
business category and the total indirect payroll is based on 1997 total average wage for
Massachusetts. The total public subsidy is divided by the number of direct FTE jobs to obtain
the subsidy per job. Likewise, the subsidy is divided by the total of direct and indirect jobs to
obtain a total subsidy per job created.
One limitation when analyzing the job multiplier effect is that regional multipliers do not
capture the impact that a retal business in one neighborhood may haVe on other retail businesses
elsewhere. It could be the case that the new businesses in Jackson Square or Egleston Square
reduce consumer expending in some other neighborhoods, which may result in job reduction in
those other neighborhoods. Thus, the net gain to the region is not clearly captured in the
multipliers of retail businesses.
Measuring Fiscal Impact
Fiscal impact is measured by property taxes paid to the City of Boston, despite the fact
that many of these projects receive funds from federal and state agencies as well. The projects
also generate revenues to the federal and the state governments in the form of corporate taxes,
individual income taxes, sales taxes, and other. Nevertheless, I propose using property taxes
because it is the most readily available data to measure fiscal impact. In addition, the public
investment on these projects are essentially tax payer's dollars regardless of the agency that
provides such investment and the agency that collects the return on that investment. The purpose
of this exercise is to measure how well taxpayers' dollars are invested from a strictly fiscal
standpoint.
Evaluating the property taxes paid in one year is not appropriate because the subsidy
provided by the public sector only occurs once, whereas the City collects property taxes every
year. In fact, the property tax paid by JP Center in its first year was relatively low because the
project received a tax abatement. One approach to analyze the cost benefit of public subsidy is
by thinking of the subsidy as a public investment on a project that earns a return in the form of
annual property taxes. Property taxes are paid in perpetuity, for both land and structure. Thus,
the public subsidy should be compared with the sum of all property taxes to be collected in
perpetuity. However, there are some challenges with this analysis. First, the property taxes to be
collected must be discounted to reflect the declining purchasing power of tax dollars received in
39 This agency was known in 1996 as Public Facilities Department (PFD)
the future. But finding an appropriate discount rate is not an easy exercise, particularly for public
funds because it entails determining the risk level associated with the investment. Further, it
involves a more abstract discussion about whether or not the government makes public
investments for a financial return as the private sector does. Determining an appropriate discount
rate is beyond the scope of this thesis. In turn, the thesis suggests a discount rate equivalent to
the 30-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities as reported in the Wall Street Journal on July
13, 2001.40 The second challenge with this analysis is that commercial properties may lose
economic value overtime as properties depreciate. One will expect that as a result of the
revitalization of the area, the real estate market will continue to rise which will justify additional
improvements to the property and so property value will increase.
A third challenge is that property values may increase or that tax rates may change in
which case the discount rate should reflect those changes. One could conservatively project a
small percent increase in real estate values over time, but predicting the changes in property tax
rate is more speculative. In fact, as it will be shown in chapter 4, the assessed value of JP Center
increased, but the commercial tax rates in Boston declined at a much faster rate than the increase
in assessed property values. As a result, JP Center is paying less property taxes in 2001 than in
1998. Given the potential changes in these various variables, property values and tax rates, I
assume a simple stylized model with two very conservative scenarios: Scenario (1) no changes in
property values and tax rates over time, Scenario (2) no changes in tax rates over time but a
small increase of property value equivalent to 0.5% percent per year. Scenario 2 is very
conservative and probably more realistic than assuming that property values will remain the
same forever.
More fundamentally this analysis assumes that vacant or distressed inner city commercial
properties will remain in their current condition without public sector intervention. Therefore,
the analysis does not compare the public investment with alternative scenarios, which will be
highly speculative on my part. Nor does it consider that eventually the private sector may
develop these properties without some form of government subsidy. Such scenario will clearly
make an argument for no public subsidy. However, thirty years of disinvestments in inner city
neighborhoods serve as the best evidence that commercial development will not occur without
40 Technically, the discount rate used should be the one listed in 1995 or 1996 when the public investment was made.
public sector intervention. As argued later in this thesis, most CDCs-sponsored commercial
projects are typically the dilapidated properties in the neighborhoods. Because of the distressed
nature of these properties they are not economically attractive to the private sector. Moreover,
the level of distress of these properties drag down the real estate market in the neighborhood and
prevents other private development from taking place.
Measuring Leverage Effect
An important indicator for economic development practitioners is the extent to which
public dollars leverage private investment. At present there are two approaches to measuring the
leverage effect. One approach is to measure direct private funds invested in the project. That is,
only the amount of the total development cost that was financed by the private sector in the form
of equity or debt. Another measurement of direct leverage effect takes into consideration the
initial amount invested by the tenants of the project in the form of equipment, furniture, and
inventory, which in essence, is private investment not included in the total development budget
of the project. Both case studies measure the private investment in the development. The case
study of Egleston Center also measures the investment made by the tenants. However the
tenant's investment in JP Center is not measured separately because the tenants provided some
funds for the development of the project, which can create double counting problems. In
addition, the tenants could not differentiate their investment in the project from their investment
in equipment, and furniture.
Measuring Impact on Physical Improvement and Revitalization
The impact of the projects on physical improvement and revitalization was measured by
interviewing businesses in the two commercial districts.
Interview Methodology and Survey Content
The survey protocol was prepared in English and Spanish. Business owners were asked to
complete the survey, but most choose not to read the survey and responded the questions as part
of the on-going conversation with the interviewer. The survey was divided in two sections, the
first part asked about the overall impact of the project on the commercial district and the second
part asked about the project impact on their businesses. Some questions were intentionally
redundant to probe previous answers. The questions are closely related to the indicators for
commercial vibrancy and business mix suggested by the National Main Street Program and listed
in the first chapter of this thesis. The survey gauges three areas of possible impact:
" impact on physical revitalization as measured by changes in vacancies,
abandonment, crime, property values, rents, and physical appearance of other
properties,
e impact on business activity as measured by changes in the number of customers in
the area and business sales, changes in businesses and variety of goods and services,
and
e psychological impact as measured by changes in the confidence level of business
owners, expectations of what would have happened in the district if the project was
not developed, and overall well-being of the community.
The survey was composed of 24 questions, of which eight were open-ended to allow the
interviewee to openly express how they felt the project had impacted the district. These open-
ended questions asked them to describe the district and the site before the project was developed,
the changes that had occurred since the project was completed, the impact on their businesses
and on other businesses excluding theirs, and the link between the project and the changes in the
district.
The other 16 questions were more specific about the impact on aspects such as number of
customers, sales, property values, crime, physical appearance of the district, variety of products
and services and the like. Each of these 16 questions had 3 to 5 answer choices. For example,
one of the questions asked about changes in sales and the answer choices included: increased a
lot (>15%), increased a little (<15%), Did not change, and decreased. The difference between
the choices "increased a lot" and "increased a little" is to discount sale increase that resulted
from normal inflation, particularly that the project is 5 years old and one will expect that prices
over this period (thus sales) will not remain constant even if the number of customer remained
constant.
Measuring Impact on Capacity Building
Inner city revitalization driven by community-based organization is dominant
revitalization paradigm during the last 20 years. It is now widely accepted that community
development is more effective when it is driven by local organizations with the support of the
public and private sectors, because community-based groups can respond more quickly and
effectively to the needs and problems of their communities. Community-based organizations
also have the entrepreneurial features that the public sector lacks to tackle inner city problems in
innovate ways. These organizations build local capacity by training residents and leaders on the
process of revitalization and development. The capacity that an organization, i.e. a CDC,
develops through every new project allows the organization to undertake new projects and to
push forward the revitalization of the community. Commercial real estate projects also
strengthen the CDCs' linkages with the mainstream economy, that is national tenants, investors,
and lenders. Commercial projects can create local leadership and other long-lasting assets of
importance to the community. The importance of building capacity in local organizations was
recognized by the Assistant Director of the City of Boston's Office of Business Development.
He acknowledged that-albeit lower in importance to jobs and physical improvement-the City
places a value in building capacity in its community partners.
Measuring the impact on capacity building was done at a qualitative level by discussing
with the CDC staff how the particular projects, JP Center or Egleston Center, increased the
capacity of the CDC to undertake more commercial real estate, economic development, or other
revitalization efforts. The case studies describe the changes the impact on capacity building and
describe other spin-offs of the projects. For example, the creation of a community trust fund in
Jackson-Square or programs to assist local businesses to counter the potential negative impact of
a development.
Doubts about the use of this methodology
This chapter proposes a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators of
neighborhood impact of commercial development that are straightforward, measurable, and yet
provide room for those who believe that revitalization cannot be quantified in a spreadsheet.
However, there are several limitations with this analysis. First, even in cases where there are
significant and discernible positive changes in a commercial district, it is difficult to prove
causality, due to several confounding factors that individually or in the aggregate may cause the
changes. Among the factors contributing to positive changes in these neighborhoods are the
national economic bonanza of the last seven years and the soaring real estate market in Boston,
the enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act which requires local banks to invest in
low- and moderate-income communities where they have a presence, the designation of Roxbury
as an Enhanced Enterprise Community which brought financial resources to the inner city not
previously available, and the Main Street Program which has attracted marketing and financial
resources to the districts. Second, changes in demographic and income composition of the
neighborhoods could not be measured because the US Census Bureau has not released
information from the 2000 Census for the tracks surrounding the two projects of this case study.
Third, the two projects studied in this thesis are only 5 years old and their impact may better
reflected over a longer period of time. Fourth, the impact study relies on self-reported
information from the tenants of the projects or businesses in the districts. When possible, the
author tried to corroborate some of the information through third parties, nonetheless it is
possible that the interviewees may have under or over reported the impact of the projects. Fifth
and more important, the number of jobs held by community residents as reported by each tenant
or the sponsoring CDC included residents from Jamaica Plain, Mission Hill, Roxbury, and
Dorchester, all part of Boston's inner city. Ironically, the CDCs did not keep track or did not
report how many of the jobs created by the project were held by residents of the CDCs' service
area, despite their argument that the projects created jobs for local residents. This appears to be a
deficiency in the economic development efforts of the CDCs under the study. Nevertheless,
from a city-wide perspective, creating jobs for residents of the four inner city neighborhoods
listed above is a positive outcome, since these are the neighborhoods with the highest levels of
unemployment and poverty in the City of Boston. Therefore, this thesis treats those jobs as
positive results of the projects, but warns the limitation on impacting the particular
neighborhoods were the projects are located.
This chapter discusses the case study of JP Center, a commercial real estate project
developed by a private developer in partnership with the Jamaica Plain Neighborhood
Development Corporation (JPNDC or NDC) and the Bromley-Heath Tenant Management
Corporation (TMC). The chapter describes the neighborhood and the sponsoring CDC, the
project development goals, and the impact of the project on the neighborhood. The chapter also
discusses the controversy between local merchants and the developers for attracting a large
competing business and how JPNDC managed that controversy. This chapter answers the
following questions:
e How did the project come about? What were the intended goals?
e What has been the impact of the project on revitalizing the Hyde/Jackson
neighborhood? What are the benefits of the public investment?
- How did the project contribute to the commercial real estate capacity of the CDC?
and how did the CDC manage the tension between commercial development and
local constituents.
Neighborhood Context
On any afternoon, as one goes through either direction of Centre Street in Jamaica Plain,
the first indication that one have entered the Hyde/Jackson Square neighborhood is the aromatic
scent of cilantro, oregano, and cumin that emanate from eight Hispanic restaurants and nearly
2,000 Hispanic households. The aroma of the Hispanic cuisine is quickly reinforced by the
glittering signs and names of local businesses: Tropical Market, Pimentel, Estrella Bakery, El
Oriental de Cuba, and others. Salsa and merengue songs played by slow-moving cars, and
pedestrian speaking Spanish make one conclude that this is a predominantly Hispanic
neighborhood. Indeed, to Hispanics, Hyde/Jackson square is their Boston's Mecca. It is a low-
income neighborhood hidden behind the vibrancy and friendliness of its retail and dense
residential environment in which Centre Street serves as its spinal cord.
Chapter 4 JP Center Case Study
Hispanics are 56% of the population around Hyde/Jackson Square, other ethnic groups
include African American, Asians, and whites. Data from the 1990 Census4 1 reveals the
following demographic composition:
* Selected Demographic Characteristics
* 190 Census, census tracks 812, 1205) ........................... H!!yde/Jackson Boston............
Pp ulation...........................5,8941- 574,283:
Race/Ethnicity
White (non-Hispanic) 100/ 590/
Black (non-Hispanic) 320/ 24%
Hispanic 56% 10%
Other 26/ 12%
U~nemploymen~trate........................14 0/&* 80/a
edan family income (range from 2 census tracks $2,5-$22,557:$9 6
/of households below PMSA median Income 800/
/o of low income families 730/
~PvryRate 27/ 190/
distribution of children under 18ng eparents households 640/ 43/
ThhSchool Dropout rates for all age 47/% 60/
Occupied dwelling units
Owner occupied 18/
Renter occupied 820%/
Hyde/Jackson's ethnic diversity is based on a tradition that goes back more than 60 years
ago. In the 1940's Hyde/Jackson Square was a melting pot of Irish, Italians, Jewish, Armenian,
Greek, some American Indians and blacks. Back then, the orange line subway did not exist,
instead streetcars took people from Dudley Station through Roxbury Street and Columbus
Avenue onto Centre Street. The Bromley-Heath public housing project had not been built, the
site was instead a vacant lot where carnivals would be set up during the summers. Immediately
after the lot was a row of retail businesses, mostly Italian owned. The Plant's Shoe Factory was
next; a large building that occupied four city blocks or five acres.
In the 1960s, Hyde/Jackson went through a rapid transformation and decline as white
families moved out to the suburbs and new poor black and immigrant families moved in. The
decline of Hyde/Jackson was emblematic of a transformation occurring at that time in other
Boston neighborhoods and cities through the country.
41 Data of the 2000 Census for the tracks in question was not available, which would have allowed for a complete analysis of the
neighborhood demographic changes in the last decade. The author had access to demographic projections prepared in 1998 by
National Decision Systems. However, projections based on few census tracks as in the case of Hyde/Jackson tend to be unreliable
because small changes can have a big impact on demographic composition that may not be captured by the projection model. For
example, NDS 1998 projections for Hyde/Jackson predicted a population and household decline of 3.7% and 3.2% respectively
from the 1990 census. It also predicted further population and household decline for 2003. Yet, in the last five years the housing
market in Hyde/Jackson has boomed precipitously. The neighborhood has lower housing vacancy and abandoned properties than
in 1990.
42 Goolksy, Richard, A Stroll Around 1940s J.P., Jamaica Plain Historical Society Website.
Project Development History
Adjacent to the shoe factory was a major supermarket, which served the needs of the
community until the late 1970s when it closed down. In 1976 a fire burned the shoe factory,
which then remained vacant for two decades. During the construction boom of the 1980s, the
shoe factory site became an illegal dumping ground for construction debris, adding to the
existing contamination of the site. The shoe factory site became a community eyesore and a
magnet for drug activity. Crime was rampant in the 1980s and early 1990s throughout
Jackson/Hyde Square and the vacant shoe factory was perceived as a major reason. Frank
Penzo, who grew up in Jamaica Plain explained that in the 1980s and early 1990s people would
drive down Centre Street, but would turn around rather than cross through Jackson Square
because of its crime ridden image. Richard Thal, Executive Director of JPNDC, told that during
a visit of Boston Mayor Ray Flynn, a shooting broke up just 300 feet away from the Mayor.
Crime isolated Hyde/Jackson from the more affluent neighborhoods in Jamaica Plain. The shoe
factory was a key factor in the lack of public safety in the neighborhood. As Thal noted, it was
the biggest undeveloped site in the neighborhood and a symbol of blight. He further added that
the magnitude of the problem was such that "it was very hard to envision anything positive
happening there."43
Development Opportunity
In late 1980s, Mordachi (Morty) Levin, a private developer, was presented with the
opportunity to acquire a one-acre parcel at the corner of Centre and Walnut Streets. 4 The site
was the former location of the supermarket that closed down in the 1970s. Levin knew the
neighborhood's need for more and better retail businesses. But he also knew that one acre was
not big enough to accommodate the retailing needs of local residents. From the outset he had
set his eyes on the adjacent former shoe factory site, owned by the City of Boston. Further, he
knew developing the one-acre site without changing the conditions of the most blighted site in
the neighborhood was not a sound retail strategy. Levin approached the City with a proposal for
the entire 6-acres but he soon realized that the disposition process could take years. Instead,
Levin took the risk and went ahead with the development of his one-acre parcel independently of
4 Interview with Richard Thal
44 The Orange Line of the subway, operated above ground from Dudley Square through washington Street until 1987, it was then
placed underground with a station at the entrance of Jackson Square. The relocation of the orange line provided Hyde/Jackson
residents with a significant infrastructure and transportation improvement that may have set the stage for more development in
the area.
the city-owned land. He called this development JP Plaza. In an interview, Levin noted that he
knew that whatever development took place in his one-acre site would constraint additional
development because his property abutted the front third of the 5-acre site.
JP Plaza was completed in 1991 and brought the neighborhood two very needed services:
a bank branch and a pharmacy, along with 9 other store fronts ranging in size from 1,000 to
2,000 square feet and combining small independent businesses with national franchises. 45
Building had the standard L-shape of a strip shopping center with a small parking lot in front of
the building facing Centre Street. JP Plaza was successful from the moment it was completed.
The two anchor tenants drew lots of people into Jackson and created positive spillover effects for
other retailers in the area. Developing JP Plaza was critical in the development of the next five
acres, because it gave Levin the confidence and credibility to undertake a much bigger project. It
taught him that community participation in urban developments is critical. Tony Barros, a
business owner and local leader gave lots of credit to Levin for seeking community participation
in the development of JP Plaza and for producing a project that he said, "looks like the
neighborhood, small in scale, more blended with the fabric of the community, featuring lots of
small businesses, and complementing existing businesses."46 However, the most important
contribution of JP Plaza is that it gave the neighborhood, lenders, and the public sector the
confidence that Hyde/Jackson could support a bigger project, this would be JP Center. Again, the
plaza was a success in great part because community needs were considered from the start. A
survey conducted by Levin prior to the development indicated great support for a pharmacy and
retail bank branch office.
The Commercial District Today
Hyde/Jackson Square is anchored on each end of Centre Street by two supermarkets, a
40,000 square feet Super Stop & Shop which is part of a regional chain and a 20,000 square feet
Hi-Lo Foods Supermarket, a local operation. As if these two supermarkets were not enough to
satisfy the grocery needs of local residents, Hyde/Jackson features another 10 small Hispanic-
owned grocery stores (known as "bodegas"), which range in sizes from approximately 800 to
45 Rite-Aid pharmacy was one of the original tenants of JP Plaza, but it was acquired by CVS, which then moved to the corner of
Centre Street and South Hungtinton Avenue, which is about half a mile from JP Plaza and just outside the border of the
Hyde/Jackson Main Street area.
46 Interview with Tony Barros
2,000 square feet.47 With about 70,000 square feet of grocery retail space, if one cannot find a
Hispanic food-product in Hyde/Jackson, it probably cannot be found anywhere else in Boston.
Virtually all businesses in Hyde/Jackson are located at ground level. There are very few
office tenants and those that exist are also located at the ground floor level. The district has
mostly single-story and small 2- to 3-story buildings with residential units above retail spaces,
which contribute to enhance the mix-used character of Centre Street. The Hyde/Jackson Square
Business Association estimated in 1997 that about 60% of the district customers are local
residents and the remaining 40% from Boston and Greater Boston neighborhoods. 48 This
indicates Hyde/Jackson's ability to attract a significant percent of outside residents to the district,
who most likely to come to the ethnic grocery stores and restaurants.
The business directory from Hyde/Jackson Main Streets' website lists 97 businesses in
approximately 30 different categories. Almost 2/3 of all the businesses fall in eight categories,
which underscore the concentration on some types of businesses. In fact the top three categories:
restaurants, grocery stores, hairdressers, represent 40% of all businesses in the district. The
following table summarizes the eight largest business categories:
Categories with the largest concentration of Share of Total
businesses Total Businesse
1 Restaurants 19 19.60/
2 Markets (rocery store)1 12.4%/
197 toreitaiz Jaac rPans) 12aily tncly adeooial ies
3 Salons (Barber & Beauty Salons) 8 8.2%
opportunity Aparel/Accessories 6 6.2omi
5 Medical/Dental Services 5 52o eo
6 Banks/Related Services 4 4.1/
7 'Communications (Beepers & Newspapers 4 4.1%/
8 lInsurance 4 4.1 % .........
Total 62 63.9%/
Total Businessses in Hyde/Jackson S to tBon ire oam
Profile of JPNDC
The Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation (JPNDC) was founded in
1977 to revitalize Jamaica Plain "as a racially, ethnically, and economically diverse
community." 49 Since then it has been providing affordable housing, creating economic
opportunity for local residents, and organizing the community on several issues. JPNDC has
47 Restaurant count based on Business Directory of Hyde/Jackson Square Main Streets. Square feet count based on author's
estimates and interviews with businesses owners.
48 Hyde/Jackson Square Business Association, Application to the Boston Main Street Program, March 1997.
49 JPNDC website 7/4/01.
developed 330 units of affordable housing. The organization employs 30 people, including
property management and maintenance staff, and has an annual operating budget of $1.7 million.
JPNDC's most visible economic development project was the renovation of a complex of
16 brick buildings known as the "Brewery" which owes its name to the Haffenreffer Brewery
which at one point was one of the largest local breweries in New England.5 4 JPNDC made the
rehabilitation of the Brewery a priority. in 1983, after more than five years of planning and
negotiation, the NDC took control of the property and began renovations which lasted through
the early 1990s. The brewery now houses 40 businesses, which together provide over 100 jobs.
The brewery became a testing ground for JPNDC's economic development efforts. It provided
affordable commercial space for local businesses and encouraged JPNDC to engage in other
small business development activities.
In the early 1990s JPNDC joined a consortium of CDCs that partnered with the City of
Boston's Economic Development and Industrial Corporation (EDIC) to provide technical
assistance to neighborhood businesses and to package micro loans. The initiative operated for
nearly three years and then came to a halt by late 1994 due to political changes in the
Administration of the City and structural problems inherent in the program. Two years later
JPNDC's small business development program went through a second iteration. The
organization joined efforts with other CDCs in forming the Community Business Network,
which provides technical assistance and loan packaging services to local businesses. Since then,
the CDC has secured 44 business loans totaling $2.4 million of which 19 loans in excess of $1
million have been for businesses in Hyde/Jackson.
The work of JPNDC with businesses, residents, and other organizations led the National
Community Development Initiative to select the JPNDC as one of the five CDCs across the
country to be studied for their role in returning economic health and vitality to inner city
neighborhoods.
5 In the 1960s, Haffenreffer closed down and moved out of the state.
51 The brewery most noticeable tenant is Boston's best-known beer brand Samuel Adams, which has corporate offices and a show
room on the site. However, most of the Samuel Adams beer is produced under license contracts by breweries in other parts of the
country.
Building up JP Center
As early as 1990, Morty Levin already envisioned a supermarket for the remaining 5
acres next to his JP Plaza. However, as he said during an interview, "it became clear to me that
it would be a lengthy community process to get a supermarket on that site because some local
groups were fueling the idea that the supermarket will hurt the community."52 Levin realized
that he needed to partner with local organizations in order to move forward the project. Further,
the project was not viable without public subsidy due to environmental problems on the site.
Hence, a partnership with local groups allowed him to leverage public funds more effectively.
Levin struck a partnership in 1992 with JPNDC and Bromley-Heath Tenant Management
Corporation (TMC), one of the first tenant organizations in the country to manage a public
housing project. JPNDC and TMC each received a 10% stake in the limited partnership of the
project with Morty Levin's company (Boston Community Ventures) controlling the remaining
80% and acting as the general partner. As limited partners, JPNDC and TMC were entitled to a
portion of the yearly profits generated by the project's cash flow. .
Project Goals and Expected Impact
The development team articulated the goals of the project differently. Richard Thal said
that for JPNDC the project was developed with three goals in mind, in the following order of
importance:
1. to revitalize the Hyde/Jackson district by turning around the biggest dump site in the area
and the biggest evidence of neighborhood distress,
2. to satisfy a need for a larger grocery store that could provide more variety of products and
better prices,
3. to provide jobs to neighborhood residents as part of an economic development strategy
for the district. 53
For Morty Levin, the goal of JP Center was two fold. First, he agrees with JPNDC that
one goal was to provide needed grocery goods and health services. Second, he saw the project as
an opportunity to attract more affluent residents from other parts of Jamaica Plain or other
neighborhoods into the supermarket. Levin explained that the biggest problem of the
52 Interview with Morty Levin.
Hyde/Jackson was perception, "an invisible line at the corner of Centre and Day Streets kept
people from coming into the district," he added. His argument was that if he could bring more
affluent shoppers into the supermarket, then their perception of the district will change and they
will be willing to invest in the area. JPNDC's and Levin's goals for the project are
fundamentally about neighborhood revitalization. However, the nuance between their views is
that JPNDC's goal is to make the neighborhood more attractive for its residents, whereas Levin's
goal is to make the neighborhood attractive to outsiders to attract further external investments.
These differences in goals can have repercussions on how and for whom revitalization is carried
out.
Each organization added value to the development process. Bromley-Heath is the
immediate abutter of JP Center, neighboring two sides of the development (east and north). The
available parcel was of significant importance to Bromley-Heath, thus a proposal that did not
involve Bromley-Heath could have faced opposition. For Levin, having a tenant-run
organization as partner of JP Center was an implied assurance that the tenants will do their best
to protect the project from vandalism, crime, and other potential problems. JPNDC involvement
was also needed. JPNDC was the largest, stronger, and most credible non-profit in the
Hyde/Jackson area. It was involved in at-large neighborhood revitalization strategies and had
access to real estate funds from the city and other sources, such as LISC. Levin, perceived
JPNDC as the local organization with the best understanding of those challenges and constraints
posed by real estate development.
JPNDC and TMC established a Working Committee of community residents that advised
the development team on various aspects of the project. The Working Committee met every
month for nearly 5 years and set up three subcommittees to review specific components of the
development. These were the Design and Construction Committee, the Jobs Committee, and the
Trust Fund. JPNDC staffed the Working Committee but had no voting rights. The Committee
reviewed drawings, traffic studies, parking plans, lighting and safety issues, recruitment and
training efforts. They discussed the impact that the project would have on the community and
helped guide the development in an effort to incorporate the project into the life of the
neighborhood. TMC's role in generating community support was critical. This included
5 According to Richard Thal, Hyde/Jackson became the first community partnership under the administration of Major Raymond
Flynn. The Hyde/Jackson Task Force, a community-driven revitalization initiative, identified five key components of the
documenting the difficulty residents had buying grocery shopping. "Without community
support, the city might have dropped the project because of escalating environmental
remediation costs," said Thal.
In spite the community outreach efforts the project was not free of controversy. Some
felt that the project did not have adequate input from existing business owners in the area. Tony
Barros, a local business owncr and leader, was very critical of the process and the whole
project. He said that "the outreach was done in a way that detracted people from being
involved.. .the process was manipulated." Barros contrasted the process of the JP Plaza (the
small strip shopping center done by Levin a few years earlier) with that of the JP Center, arguing
that the former was proactive, asking people what to build on the one-acre site. Whereas,
according to Barros, the process for JP Center was about how to build support for the
supermarket. Barros stated that he and other business owners felt disengaged, which he regrets
now. He was also critical about the scale of the project, the layout, and the impact on existing
businesses, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Several other business owners
interviewed for this thesis made reference to the opposition to the development from grocery
store owners and residents who were particularly concerned with traffic impact. However, with
some exceptions, the majority of the business owners interviewed seemed to have placed the
controversy behind them and tried to give a positive spin to the presence of the Stop & Shop.
Additional Contribution
JPNDC's contribution to the project went beyond the initial community outreach efforts.
The CDC secured a grant for half a million dollars from the US Department of Health and
Human Services Office of Community Services (OCS). Levin credited JPNDC for securing the
OCS grant. The OCS grant was used to cover part of the environmental remediation expenses.
In addition, JPNDC secured predevelopment financing from LISC. Richard Thal also said that at
some point in the development, JPNDC served as project manager because Levin did not have
staff to help him. However, Levin does not remember t JPNDC playing such a role. It is not
clear whether or not JPNDC managed the project as claimed by Thal. Ultimately, Levin hired a
staff person from JPNDC to manage the process, demonstrating once again the indirect
contributions of the CDC to the project.
revitalization strategy: 1) housing development, 2) economic development, 3) safety, 3) open space, and 5) youth services.
Development hurdles
The largest development hurdle faced by the project was the environmental remediation
that was needed. The former shoe factory left significant soil contamination, aggravated in the
1980s by contractors who dumped construction debris on the site. According to JPNDC,
estimates done by previous potential developers suggested that clean-up costs could approach
$20 million. As a result the development team requested that the City remediate the site before
turning it over. However, the city declined due to concerns over liability, costs, and timing. In
the end, the development team took ownership of the site "as is" and conducted extensive soil
sampling and sonograms. A document of JPNDC describes their findings, "everyone knew that
the site was an environmental nightmare, but it was only when we began the actual excavation
that we discovered the full extent of the problem. Some of the goodies discovered included: four
underground storage tanks, 600 tons of solidified sludge, and 38,000 gallons of contaminated
water." 5 These items were removed from the site. Also, due to groundwater contamination, 2.6
million gallons of water were pumped out and treated. Changes in environmental regulation
allowed the development team to process and clean the soil on site. That soil served as the base
for the asphalt parking lot. Consequently, the environmental remediation was done for a fraction
of previous estimates. The final cost was $2.4 million, which was funded mostly by CDBG funds
from the City of Boston and the OCS grant. JPNDC recognizes the city's role in moving forward
the development, stating that "the city's long-standing support of this important community
development venture, coupled with the strong community backing that existed for the project,
helped solidify the political will to fund the project adequately."56
The Trust Fund
The development team established a Community Benefits Trust Fund funded over 10
years with $500,000 from the income generated by the project. The development team included
the Trust Fund as a part of the team's proposal to the City when bidding to secure the site. The
Trust Fund is now completely managed by community residents, independently from the
development team.
5 Tony Barros is also the director of the Hyde/Jackson Square Main Street Program and the president of the Hyde/Jackson
Square Merchants Association.
5 The source is a brief document about the JP Center which was provided by JPNDC, no date specified.
56 Ibid.
Employment Recruitment and Training Efforts
Recognizing that a rising tide lifts only those boats that are in the water, JPNDC and the
Working Committee made an effort to train local residents so that they could compete for jobs
created by the supermarket. The Working Committee coordinated meetings with Stop & Shop
to understand their employment needs and to tailor a training program for those jobs. JPNDC
coordinated four job readiness workshops, which were attended by over 100 residents. In
addition, JPNDC established a community referral system that enabled over 35 local agencies to
refer job candidates. These referrals served as character references for local residents. As a result
of these efforts, 60% of the 200 new jobs created by the supermarket were Jamaica Plain
residents, and the remaining employees came from Roxbury, Mission Hill, Dorchester, and
Roslindale.
Project Cost and Public Subsidy
Total Development Cost
Development costs for the project totaled $14.2 million, of which $2.4 million (17%) was
environmental remediation, $8.6 million construction costs (60%), and the remaining $3.2
million were soft costs (23%). The table below summarizes Total Development Cost (TDC) of
the project.57 Funding for the project included four sources: the City of Boston provided $3.3
million to cover remediation costs and equity deficiencies. An OCS grant of $474,000
represented the second source of public subsidy. 58 The Carpenters' Union Pension Fund
provided the permanent debt financing for $9.2 million. The remaining $1.2 million was
provided by Stop & Shop and the Martha Elliot Health Center (i.e. Children's Hospital) for their
build-out. Thus the public subsidy amounted to $3.8 million or 27% of the total project cost,
which represents a per-square-foot subsidy of $58 dollars.
57 The statement with the Total Development Cost of JP Center was provided by JPNDC and prepared by Boston Community
Ventures. The statement included, in addition to the permanent financing, the construction loan of $8.2 million on both, the
sources and uses. That amount was subtracted from the budget because the permanent financing replaced the construction loan.
The total uses were short of $134,324, which was added to the soft costs to match total sources. Further clarification on the
nature of the tenants/refunds for $1.2 million may provide a better picture of the budget and the subsidies.
58 Interestingly, no private equity was invested in the project. The funds provided by the supermarket and the health center
covered part of the tenant's build out expense, which-arguably--does not constitute permanent equity in the project.
JP Center - Total Development Cost (as of 12/31/96)
OCS Grant 500,000 4
otal Sores $1,3228 0
Ues of Funds
HadCsts:
Architect & Engineer, Legal, Appraisals, Construction Financing
Interest, Insurance, Consultants, Leasing Commissions, Replacement
Reevand other28626 2
Construction Maaemn Fee, Developer's Overhead 4756
T tlU e . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... $14,232,228.......................... 100 ....
Total ~ ~ ~ ....... SbiieFud(CB anOCfud).............. .. 3,1121.2.
otal Squa e feet o uilding (in luds s.upermnnk andealth center) 66,000
Total Development Cost Per Square Foot $1
Total Subsidy per Square Foot$5
A subsidy of 27% of total development costs is lower than other inner city commercial
projects developed in Boston during a similar period. However, two observations should be
made that could increase the public subsidy as a percentage of the total development cost. First,
the City did not sell the land at market value, which given the environmental problems of the
site, the value could have been zero. Regardless, the city subsidized the land in two ways, by
forgoing a sale price and by paying for the environmental remediation. Thus if the value of the
land after environmental remediation is factored in the total development cost, the public subsidy
will increase probably by several millions.
The second observation that could increase the percent of subsidy is the treatment of
"tenant/refunds" as a source of funds in the development budget. In a typical commercial
project, the developer entices tenants by providing a certain amount of tenant improvements
(TIs) per square foot, this amount is a Use of Funds for the development. Any excess costs of
building out the tenant space, beyond the allocated TIs, is typically the responsibility of the
tenant and is outside the development budget. Even if the tenant hires and pays the developer to
do the entire tenant buildout, such revenue does not represent part of the development cost of the
project, since it could mingle costs of the project with costs of the tenants. The development
team could not clarify the nature of the tenant/refunds as a source in the budget.
Estimating the impact on public subsidies based on either of the two observations made
above is beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, for the purpose of cost-benefit analysis of JP
Center, this thesis will utilize the subsidy amounts as listed in the development budget which
includes the OCS grant and funds from the City of Boston.
Project timeline
From the project conception to completion, JP Plaza took nearly six years. Planning and
discussion between Mordachi Levin, JPNDC and Bromley-Heath began in 1990. The
partnership was formed in 1992 and community outreached was carried throughout the
completion of the project. Environmental remediation took a year, from the summer of 1994 to
the summer of 1995. The construction also took a year, from September of 1995 to September
of 1996. The tenants opened for business in October of 1996.
Project Leasing
Mordachi Levin was responsible for the leasing of the project, with no involvement of
JPNDC. Originally he signed Purity Supreme as the operator for the 40,000 square feet
supermarket. Then, after several months into construction, Stop & Shop, the largest supermarket
chain in New England, acquired Purity Supreme. Stop and Shop preferred a bigger store but
realized that it was no possible due to the stage of the development.
The second tenant, Martha Elliot Health Center, had been operating for over 20 years in a
smaller and inadequate facility next to the Bromley-Heath projects. In the late 1980s and early
90s infant mortality in Boston was unusually high. The Boston Globe ran a series of articles that
highlighted the irony of Boston being the capital of medicine in the country while having such
public health issues in its own backyard. The Globe articles sparked new efforts from the city's
health industry to expand the facilities and services in Boston's inner city. The Martha Elliot
Health Center received financial support from the Children's Hospital for a new 26,000 square
feet state-of-the-art facility. The following table shows the distribution of space, and the jobs
created and retained by each tenant.
Tenants Size in SQ FT Number of new Number of
jobs retained Jobs
Super Stop & Shop 40,000 200 N/A
Martha Elliot Health Center 26,000 110 120
Total 66,000 210 1201
Job and Income Creation
As explained in chapter 3, this thesis measures impact of the project on neighborhood
revitalization based on the following five objectives: (1) job and income creation, (2) fiscal
improvement, (3) leverage of private financing, (4) physical improvement and revitalization, and
(5) capacity building. The following sections describe the direct impact on job and income
creation, fiscal improvement, and leverage of private financing.
Construction Payroll and Construction Jobs
Information on the total construction payroll of $2,376,000 (27.6% of hard cost)59 was
provided by the Department of Neighborhood Development (DND). 60 The report also details a
total of 57,260 hour of workers' labor, of which 34% were hours worked by Boston residents,
23% by minorities, and 4% by female. It is important to highlight the relatively high average
wage per hour, which was $41.50 including payroll expenses ($2,376,000/57,260 hours).61
The reports from DND show over 20 different trades and a total of 345 workers hired for
the project. Since these workers are not hired for the entire year, I estimated a range of full-time
equivalent jobs (FTE) by dividing the 57,260 hours of workers' labor by a range of 30 to 40
hours per week times 48 weeks per year. That is 52,760/(30 or 40 hrs per week x 48 weeks per
year).62 Thus, based on this approach the project in one year created the equivalent of 30 to 40
full-time construction jobs.
:Full-Time Equivalent Construction jobs 30 -40
59 The construction payroll of 27.6% of hard cost is very close to the 25% industry average reported by studies of Robert Ball for
the U.S. Department of Commerce.
60 This agency was known in 1996 as Public Facilities Department (PFD).
61 This wage is significantly higher than the average construction wage of $25 to $31 per hour based on 1996 Suffolk County
Business Patterns of the U.S. Census.
62 The 48 weeks takes into account vacation time and holidays that are typical of full-time workers, whereas the 52,760 are
strictly hours worked.
DND report does not include payroll and jobs for environmental workers. The total
budget for environmental remediation was $2,382,000. According to JPNDC remediation work
took a year and a significant portion was done on site, which was probably more labor intensive
than other remediation projects. However, due to limited information, this analysis does not
estimate the jobs and payroll of environmental remediation.
Direct and Indirect Jobs Created
The Stop and Shop supermarket hired 200 new employees of which 50 were full-time and
125 were part-time working between 20 and 30 hours per week. 63 This represents 125 full-time
equivalent jobs (FTE). The total payroll of $1.7 million was estimated using 1997 Suffolk
County Business Patterns. According to JPNDC 60% of the 200 new employees were area
residents, which represented 120 jobs that includes full-time and part-time.64 The Martha Elliot
Health Center estimated that 10 new full-time jobs were created, of which half of them were held
by local residents. The wage for these 10 new jobs was estimated using 1997 Suffolk County
Business Pattern which closely matches the average wage of the Martha Elliot Health Center. 65
Indirect jobs of 65 were estimated using the 1997 Massachusetts Employment Multiplier
for retail businesses and the total indirect payroll of $2.17 million is based on 1997 total average
wage for Massachusetts. The public subsidy for every direct full-time equivalent job created was
$28,231, well within the job guidelines for Community Development Block Grants (CDBG).
irect Full-Time Equivalent Jobs 135
Direct Annual Payroll $2,013,975
indirect jobs 65
Indirect Annual Payroll $2,170,425
Total FTE jobs Created (excluding construction) 200
Total Annual Payroll Direct & Indirect FTE jobs $4,184,400
Direct jobs held by local residents (not FTE) 125
.Payroll of Direct jobs held by local residents $1,175,275
63 Interview with Sarah Griffen.
64 The full-time equivalent jobs held by local residents cannot be estimated without the breakdown of full-time and part-time jobs
held by local residents. This information was not available.
65 Interview with Francine Azzara. The Martha Elliot Health Center has a payroll of about $4 million and 120 employees, which
gives an average wage of $33,333. The 1997 County Business Pattern gives an average annual wage of $33,110 for health center
employees.
P u b li........................Su b sid y..........................per..............Direct...........................ob..........Created.... ......E .... . .$28,231 
Public Subsidy per Direct &j netob Created (FTE) $19,071
Fiscal Impact
Fiscal impact compares the total public investment with the property taxes paid and to be
paid by the project. All the taxes are discounted using a rate equivalent to the 30-year US
Treasury Inflation Protected Securities as of July 13, 2001. As explained in chapter 2, this
analysis includes two scenarios. Scenario 1 holds constant the property value and the property
tax rate. Scenario 2, assumes a constant tax rate and an increase in property value of 0.5% per
year. The following table shows the taxes paid by JP Center from 1996 to 2001, the value of
those taxes in 1996 dollars and the value in of taxes to be collected in perpetuity (also in 1996
dollars) for each of the two scenarios:
......... -1" . Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Year Asesd Tax Rate 66 Taxes Paid Vlei196dlas 7 Value in 1996 dollars
1996 Public Investment -$3,811,210 -$3,811,210
1997 $630,000 $41.50 $26,145 $25,170 $25,170
........................1998 $4,481,5060 $38.45: $172,314. $159,697: $159,6971
1999 $4,481,500 $37.04 $165,995 $148,102 $148,102
2000 $4,481,500: $34.211 $153,312$3,8 $3,8
2001 $4,727,000 $30.17 $142,614 $117,925 $117,925
Taxes in Perpetuity $3,043,225 $3.494.07 31
1996 Value of all Taxesl $3,625,803: $4,076,65f1
1996 Net Return of,
Public Investment.. -$185,407 $265,441-1
Discount Rate: 3.875%, Rate for 30-year TIPS 68
Scenario 1 shows that the public investment in JP represented a negative investment, that
is a subsidy of $185,407. Scenario 2, which is still conservative and more realistic, shows a
positive investment of $265,441. By strictly comparing the subsidy amount with the sum of all
66 Property Tax Rate is per $1,000 of assessed value. Source: Assessing Department, City of Boston.
67 The above analysis assumes that the public investment of $3.8 millions was made in 1996. However, it is often the case that
public funds are disbursed at different stages. More detail information about the timing of the public investment was not
available, except that the development team stated that the OCS grant was received earlier than the funds from the City of
Boston. Below are the formulas used to discount the taxes paid each year, r=3.875%. Formula (a) discounts the taxes paid each
year from 1997 through 2001. Formula (b) calculates the value of the taxes in perpetuity for scenario 1 with no increase in
property value. Formula (c) calculates the taxes in perpetuity for scenario 2 asuming an increase in property value of 0.5% per
year.
(a) Tax Amount / (1 + r)' (b) Discounted Tax Paid in 2001 / r (c) Discounted Tax Paid in 2001 / (r - 0.5%)
68 Rate of the 30-year Treasuries Inflation Protected Securities as reported in the wall Street Journal on 7/13/2001.
projected property taxes, one can conclude that the public investment in JP Center-under
scenario 2-provided a positive return on tax payer's dollars.
Leverage Effect
In the case of JP Center, the leverage effect is measured directly by private funds invested
on the project, that is, only the amount of the total development cost that was financed by the
private sector. The direct private investment in the project was 73% of TDC. This represents
2.73 dollars of private financing for every public dollar invested.
Tlotal Development Cost of project $14,232,228
Private Investment of TDC $10,421,018
Private Investment as a Percent of TDC 73%
Leverage Effect of public dollars $2.73x
A second level of direct leverage effect is the initial amount invested by the tenants of the
project in the form of equipment, furniture, and inventory, which is not included in the total
development budget of the project. For example, staff at Martha Elliot Health Center reported
that Children's Hospital invested between $2 and $2.5 million dollars in the new Health Center
facility. This amount includes a portion paid as reimbursement expense to the developer as well
as state-of-the-art equipment for the new health center. Likewise, Stop & Shop invested
approximately $3 million in refrigerated equipment, shelving, computers and other. However,
the investment of the tenants is not counted in the leverage ratio to avoid the possibility of
double counting because a portion of the tenant's investment ($1.2 million) is included in the
total development cost of the project.
Physical Improvement and Revitalization
The impact of JP Center on physical improvement and business activity was measured by
interviewing with businesses in Hyde/Jackson. The following section describes the results of
those interviews.
Sample of Businesses
Twenty of the 97 businesses in Hyde/Jackson Square were interviewed in person and
completed a survey. The sample of interviews represented 21% of all the businesses in the
Hyde/Jackson Main Street Area. Twelve of the 31 business categories of Hyde/Jackson were
represented in the sample. A large sample of small grocery stores (classified by Main Streets as
"Markets") was intentionally chosen to better understand the impact that the supermarket had on
these particular businesses. The grocery stores interviewed represent 30% of the sample,
whereas grocery stores only represent 12.37% of the businesses in Hyde/Jackson. Thus, the
sample of businesses is over weighted on grocery stores.
Category Total %of sample
and1the o t arel/Accessoies 2 10/s
2xnpre el/Accessores (Tailoringe 50/ h
3 APo.r~c.!.arts) 15%/
4 ................ Bake ... ............................. . . . . . .15/
5 Banks/Related Services 1y 5f
6 Discount 15%
7 Liquor 2 10% t
8 Mare ts 6 30h
9 MNusic 2 10%/
10 Restau vization.. 1 5%
11 Salons ( a ty!.Barb ................... 1 50/
12 :Shoes (Sales) ................................................1 5%/
Total Sample 20 100%
Ninety five percent of the businesses in the sample were established before the
development of JP Center. The most recent business (Countrywide Home Loan) is 4 years old
and the oldest business is 63 years old. On average businesses had been established for 18 years.
Six interviewees had owned or managed their business for 5 years or less, which brought down
the average tenure of owners/managers to 9 years, or half the average tenure of the businesses.
Eighteen businesses (90%) are independent and the other 2 (10%) are national companies
(Countrywide Home Loan and Payless Shoe). See Appendix 1 for a copy of the survey as well
as tabulated responses. The following sections summarize the key findings of the interviews and
the surveys.
Impact on Physical Revitalization
All business owners agreed the project eliminated the most blighted property in the
district, and highlighted this aspect as one of the most significant accomplishments of the project.
Public safety and overall attractiveness of the district was also highlighted. Many described the
site as a "jungle" and a "hive of crime" that blocked the revival of the neighborhood. "JP Center
improved the fagade of Hyde/Jackson ... since then, the district looks cleaner, brighter, and more
pleasant," said Rafael Benzan, former president of the Hyde/Jackson Merchant Association.6
69 Interview with Rafael Benzan.
Those surveyed also stated that property values and rents have increased dramatically.
Some argued the project had something to do with this change, others believed properties values
in JP were increasing regardless of the project, but the project hastened the increase in values and
rent. In fact, most business owners expressed concern over the rents in the area, citing that rent
increases represent the biggest survival threat to local businesses. Fifty percent of the
interviewed are tenants whose rents have increased for as much as 200%. A few have long-term
leases with locked rents which brought down the average rent increase for the last five years to
98%, not a minor increase. The impact on reducing vacancies and abandonment was positive but
less overwhelming, as several felt that vacancy and abandonment was already low prior to the
development. The table below shows the responses to questions related to physical
revitalization.
In general what was the impact of the project on the district?
% of Increased or
N sample Impoved Dcesd Didn't chae
Crime 18 900/ 0/% 17 94/ 1 6/
Project Site 20 100%/ 2 100/ 0/ 0/%
Conditions of buildings in the
district 19 95% 19 100% 0/ 0%
Abandoned properties 18 90%
Impact on Business Activity
Changes in the number of customer and sales were measured in two different formats.
The first set of questions asked about their perception of change in customers and sales in the
district excluding their business. The second format asked about the change in customers and
sales in their business. For both formats, more than fifty percent of the interviewees responded
had a "major"~ or a "mode rate" role, in the increase of customers and sales.
How has the number of shoppers coming into the district changed since the project was completed?
..........................................I  I . ..... ................... ?..................... ......
.......... ...................................... ...............
20badoe 10prte 5 80% 7 35/ % 10/ 56 0/a%; ................................. ..........................................................................................:..................... ...... ..
How has the number of residents buying in the district changed since the project was completed?
H ow has the number ofyorestomr chain edsnetepojc a opetosicyuaqrdetbihdtebsns?
.......................... .................................................... ................................ 
.................................. ...................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
N Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
.......................... .......... ............................................ 
.......- -  ...........................W ............. ................................................ . . . . . . . ...
20 11 50/a 7 5 35 0% 4/ 10 500%
.............................................................. . . . ................... .................* ......... 
.................................................... ...... 
... 
. . . . . . ... . . . . .
. . . . . . . ... . . .
How hasvte nubesofyr ofyuin cto s cnged since theproect was completed? or sin ceyou acquird/established the business?
N. Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 9 45% 6 0% 2 10% 3 15
What role doyou think that the project had on this change?
N MaJor Moderate Minor None Not Sure
20 11 55% 5 25% - 0% 4 20% 0%
ver ine schnged tce the p t was completed? or sceyou acquidlestablished the business?
N Increased a lot Increased a little Didn t change Decreased
20 7 35%/ 7 35/ 2 10%/ 4 20/
Wat role do you think that theprject had on this change?
N Ma Moderate Minor None Not Sure
20 9 45/ 4 20/ 0/ 7 35/ 0/a
Over ninety percent felt the variety of products and services available in the district
increased. Fifty five percent changed the product mix they offered, but the majority has not
physically expanded. Many stated that even if they wanted to expand, there was no vacant space
to do so. More than two thirds believe anchor businesses have increased, but the answer to
whether independent businesses have increased or not was divided.
In general what was the impact of the project on the district?
% of
N= sample
Increased or
Improved Decreased Didn't change
t8 p ts% s7 94%0 1 6V rietProducts & services
[Anchor businesses 16 80%/ 11 69/ 0/ 5 31/
p buinesses 90 9 50 2 11 7 39
Physical expansions of existing
businesses 17 85% 4 24% 0% 13 76%
Psychological impact
Six questions in the survey related to the psychological impact of JP Center. Seventy five
percent responded affirmatively that business owners' confidence in the commercial district
increased as a result of the JP Center. Interviewees also felt that the Merchants Association is
stronger now, citing that the opposition to the supermarket (and more recently to the proposed
Kmart) created a stronger coalition of small businesses.
......................................................................
In general what was the impact of the project on the district! neighborhood?
% of
sample
Increased or
Improved
Decreased or
Worsened Didn't change
Business owners' confidence in
th commercial district 16 80% 12 75/ 2 13/ 2 13/
Merchants Association 14 70% 10 71o 1 7% 3 21%
ain Street Program 9 45/ 8 89/ 0/ 1........a m............. ...........".... ...  ...................... ......................
The three other questions of psychological impact asked them about what they though
would have happened if the JP Center was not built, to which 55% responded that the
commercial district would have remained the same as before the project, which interviewees
meant high crime and physical blight. Equally important is that thirty-five percent of respondents
indicated that the changes in the district would have taken longer to occur, thus supporting the
notion that JP Center accelerated the revitalization of the neighborhood.
Which of the following statements best describes whatyou think would have happened if the project was not developed (N =20):
11 55% / 'MTe commercial district would have remained the same as before the project
2 10% The changes in the district would have happened anyway
7 35% The changes in the district would have taken longer to occur
Not surprisingly business owners overwhelmingly responded (95% and 89%
respectively) that community and their businesses are better off since the project was completed.
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on the community (N= 19):
18 . 950/% Overall, the community is better off since the project was completed
1 5/% Overall, the community is worse off since the project was completed
-0 % Overall, the community is the same since the project was completed
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on your business (N4=18):
16 89%/ Overall, my business is better off since the project was completed
2 11%/ Overall, my business is worse off since the project was completed
...........................  ................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
0% Overall, mymbusiness is the same since the project was completed
Impact on Existing Grocery Stores: The Controversy with the "Bodegueros"
Since the opening of JP Center, it has been said that small grocery stores will be driven
out of business because of the competition from Stop & Shop. However, it seems that only one
grocery store has closed since the project was completed.70 During an interview, Tony Barros
supported the view that Stop & Shop has hurt bodegas and listed various bodegas that have
changed ownership in the last 5 years as evidence that the owners wanted to "get out of the
business" before it was too late. The interviewer was also told that sales of Hi-Lo Foods
Supermarket, the second largest supermarket in the neighborhood, have declined since the
opening of Stop & Shop. Given this information, I interviewed six grocery stores, 5 bodegas and
Hi-Lo Foods Supermarket, which represent a large proportion of the population of grocery stores
in the district. Below are summaries to selected responses. The complete survey results for
grocery stores are included in Appendix 2.
Only two bodegas in the sample were sold since Stop & Shop opened. However, it is
possible that other bodegas that were not interviewed have changed ownership recently.
Busiess ame wner Business tenure :Ownership tenr
1Evelyn'sMarket Rafael Meia m40 6 rs
2 Pimentel Market Luis Guerrero 31 6 months
3 Freddy's Market Bodega Freddy Cabral 17 s12.yrs
4 T-Lo Foods Supermarket Jillordan 38 rs38
5 Anibal Market (formerly Emilio's Grocery el Castillo 30
6Gentleza's Market antiago Rodriguez 10 7
Average Tenure 28 yrs1
Three of the interviewees (50%) said that sales have declined since the opening of Stop &
Shop, two (34%) said that sales increased and one person (17%) said sales have not changed.
Five (88%) of the interviewed stated that Stop & Shop had a major or moderate role in the
change of their business sales.
How has the number ofyour customers changed since the project was completed? or sinceyou acquired/established the business?
N- Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
6 1 17/ 1 | 17% 1 17/ 3 50%
How have sales of your business changed since the project was completed? or sinceyou acquired/ established the business?
N Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
6 1 17% 1 17% 1 17% 3 50%
What role doyou think that the project had on this change?
N Ma or Moderate Minor None Not Sure........................................... 4  .......................  .............................4 ....................................... .  ....................................................... 
6 3 50% 2 33%- 0% 1 17% 0%
70 Tony Barros mentioned that JR Variety closed down before changing ownership 3 times. None of the 20 businesses
interviewed mentioned the closing of JR Variety or other grocery stores, which presumably would have been a noticeable event
given the notoriety of the issue between the bodegas and Stop & Shop.
Surprisingly, Hi-Lo Foods Supermarket was one of the businesses that stated sales
increased steadily during the last five years. Bill Jordan, owner of the 20,000 square feet Hi-Lo
Foods Supermarket, said sales dropped about 5% the first month after the opening of Stop &
Shop, but they gradually went up again and kept raising. Jordan added that during the months
before the opening of Stop & Shop he was worried about the future of his business, but he
realized that his business strategy-based on market niche-would assure that not only would
the store survive but grow. According to Jordan, he does not compete with Stop & Shop by
offering the same merchandise selection. Instead he offers a better selection of products sought
by Hispanics and Caribbean customers. His small operation allows him to constantly bring
products that customers demand. He has suppliers in New York, Miami and the Caribbean,
which offer him more Hispanic brands, specialty items, and sometimes better prices than Stop &
Shop on selected items. Jordan further stated that he was very happy with the presence of Stop
& Shop because it brought many more customers to Jamaica Plain which now come to his store
for products not found elsewhere.
Freddy Cabral owner of Freddy's Grocery, a small bodega directly across from JP
Center, also said that his business sales went down right after the opening of Stop & Shop, but
they went up again and have increased significantly. Cabral said that bodega customers do not
go to bodegas to a get a full week of groceries, "they come here for a few items, because is
conveniently located and they don't have to wait in long lines to pay" he added. Many other
business owners echoed Cabral's comment that bodegas and supermarkets serve different needs.
For example, bodegas have traditionally provided credit to their well-known customers.
Although the impact of Stop & Shop on customers and sales of bodegas did not reach
consensus, the majority agreed that their businesses and more so, the community is better off
with JP Center. This may be in part because bodega owners also considered the benefits of the
Martha Elliot Health Clinic.
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on your business (N5):
3 60% Overall, my business is better off since the project was completed
............................ .... ...............................................................................................................................................................................................
2 40%/ Overall, my business is worse off since the project was completed
.............................................................................................................. ..................................................................................
-0%/ Overall, my business is the same since the project was completed
........................... .................................... .....................................................................................................................................................
Which of the folowing statements best reflects the project impact on the communiy (N= 5):
4 80%/ Overall, the community is better off since the project was completed
1 2 0 %a Over all, the community is worse off since the project was completed
0% Over all, the community is the same since the project was completed
One fundamental question remains, why some grocery stores experienced sales decline
while other experienced increases? Ricardo Austrich, the President of the Latino Grocers
Association (LAGA) and a food distributor, offered a simple explanation. "It is all in the
owner's skills," he said. He added that most bodegas are doing well or better since Stop & Shop
came to Hyde/Jackson, and that those that are not is because of management problems. Austrich
distributes candies to most or all the bodegas along Centre Street including Hi-Lo Foods, and he
confirmed which bodegas are selling more based on what they purchase from him now versus
what they purchased five years ago. Austrich also noted that the ownership turnover in some of
the bodegas is because the owners are either retiring or dying, "keep in mind that many of these
businesses are very old and their owners get tired or die...and [ownership] transitions are usually
messy," he added, citing Pimentel Market as an example. It most be noted that Austrich is an
advocate of bodegas and criticized the presence of Stop and Shop for other reasons not relevant
to this discussion. Austrich offers a reasonable explanation to the possible drop in sales or the
"problems" of the bodegas. However, there are other possible explanations:
- Between 1996 and 1997 (coincidentally the first year of Stop & Shop operation in
Hyde/Jackson), the Food Stamps program changed from paper stamps to an
Electronic Benefits Transfer Cards (EBT). The previous paper stamp program was
relatively easy to use and was as liquid as cash for bodegas. Many recipients of food
stamps used them in bodegas. Them, when the program changed it became more
restrictive and according to Bill Jordan there were numerous times when the
transactions did not get approve because of electronic communication problems,
which were later corrected. Jordan also pointed out that the whole EBT card program
received less funding that the paper Food Stamps, which represented an automatic
drop in demand for grocery.
- Changes in the demographic composition of Hyde/Jackson could mean that non-
Hispanic residents are less likely to shop at a Hispanic Bodega unless the businesses
offer a mix of products that attract a broad range of ethnic groups. Although this
seems to counter Hi-Lo's niche strategy of catering to the Hispanic community, Bill
Jordan explained that most of his new customers are not local residents and they drive
to his business. By contrast, bodegas are convenience stores that are most likely to
attract nearby residents.
Escalating rents could be hurting some of these businesses more than anything else by
eroding their profits.
The survey of six grocery stores represent 50% of all retail grocery establishments
including Hi-Lo Foods and Stop & Shop) in Hyde/Jackson. Based on their responses, it cannot
be concluded that Stop & Shop has had a direct positive impact on sales and customers of local
grocery stores. However, the findings of this study do not support the claim that Stop & Shop
had a "significant negative impact" on existing grocery stores. The evidence is that after five
years, virtually all grocery stores are still in business. If the impact had been negative, its effects
should be more evident at this time. Further, various grocery store owners claim that they are
doing better business, which was backed by a local supplier and long-term advocate of
neighborhood grocery stores.
Empirical evidence of business turnover
Concurrent with this research, Karl F. Seidman Consulting Services was documenting
outcomes and best practices on the City of Boston's Main Streets Program in three business
districts, including Hyde/Jackson, as part of study for the City of Boston and the Pew
Partnership. In conversation with Karl Seidman, he noted that there has been a fair amount of
business turnover in Hyde/Jackson in the last few years. Most notably, during the second half of
2000, about 8 businesses closed or moved out, among them Black Crow Caf6, Las Villas Market,
Kiaras Beauty Salon, Teddy's Hardware (which was over 40 years old), Prime Financials,
Vazquez Insurance Agency, Christies Market, and Looks. These businesses provided about 21
jobs. In many cases they were quickly replaced by other business, since vacancy rates have been
low in the neighborhood. For example, Christies Market was replaced by a Seven-Eleven store.
Teddy's Hardware was replaced by Rent-A-Furniture. Also, during the course of this research, a
video rental store in JP Plaza closed or moved out and was immediately replaced by a clothing
store (the same occurred in Egleston Square).
This business turnover seems puzzling, but it appears unrelated to the presence of Stop &
Shop and the Martha Elliot Health Center, especially because the turnover cuts across several
business categories that are not in direct competition with the supermarket or the clinic. One
paradoxical observation is that many of the business that closed or moved out of the district are
convenience type retailers that according to retail theory are most likely to succeed in
neighborhood commercial districts. Analyzing the causes of this turnover, although important, is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Impact on Capacity Building7'
Two forms of capacity building can be credited to JP Center, first the creation of a
Community Trust Fund, second the impact on JPNDC's economic development capacity. The
development team pledge to contribute $500,000 toward the establishment of a community-
driven Trust Fund. According to the adopted mission statement, the Trust "is created as a long-
term resource to benefit the health, development, and betterment of the Hyde Square/Jackson
Square community as a diverse and vibrant one." 72 Beneficiaries of the CBTF are residents and
business in the target area. In particular the principal goal of the Trust Fund is to make social and
economic investments in the target area that support programs and activities benefiting the
residents of Hyde/Jackson Square. The Trust Fund is used as community asset in support of
existing and emerging programs that meet important community needs such as training for
employment for youth and adults, educational and recreational activities for youth, programs for
the prevention of violence and substance abuse, elderly services and activities, scholarships for
postsecondary education, and economic assistance to new and existing owner operated small
businesses. With the proceeds from the project the Trust Fund has established an endowment and
uses the yield to provide grants to community organizations and business. To date the Trust
Fund has awarded close to $100,000 in grants to community organizations and businesses.
Contrary to what one would expect, JP Center did not build additional commercial real
estate capacity for JPNDC. This is an outcome that differs from the experience of other CDC-
sponsored commercial real estate projects in Boston. For example, Codman Square, Urban
Edge, Nuestra CDC, Dorchester Bay EDC, Quincy-Geneva, and Madison Park all gained
additional commercial real development capacity from their first projects and are currently very
active in commercial development. A number of factors may explain this difference. One
factor is that JPNDC role in the development of JP Center was less hands-on than the role of
71 Another form of capacity building is that the JPNDC receives a portion of the annual profits from the project. Unfortunately,
the CDC did not provide information about the fees it has received which could have been counted as part of the community
benefits of the project.
72 Press release from the Community Benefits Trust Fund dated August 27, 1997.
7 Interview with Fernando Milan.
other CDCs sponsoring commercial projects. For example, JPNDC did not participate in the
financial structuring and leasing of JP Center, both which are critical components of commercial
development. Thus, the CDC did not necessarily gained new competencies in commercial
development. Coupled with this, was the fact that the original project manager at JPNDC left the
organization to work with Levin's company.
JPNDC stated that the reason the CDC did not build additional commercial real estate
capacity was strategic.74 During the development of JP Center, the CDC conducted a
neighborhood-wide strategic planning process to guide the direction of the organization for the
next few years. The neighborhood planning process and other factors steered JPNDC into a
different direction. Among the factors that contributed to the CDCs strategic direction were:
e The commercial real estate market had changed, prices were increasing exponentially
and the private sector was more interested in commercial real estate, which
diminished the need for the CDC to engage in this activity.
e Jamaica Plain has significantly less vacant land than neighborhoods such as Roxbury
and Dorchester, which could discourage a commercial real estate development
strategy.75
- Employment and training of low-income residents became a growing need given that
1996 Welfare Reform threatened to leave many low-income families without a
supplemental source of income.
- Local businesses needed technical assistance and financing for them to survive this
period of neighborhood transformation. Small businesses seemed to have resented
the NDC for the lack of involvement they had on the development of JP Center and
the CDC realized that the local businesses needed more participation in the
revitalization of the district.
e Housing gentrification threatened the stability of low-income residents.
Assisting local businesses and providing employment and training services to local
residents became the two most important economic development strategies of JPNDC. In 1996
the CDC revived its business development program hiring a business manager to provide
technical assistance and packages business loans. In addition, building on the employment and
training experience with Stop & Shop, the CDC made a major commitment to helping local
74 Interview with Sarah Griffen.
75 Ironically, most of Urban Edge's commercial real estate development strategy focuses on the Jackson-Egleston corridor.
residents find jobs in or outside the neighborhood. In fact, JPNDC's Director of Economic
changed her role in the organization and became the Employment and Training Coordinator.
One significant influence contributing to the change in the strategic direction of JPNDC
is the professional background and outlook of staff with respect to community development.
JPNDC executive director and the former director of economic development have both stronger
background in organizing and advocacy than in real estate development. This does not mean that
JPNDC is not competent in real estate, which their portfolio of housing proves otherwise.
Instead it means that the organization may be more interested on improving the human capital of
the neighborhood than merely the physical environment. A business leader stated that the lack of
participation of local merchants in the development of JP Center may have prompted JPNDC to
correct its actions by proactively working with and helping local businesses. This is largely the
topic of the next section.
The Response of the CDC to the Controversy with JP Center
As stated in chapter 3, commercial real estate development creates tension with local
constituents. First, commercial real projects are likely to attract businesses that compete with
existing businesses, regardless of the size and ownership of the new businesses in the project.
Competition can make existing businesses stronger or can cause the weaker ones to fail.
Instinctively, business owners prefer to operate in an area of little or limited competition. Thus,
a project that brings competition often meets opposition of established businesses, as in the case
of JP Center. The second source of tension, and the most important, arises when the
development attracts large businesses are part of large national or regional chain or not owned by
local residents. When this occurs, local merchants argue that they cannot compete with the
resources and purchasing power of large franchises. Further, merchants resent that a local CDC
will use neighborhood assets (land and community support) as well as public subsidy to create
wealth for outsiders at the expense of local businesses. These issues were explicitly affirmed by
several business owners in Hyde/Jackson referring to JP Center and other potential
developments. Yet, there is also a feeling that not all neighborhood businesses are necessarily
worth helping, because some may not be efficient and may not provide the quality of goods and
services that residents want.
How does a CDC manage this tension? In the case of JPNDC, the CDC took various
steps to lessen the tension and to continue the revitalization of the neighborhood. First, the JP
Center development team created the Trust Fund.76 Second, JPNDC launched a community-
driven planning process that improved the CDC relationship with the community and that guided
its strategic direction for the next years. Third, the CDC revamped the business development
program that provides technical assistance, training, and loan packaging services. Fourth,
JPNDC provided staff support to strengthen the Hyde/Jackson Business Association and to bring
the Main Street program to the district. The CDC actively fostered these developments with the
assistance of neighborhood business leaders. One local merchant was invited to become a board
member of JPNDC.
JPNDC's afterward efforts did not deny claims that the development of JP Center failed
to consider the input of local businesses, nor did they deny the claim that the supermarket
negatively impacted local businesses, a claim that is not supported by the findings of this thesis.
However, the subsequent efforts of the JPNDC reinforced the notion that revitalizing a
neighborhood entails more than improving its physical character or the availability of goods and
services. As a former board member of JPNDC indicated instead of building more real estate
capacity and continue a "bricks and mortar" approach to revitalization, JPNDC focused its
attention on developing human capital and on preserving the social fabric of the Hyde/Jackson
neighborhood.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter describes the history and development process for JP Center, a partnership
of a private developer, a CDC, and a tenant management corporation of a public housing project.
From the perspective of the CDC the goal of JP Center was to revitalize the district by
developing the most blighted property in the neighborhood, create jobs for local residents, and
satisfy a need for goods and services. The private developer had one other goal: to attract more
affluent customers to the district to change their perceptions and increase their investment in the
community. All four goals have been accomplished in JP Center with different degrees of
success.
76 Several interviewees said that the Request for Proposals issued by the City of Boston to develop JP Center required the
developers to establish a package of community benefits.
The benefits of the project are compared against the public subsidies received, using 5
categories of impacts explained in chapter 2. JP Center had a positive impact on each of above
5 categories, which are:
1. Job and income creation directly generated by the project during the first year of
completion as measured by direct full-time equivalent jobs of the tenants, the estimated
payroll of those jobs, and the estimated indirect jobs and the payroll using industry
multipliers.
The project created 210 new jobs of which 125 were held by residents of Jamaica Plain,
Mission Hill, and Roxbury. Of the 210 jobs, 135 were full-time equivalentjobs. The estimated
annual payroll for 1997 is $2 million. In addition, the project may have created another 65
indirect jobs and an indirect payroll of $2.1 million. On a per job basis, this represents a public
subsidy of $28,231 per direct full-time job created and $19,000 per direct and indirect full-time
job created. More important, when considering that on average local businesses create about 3 to
4 jobs, JP Center increased the number of jobs in Hyde-Jackson by about 50%, from
approximately 400 to 600 jobs (excluding jobs created by non-profits and other institutions).
2. Fiscal improvements measured by property taxes paid and to be paid to the City of
Boston.
When comparing the property taxes paid and the estimate of property taxes to be paid
under two scenarios, the public investment translates into a subsidy of only $185,000 under
scenario 1, and positive investment of $265,441 under scenario 2. This type of project does not
generate significant returns on taxpayers' dollars, but it does not represent a taxpayer burden
either. When considering all the other public benefits of the project, JP Center was a wise public
investment.
3. Leverage effect, which measures the private financing that was leveraged for every
dollar of public subsidy.
The project subsidy represented 27 percent of the real estate cost and leveraged $10.4
million in private financing which represents $2.73 private dollars for every public dollar
invested. In addition, both tenants in the project, Stop & Shop and Martha Elliot Health Center,
invested millions of private financing for equipment, furniture, inventory, and supplies that is not
counted in the above ratio.
4. Physical improvement and overall impact on revitalization, measured at a qualitatively
level based on interviews with business owners and community leaders who accessed the
project's effect on district business activity, crime, property values, variety of goods and
services, and psychological well being of the community.
JP Center eliminated Hyde/Jackson Square's most blighted and polluted site, one that
gave the commercial district a negative reputation and prevented people from shopping the
neighborhood. All business owners interviewed agreed with this assessment. The majority of the
business owners (75% and 70%) reported that their customers and business sales increased since
the project was completed. Ninety four percent reported that crime went down and 100% that
property values increased. They also believe that the variety of products and services increased.
Surprisingly, half of the grocery stores interviewed, which represented 30% of the
population of grocery stores in Hyde/Jackson, indicated that their businesses are better off since
Stop & Shop moved to the neighborhood. Eighty percent of them believe that the community is
also better off since the project was completed. The interview results suggest that Stop & Shop
did not impact adversely the small grocery stores or Hi-Lo Foods, the second largest retail food
store in Hyde/Jackson. Instead, these businesses are competing on the basics of convenience and
variety of ethnic-products that attract Hispanic and Caribbean customers. Some suggested that
grocery stores having difficulties is the result of management problems. The case study
illustrates that local businesses can adapt and survive, particularly in businesses that can offer
niche products.
The psychological impact of the project is equally important and was very positive.
Business owners' confidence on the revitalization of the commercial district increased, which
was also boosted by a stronger business association and Main Street Program. Only 10% of the
interviewees said that the changes in the district would have happened anyway regardless of the
project, thus 90% believe that the changes would not have occurred or would have taken longer
to occur. Likewise, 95% said that the community is better off since the project was completed
and 89% believed their businesses are also better off.
The psychological impact of the project is well illustrated by the following quote from a
letter written by Leslie Belay which was published by The Boston Globe on October 27, 1996:
Thanks to the tenacity of community activists, the new market at Jackson Square has
hired record number of local residents. On the store's first day of business, it was evident
that dozens of teen-agers were working their first jobs as cashiers and baggers. Stocking
shelves and working behind meat and deli counters were women and men from our
neighborhood with full-time jobs, many of them skilled positions requiring substantial
training. Yet,....there is another less tangible element that comes into focus. It is the
feeling of community pride that I and my neighbors feels as we stroll the wide aisles of
the new supermarket.
5. Capacity building measures the ability of the project to create knowledge, skills, or other
assets that could be used for the continue improvement of the neighborhood.
The project also established $500,000 in a trust fund that is controlled by community
residents of Hyde/Jackson and established as a permanent vehicle to provide social and
economic investments in the organizational and business infrastructure of Hyde/Jackson Square.
The grants awarded serve to improve the social and economic fabric of Hyde/Jackson.
The CDC did not gain additional commercial real estate capacity. Instead, JPNDC
channeled its resources to address other pressing needs of the community, specifically
responding to the needs of local residents and business owners, building more the human
capacity than the "hardware" of Hyde/Jackson. The CDC's focus on developing a more skillful
workforce and on improving job access for local residents seems right on target. Jeremy Nowak
underscored the importance of this effort, he wrote, "inner-city neighborhoods require
'workforce intermediaries,' who can position themselves between residents and employers, even
more than they need real estate developers and social workers."77 In that sense JPNDC acted as
such workforce intermediary for the JP Center and based on that experience built capacity to
address the training and employment needs of Hyde/Jackson residents.
The JP Center is an unique but not uncommon model of public-private sector partnership.
The project leveraged the expertise, entrepreneurial skills, and relationships a private developer
as well as the local knowledge, revitalization mission, and advocacy interests of two non-profits
that allow the project to go forward while ensuring the highest possible return to the community
in the form of jobs, products, services, commercial vibrancy, and emotional well-being.
77 Nowack, Jeremy, Neighborhood Initiative and the Regional Economy. Economic Development Quarterly, Vol.11, No.1,
February 1997, page 7.
Egleston Center Case Study
We do not envision Egleston Square as a regional center, one which will attract people
from miles away. We do envision it as a neighborhood center which will attract people
who live in the surroundings areas as they seek the services and the experience they
need-commercial, cultural, recreational, social, and spiritual." Community Statement
Mission, Egleston Square Master Plan, 1991
The previous chapter discussed the case of JP Center. This chapter examines the second
case study, Egleston Center, a retail project developed by Urban Edge Housing Corporation
(Urban Edge) in Egleston Square. Following the outline of the previous case study, this chapter
describes the Egleston neighborhood, the local community development corporation that
sponsored Egleston Center, the goals of the project, and the impact on the neighborhood. This
chapter answers the following questions:
e How did the project come about? What were the intended goals?
e What has been the impact of the project on the revitalization of Egleston Square?
e How did the project contribute to the commercial real estate capacity of the CDC?
e How did the CDC manage the tension between commercial developments and local
constituents?
Neighborhood Context
Egleston Square straddles the two Boston inner city neighborhoods of Jamaica Plain and
Roxbury, and its commercial district is made of two intersecting corridors: Columbus Avenue
and Washington Street. Located about one half mile from Jackson Square in Jamaica Plain and
about one mile from Grove Hall in Dorchester, the district encompasses about one mile of retail
and residential areas. In the early 1960s, Egleston Square was a bustling center of commerce.
However, in the 1960s there was a massive flight of middle-income families to the suburbs.
Within a decade, the neighborhood was rapidly transformed into a low-income and immigrant
community. Correspondingly, the businesses in Egleston also changed and became
predominantly black- and Hispanic-owned.
Until the late 1980's, the principal means of public transportation in the area was the
elevated Orange Line of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), which
wound through Washington Street, connecting Egleston and Jamaica Plain with Downtown
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Boston. Despite the importance of the orange line in providing necessary transportation services
at that time, the elevated train was a massive structure on the narrow Washington Street. The
structure cast shadows over the entire commercial district and made Egleston Square look dark
and unsafe. One of the district's most important accomplishments occurred in 1987 when the
elevated orange line was removed and replaced by an underground subway station in Jackson
Square. The removal of the train tracks brought the commercial district to light since it allowed
residents and drivers passing through the district to see the businesses that were once hidden by
the shadows of the rusted steel tracks. A local merchant explained, "the removal of the Orange
Line revived a commercial district that didn't seem to exist before." The majority of businesses
owners interviewed acknowledged the impact of removing the orange line on improving the
physical appearance of the district. However, the benefits of the removal were mitigated by
costs to the community. The relocation of the train tracks to Jackson Square changed the
pedestrian path of area residents, depriving the commercial district of the large amount of foot
traffic generated by the train station. The foot traffic gain of Jackson Square was the loss of
Egleston. Nevertheless, most people agree that the removal of the train was best for the
neighborhood. The Merchant Association acknowledged the overall positive impact, stating "in
1987 the elevated train tracks were removed, literally allowing the sun to shine in Egleston. The
promise of a Washington St. corridor free from the darkness and noise of the elevated tracks,
presented an enormous opportunity." 78
Demographic Characteristics
Once the biggest physical obstacle to revitalization was removed, residents and business
owners gained a new dose of optimism with regard to the revival of the commercial district and
the neighborhood as a whole. However, several social problems challenged the possibility of
that revival. The population in 1990 was 12,040, which was primarily low- and middle-income
African-Americans and Hispanics, of which 32% lived in poverty. The unemployment rate was
also high (14% compared with 8% for the City of Boston), and median household income was
between $20,426 and $29,267, nearly half that of Boston. High school dropout rate was more
than six times that of Boston. The following table summarizes selected demographic
characteristics of the Egleston neighborhood based on 1990 Census.
78 Egleston Square Merchant Association, Application to the Boston Main Street Program, April 1995.
*Selected Demographic Characteristics
1990 Census, census tracks 813, 815, 1203 7 Egleston Boston
Population 12040. 574,283
Race/Etnicity
White (non-Hispanic) 17% 59%
Black (non-Hispanic) 48% 24%
Hispanic 34% 10%
Other 21% 12%
Unemployment rate 14/........8%
Median family income (range from the 3 census tracks) $20 426-$29,267. $49,266
% of households below PMSA median Income 84%
/ of low income families 72%
/% distribution of children under 18 in single parents househol sds 70 /ih r 43
needed more economic activity. In addition to the high unemployment and poverty rate, in the
early 1990's, Egleston suffered from a high incidence of crime, especially crime involving gang
and youth violence, concentrated around the site of former of the MBTA station.
The Commercial District
With the exception of Urban Edge and the Egleston Square Community High School, all
businesses in Egleston Square are currently located at the ground floor level. In addition, almost
all of the commercial buildings are one story in height. The retail activity in Egleston is
concentrated in one and half blocks on Washington Street, between Columbus Avenue and
Boylston Street. Egleston retail activity mainly offers convenience goods and services (such as
small grocery stores, hairdressers, and auto repair businesses) that cater to nearby residents. In
fact, the merchant association estimated in 1995 that about 85% of the district customers come
from the adjacent neighborhood. 80 The mission statement of the 1991 Master Plan, which serves
as the introduction to this chapter, is reflective of this Egleston Center characteristic as a small
neighborhood commercial district primarily serving the needs of its local residents.
The business directory from Egleston Square Main Street lists ninety businesses in
roughly thirty closely-related categories. Six of these thirty business categories represent over
9 Sources: Demographics of Urban Edge's Service Area based on 1990 U.S. Census, as well as reports from National Decision
Systems provided by the Department of Neighborhood Development.
80 Egleston Square Merchant Association, Application to the Boston Main Street Program, April 1995.
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half of all the businesses in Egleston Square. The following table summarizes these six largest
business categories:
at g re w th the Ia g s . o....tr............. .................. . . . . .  .. ......ategrieswitt e rget cocenratin 0Share of Total
businesses Total Businesses
2 Salons (Barber, Beaut Salon, Nail Salo 11 12%
3 Markets (Grocery store9s 10%
4 'Communications & Beepers 7%
5 Dry Cleaners/ Laundromats 5 6/
6 Restaurants 5 6/
Ttal 485%
Total Businesses in Egleston Sq. Main Streets 90
Profile of Urban Edge
Urban Edge started in the 1970s as part of a Jamaica Plain and Roxbury organizing
alliance formed to stop a proposed highway that that would have cut through both neighborhoods
and ripped them apart. The organizing efforts succeeded but the highway land-taking, coupled
with bank redlining, fueled real estate speculation that left behind a destabilized community.
The precarious conditions of the neighborhood required a patient revitalization effort described
in Urban Edge's profile as a "house-by-house, block-by-block community redevelopment
strategy that would take decades." 8' Urban Edge was founded in 1974 by the Ecumenical Social
Action Committee (ESAC) to act as a nonprofit real estate broker in the fight against redlining
and the displacement of low- and moderate-income families. Eventually Urban Edge's
responsibilities grew as the organization took on the task of buying and renovating multifamily
housing to preserve the affordability of rental units. Urban Edge's Executive Director, Mossik
Hacobian, a trained architect who joined the organization in 1978, described the evolution of
Urban Edge from brokerage to housing development as follows:
"There were quite a few vacant buildings in the neighborhood, and we felt we needed to
intervene in this cycle of disinvestment and abandonment. We received a demonstration
grant to buy one to three family houses, renovate them, and sell them to owner occupants.
Then in early 80s, so many people wanted to live and speculate in the neighborhood
that.. .we became concerned that multifamily units that had been serving low-income
families would be converted to higher-priced housing. Our involvement in
homeownership was based on a belief that residents should have control of their housing
81 Urban Edge's web site <http://www.urbanedge.org>, A Brief Profile.
and the development that happens within their community. When we turned to
multifamily rental housing we were still trying to capture the same concept."8 2
The demonstration grant to buy one- to three-family houses led to the acquisition and
renovation of the neighborhood's most distressed properties. Between 1976 and 1980, the
organization developed about 120 housing units in Jamaica Plain. After that, most of the CDC's
housing efforts were concentrated in Egleston Square where it eventually moved its office after
years on Centre Street. During the 1980s and 1990s, Urban Edge grew its portfolio of
multifamily housing very quickly and became one of the largest CDCs in Boston. Today, the
organization manages over 1,000 housing units and three commercial facilities (including
Egleston Center), and sponsors several programs, including economic development,
homeownership lending, organizing and others. The CDC, along with its subsidiary property
management company, has an annual operating budget of $10 million and employs 50 people, of
which about one quarter are area residents.
From Housing to Economic Development
The first non-residential building that the organization developed was in the early 1990s.
The building was developed in response to a need for more youth activities in order to prevent
school dropouts and gang violence. The CDC developed a two-story building at 3134
Washington Street (which housed the first YMCA branch in the neighborhood) and a community
high school. Although the project was not a conventional commercial development and was not
intended as an economic development endeavor, it provided the CDC with experience that would
be used for later commercial developments. Egleston Center would be Urban Edge's second
commercial project and its first major economic development initiative (discussed further
below).
In 1995, Urban Edge hired its first director of economic development to coordinate the
CDC's growing economic development activities. Alvaro Lima, a trained urban economist, took
over the reigns of Urban Edge's second economic development initiative. This initiative was the
a collaborative of six Boston CDCs that secured two million dollars in federal tax credits issued
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Led by Urban Edge, the
collaborative was one of a handful of groups in the country that received the tax credits and sold
82 Atlas, John and Ellen Shoshkes, Saving Affordable Housing: What Community Groups Can Do & What Government Should
Do, National Housing Institute, 1997. The document is available on the World Wide Web at: http://www.nhi.org.
them to the private sector, primarily commercial banks. Urban Edge manages a fund that
provides debt and equity financing to local businesses. Thus far, the collaborative has provided
over $400,000 in financing to local businesses. The fund made an equity investment in an
Athlete's Foot franchise, which is co-owned by Urban Edge and a local entrepreneur. The
business is a tenant at Urban Edge's Egleston Center.
Lima's economic analysis and strategic planning skills led Urban Edge to its third and
most ambitious economic development initiative: the Jackson/Egleston Square Revitalization
Plan. The CDC completed a four-year comprehensive development strategy for the
Egleston/Jackson Square, setting the stage for up to $300 million in housing and commercial
development projects over the next decade. The plan included proposals for disposition of
public land and for infrastructure improvements. The planning process, which received good
exposure in the local media, involved community residents, business owners, public officials,
and other community stakeholders. More importantly, Urban Edge received the endorsement of
government agencies to carry out this revitalization plan. The implementation of the plan would
have placed the CDC in the unique role of acting as intermediary planning agency like Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA). However, the comprehensive revitalization plan suffered a
setback when Urban Edge's proposal to develop a site in Jackson Square for Kmart met
significant opposition from business owners and residents who organized against, and ultimately
defeated the project. The Jackson-Egleston Strategy has since come to a halt, and it appears that
the BRA will be conducting a separate master planning effort for the area. 83 Nevertheless, the
CDC is trying to move its Egleston/Jackson Square projects forward and remain active in
commercial development. In fact, during the course of research for this thesis, Urban Edge
signed a purchase and sale agreement for the largest commercial property in Egleston, a vacant
two-story building on Washington Street that will be converted into retail and office use.
How Egleston Center came to being
Project Development History
During the 1980s, the State Representative for Egleston Square initiated a neighborhood-
based master planning process for Egleston Center that lasted about seven years. The
neighborhood-based master planning process, which had the support of the City of Boston,
83 Interview with Karen Sutherland.
focused on, among other issues, strategies to develop the former site of the MBTA Station. At
the time of this planning process, crime, gangs, and youth violence were among the biggest
issues in the neighborhood. An Urban Edge survey from the late 1980s revealed that residents
ranked safety, after-school programs, and day care as the top three needs of their neighborhood.
The turning point of youth violence was in 1991, when police shot to death a young resident who
was involved in gangs. This death shocked the neighborhood and sealed the need to do more to
prevent both youth violence and school drop outs. Urban Edge and other organizations
responded to this need by launching an after-school program and a day care program. In
addition, the CDC renovated a commercial property that brought in the previously mentioned
YMCA branch and community high school.
The second resident survey done by Urban Edge, about two years after the first survey,
reflected that some of the issues in the neighborhood had changed. In the second survey,
residents ranked safety, jobs and retail services (specifically, a bank and a pharmacy) as their top
three priorities. 84 The closing of the Egleston Orange Line Station left the Square with a vacant
parcel that, although highly contaminated, provided a development opportunity to create jobs and
serve the retail needs identified by local residents. When the economy softened in the early
1990's, the neighborhood planning process came to a halt, and the possibilities of developing the
MBTA site seemed remote. Then an unusual strike of good luck occurred when Fleet Bank
announced the acquisition of Bank of New England. In response, the Community Reinvestment
Act Coalition took the opportunity to press the bank for specific community investment
commitments. Fleet agreed to open a branch in Egleston Square. The prospect of a bank tenant
breathed new life into the plans for Egleston Center. With the bank as a tenant, the
neighborhood-based planning participants began to negotiate with the City and the MBTA to
move the project forward. In the meantime, Urban Edge installed a temporary trailer to be used
by Fleet as a branch office while Egleston Center was being developed.
Project Goals and Expected Impact
For Urban Edge, developing Egleston Center was an appropriate step in line with its
affordable housing work. The CDC saw its housing redevelopment as creating a stronger
environment for economic development. As indicated in the 1990 resident survey, the
neighborhood was concerned about crime and economic development opportunities for local
residents. The CDC saw the potential of the MBTA site to address those needs, particularly the
bank and pharmacy sought by residents and business owners alike. Dick Mason, who managed
the development of Egleston Center, said in an interview, "the neighborhood never had a bank,
and many residents were discontent with the high fees and limited services of the local check
cashier." 85 Business owners and community leaders believe that the MBTA site was the gateway
to the commercial district. Therefore, they wanted a development that would epitomize the
neighborhood's past-the train station-and its future as a vibrant and diverse district. Urban
Edge's Executive Director, Mossik Hacobian, explained that these elements were consciously
incorporated in the design and tenant mix of the project.
Along with economic development goals, Urban Edge had a more altruistic goal for
Egleston Center. The CDC had always been aware of the racial, social, and income divide
between Roxbury and Jamaica Plain. Egleston Square was the dividing line between both
neighborhoods. Bringing the Roxbury and Jamaica Plain neighborhoods closer together was the
larger goal of the CDC. According to Mossik Hacobian, Egleston Center, as well as the Jackson-
Egleston Strategy, was a way to bridge the divide between the two neighborhoods and "achieve
greater racial and income integration." The CDC envisioned Egleston Center as part of a series
of developments that would link Egleston and Jackson Square into one commercial district that
would consequently improve the racial, income, and retail diversity, as well as increase the
interdependence of both neighborhoods.
Development hurdles
A significant hurdle in the development of Egleston Center was the environmental
remediation. The former MBTA station had soil contamination that required a remediation of
$850,000, which represented 27% of the total development costs. The MBTA contributed
$500,000 towards the site remediation and the remaining $350,000 was contributed from the
OCS grant. Another hurdle in the development process was the fact that the site was owned by a
quasi-public state agency. This meant that Urban Edge had the difficult task of negotiating and
coordinating the project with two government entities: the MBTA, a state-quasi public entity,
and the Public Facilities Department (PFD), an agency of the City of Boston.8 6 After long
negotiations, the MBTA granted a 99-year lease on the land and agreed for the PFD to handle the
84 Interview with Mossik Hacobian.
85 Interview with Dick Mason.
selection of the developer. PFD issued a request for proposals to develop Egleston Center and
Urban Edge was designated as the developer.87
Project timeline
From project conception to completion, Egleston Center took nearly 10 years. This
included the community planning process that was convened in late 1980s. The project
construction took one full year, from November of 1995 to November of 1996. McDonald's was
the first tenant to move in, almost immediately after project completion. Fleet Bank (now
Sovereign Bank) moved in a few months later.
Community Outreach
Egleston Center is notorious for its lengthy community process. Some staff at Urban
Edge stated that the community process alone took about seven years.88 As described
previously, Egleston Center grew out of a community planning process that had established a
vision and related design guidelines for the MBTA site. Urban Edge's building design
responded to the planning vision and to the character of the area. The building combined
concrete, glass= and a steel atrium that resembled the former train station. Mossik Hacobian
emphasized the design details, building layout and massing as an important contribution to the
district. He emphasized that the project, unlike many neighborhood strip malls, did not place the
parking in front of the building. Instead, the parking was placed behind the building so that all
storefronts front the street. Despite these positive design features, the project faced controversy
because of the tenant mix and the potential traffic impact (discussed in more detail in the
following section, Project Leasing). In addition, several business owners highlighted that the
original vision of Egleston Center was to create a bigger project with more retail spaces and two
stories of office space that would have attracted office workers into the district. However, these
business owners could not explain why the project was scaled down to one-story with 7,000
square feet of retail space. Mossik Hacobian explained that the CDC tried to partner with the
family that owned a vacant commercial building next to the MBTA site. His proposal was to
make one large development that had enough space to house a bank, a pharmacy; and other
86 The Public Facilities Department (PFD) became a few years later the Department of Neighborhood Development (DND).
87 In fact, Urban Edge was the only entity that responded to the Request for Proposals.
88 This may be an overstatement of the length of the community process because it may include the period of negotiations with
the MBTA, PFD, other lenders.
retailers. However, the negotiations with the private owners of the adjacent property failed.
Urban Edge had no other choice but to pursue a smaller development on the MBTA site.
Project Leasing
Private lenders required Urban Edge to secure two solid tenants before they could issue a
lending commitment. Fleet Bank was the first tenant. To lease the remaining space, Urban Edge
then recruited a downtown Boston brokerage firm that specializes in retail leasing. In the
process of securing a second tenant, Urban Edge began negotiations with CVS and Walgreen's,
but found that the remaining space was not big enough for them. In addition, the pharmacies did
not like the fact that parking would be in the back of the structure. At one point, Urban Edge
made an agreement with Walgreen's as part of a proposed combined development with the
owners of the adjacent site. However, Walgreen's walked away when Urban Edge could not
reach a final agreement with the other property owners. 89 Eventually, Urban Edge reached an
agreement with McDonald's for a McDonald's Express and drive-thru window. This new tenant
created some controversy in the neighborhood. Some residents and community leaders did not
want a fast-food restaurant in the district's most visible property. Others were concerned that the
drive-thru would create additional traffic congestion while not attracting sufficient pedestrian
traffic to the district. During thesis interviews, several merchants echoed this last issue. Then,
the Egleston Square Neighborhood Association did a survey and found that residents supported
the McDonald's. The survey results cleared the way for Urban Edge to sign McDonald's as the
project's second tenant. One other aspect that helped in getting community support for the fast-
food restaurant is that McDonald's selected a highly regarded minority entrepreneur from
Roxbury as the franchise operator. The third space was reserved for an Athlete's Foot store that
opened in 1999. Urban Edge commissioned a feasibility study that revealed that such a sport
shoe store would be feasible in Egleston. Consequently, Urban Edge bought the franchise rights
for the Egleston area and recruited a local entrepreneur to co-invest in the store=and manage it on
a daily basis. This effort on the part of Urban Edge is commendable. The CDC reserved a retail
space for a long time to attract a local entrepreneur and provided most of the financing for the
business. Further, Urban Edge cleverly married the local entrepreneur with a national franchise
that could provide technical assistance and a proven business model. The fourth and final space
89 Coincidentally, a small neighborhood pharmacy was established in the Square shortly after the development of Egleston Center
was announced, and about two years later Walgreen's developed a stand-alone building on Columbus Avenue just one block
away of Egleston Center.
was used for program space of the CDC until January of 2001 when it was leased to H&R Block.
In summary, the following table shows the distribution of space (by tenants) for the project:
Tenants Type of Business Size in Sq. Ft. Date moved in
I Sovereign Bank (formerly Fleet) Bank 3,000 1996
McDonalds hRestaurant 1,70v1996
amun. oruneyMcDonald 's rece1heslstrehl7igtmnh0atri0oeen
3 Athletes Foot Sport Shoes 1,400 1999
4 H-R Block Tax Services 900 2001
Total 7,000
Perfor ance of Tenants at Egleston Center
In explaining the success of the project, Mossik Hacobian and Dick Mason highlighted
that McDonald's insisted on a three-year "kick-out" clause that allowed the restaurant to give a
year's notice to vacate the space if its annual gross sales within three years did not reach a certain
amount. Fortunately, McDonald's reached the sales threshold eight months after it opened and
currently its annual gross sales are twice the threshold. The lease with McDonald's also includes
a percentage-of-rent clause that allows Urban Edge to collect additional rent above certain gross
sale levels. This rent structure is not available with the Bank. Therefore, the CDC does not how
profitable the bank branch has been. In contrast, Urban Edge's equity stake in Athlete's Foot
allows it to monitor the sales of the business. According to Mossik Hacobian, the store was
doing "okay"- but barely meeting operating projections. However, Charles Lauture, the
manager and co-owner of Athlete's Foot, was very optimistic about his business and Egleston
Square. Lauture recently added a new product line that appeals to the residents of the
community and has increased sales. Surprisingly, given the small size of his store, he reported
that his business employs seven people (including Lauture) and has a payroll of $ 100,000 per
year. The last tenant, H&R Block, is too new to fairly judge its performance at this time.
All of the tenants pay rents that are above market when compared to rents in Egleston
Square. However, there are not many true comparables since Egleston Center is the newest
building in the area, whereas all others are rehabilitated buildings. Regardless, some of the
interviewees criticized Urban Edge for setting rents that automatically excluded local businesses
from renting space at Egleston Center. Rents at Egleston Center in 1996 where between $16 and
$18 per square foot (triple net), which was between 30% and 80% higher than on-going rents in
the area at that time. 90 The rent at Egleston Center today, based on the amount paid by the
newest tenant, is about 25% higher than the rates in 1996.
Project Cost and Public Subsidy
Total Development Cost
The total development cost of Egleston Center was $3.1 million, of which $850,000
(27%) was environmental remediation, $1.46 million was construction costs (47%), and the
remaining $788,000 was soft costs (26%). The table below summarizes Total Development Cost
(TDC) of the project: 9'
Egston Center - Total Development Cost
Sources of Funds %ofTDC
M-BTA 500,000 16%/
:OCS Grant 500,000 16
Total Sources$31400 0%
Hard Costs
Envirn R diaton 850,000 27/
Soft Costs
Architect's & Engineer's Fees, Appraisals, Construction
Fiacn Ineet nuaCnsulants, and te 8,5 6/
.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Total Uses $04,000 10%
Glto ubsidied Fud2$,50,000 43%
Total Sguare Feet of Building ,000
Total Development Cost Per Square Foot $0
Total Subsid $per quae Foot
TDC per SF excluding environmental remediation costs $2
Grant
Grant
Grant
Loan
Loan
Loan
The City of Boston Public Facilities Department (PFD) provided $1.2 million to cover
remediation costs, equity deficiencies and a loan guarantee; of this amount, $350,000 was a
grant. In addition, OCS provided a grant of $500,000 and the MBTA gave a grant of $500,000.
90 Several business owners said that rents in 1996 where between $10.00 and $15.00 per square foot, and most of the lease
structures in the area are gross rents. Thus the difference, in rent between Egleston Center and spaces in the area can be as much
as 100%.
Citizens Bank was the permanent lender for $900,000 (29% of TDC). The public subsidy
amounted to $3.8 million or 43% of the total project cost, which represents $193 of subsidy per
square foot.
Egleston Center was clearly an expensive project at $403 per square foot, including
remediation costs, and $322 per square foot when excluding environmental remediation. This
cost excludes the value of the land, which the MBTA virtually gave for free due to the
environmental problems at the site. Several other reasons account for the high costs. First, the
lengthy development process meant that the CDC had higher carrying costs for overhead,
amounting to 9% of TDC. In addition, a lengthy process increases other soft costs, such
architectural and consulting fees. Second, the high quality of the building's design, materials,
and features resulted in higher costs. For example, the most distinctive feature of the building is
an open atrium facing Columbus Avenue and Washington Street, with a glass and steel roof that
resemble the former orange line station. In addition to the cost of building such a feature, the
atrium is a public space for which no rent is collected. Finally, the 7,000 square foot project is
too small to enjoy the economies of scale that bigger projects gain on a per square foot basis.
Job and Income Creation of Egleston Center
This thesis measures the impact of commercial projects, as described in Chapter 3, based
on five indicators: (1) job and income creation, (2) fiscal improvement, (3) leverage of private
financing, (4) physical improvement and overall impact on revitalization, and (5) capacity
building. This section discusses the impact on the first three indicators.
Construction Payroll and Construction Jobs
A report from the City of Boston's Department of Neighborhood Development (DND)
shows that total construction payroll for Egleston Center was $600,000, representing 41% of the
hard costs of the project. The report also shows a total of 7,921 hours of workers' labor, of
which 70% were hours worked by Boston residents, 82% were worked by ethnic minorities, and
14% by females. The high resident and minority participation may be due to the hiring of Cruz
Construction, a minority-owned general contractor from Roxbury. This high percentage of
resident and minority participation on this project appears to be a praiseworthy success story.
91 The statement with the Total Development Cost of Egleston Center was provided by Urban Edge and was dated October 28,
1996.
However, the report from DND may be under-reporting this success. The average hourly rate for
the project is documented at $76, which is more than twice the average construction wage based
on 1996 Suffolk County Business Patterns. This may indicate that the total hours of workers'
labor may be under-reported, which is very likely the case.92 Nonetheless, the $600,000 payroll
amount was used to estimate a range of full-time equivalent construction jobs for one year based
on average hourly rate of $25 to $31 from the 1996 Suffolk County Business Pattern. According
to the methodology described in chapter 3, the project created between 10 and 17 full-time
equivalent construction jobs.
Construction Payroll $600,000
Full-Time Equivalent Construction Jobs 10-17
Direct and Indirect Jobs Created
Based on information provided by the tenants, the following table summarizes the
number of jobs created by Egleston Center, and the corresponding job payroll:
Tenants Nme e T:Pyol Tnn' nietIdrc
Of new jobs Investment9 3 1 job jobs
jobs 'Multiplier'
:overeign Bank (formerly Fleet) 9 $234,304 $0,002731 1
2M onls20 15 $182,000 $250,000: 1.4273 6
3 Athletes Foot 7 1 5 $100,000 $300,000: 1.4690 2
4 HR Block IN/A N/A N/ N/Al
Total............37 27 $516,304 1 $850,000: 21
McDonald's created the most jobs at 20, of which 15 are full-time equivalent (FTEs).9 4 The
bank created seven FTEs, and Athlete's Foot reported five FTEs.95 HR & Block was not
included because it just opened in 2001 and the operation is not expected to create that many
FTE jobs. The three main tenants reported that all of their workers are residents of Jamaica
92 it also seems strange that a detailed report by trade will have a rounded $600,000 for total payroll and that construction payroll
is 41% of total construction costs, which is very high. According to the Boston Redevelopment Authority, studies from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics indicate that on average construction wages are 25% of hard costs.
93 Includes investment in equipment, furniture, leasehold improvements, fees, initial inventory and working capital. The
investment for McDonald's and Athlete's Foot was provided by the respective owner. The investment amount for the bank was
estimated by the author based on information provided by a manager from a comparable bank branch, who quoted that the initial
bank investment could be as high as half a million dollars.
94 McDonald's reported 20 jobs, 10 full-time and 10 part-time, and weekly payroll of $3,500 which does not include the owners
salary. Therefore FTE=10+10/2 and annual payroll=$3,500 x 52 weeks.
95 Some of the jobs of the bank were created earlier and transferred from the temporary structure-the trailer-that was placed at
3134 Washington Street. All of these jobs are counted as new because the trailer was a temporary structure while Egleston
Center was erected.
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Plain, Roxbury, and Dorchester. In addition, they are all ethnic minorities. 96 The following table
shows the effect on employment and income of the project:
Direct Full-Time Equivalent Jobs 27
Direct Annual Payroll $516,304
Indirect Jobs 21
Indirect Annual Payroll 97  $702,912
Total FTE jobs Created (excluding construction) 48
Total Annual Payroll of Direct and Indirect FTE jobs $1,219,216
Direct FTE Jobs held by local residents 27
Payroll of Direct jobs held by local residents $516,304
Public Subsidy per Direct job Created $49,541
Public Subsidy per Direct & Indirect Job Created $27,969
The public subsidy for every direct FTE job created was $49,541, which is above the job
guidelines for Community Development Block Grants (CDBG). When considering the direct and
indirect jobs created, the subsidy per job drops to $27,969. The subsidy would drop even further
if this job calculation considered the jobs created by the property management company for
administrative and maintenance functions. As stated in chapter 3, one limitation when analyzing
the job multiplier effect is that regional multipliers do not capture the impact that a retail
business in one neighborhood may have on other retail businesses elsewhere. It could be the
case that the new businesses in Egleston Center reduce consumer expending in some other
neighborhoods, which may have resulted in some job reduction in those other neighborhoods.
Thus, the net gain to the region is not clearly captured in the multipliers of retail businesses.
Fiscal Impact
This thesis proposes to measure fiscal impact using the property taxes paid by the project.
However, Egleston Center does not pay property taxes because the land is owned by the MBTA,
96 The total payroll for McDonalds and Athletes Foot was provided by the respective business owner. The payroll for Sovereign
Bank was not available and the average wage for commercial banks based on 1997 Suffolk County Business Pattern was $71,620
which is too high as an average for a branch. The average 1997 wage for all industries in Suffolk County was $41,065 and for all
Massachusetts was $33,472. To avoid overestimating the payroll of the bank, the author used the (lower) average wage for all
industries in Massachusetts.
9' The 1997 average annual wage for all industries in Massachusetts was $33,472. This wage is multiplied by the number of
indirect jobs to estimate indirect payroll. Wage Source: 1997 County Business Patterns (Massachusetts Totals), U.S. Census
Bureau.
and as a quasi-public state agency, the MBTA does not pay municipal property taxes. It is
important to highlight that property taxes are not the only way to measure the fiscal impact of a
project. For the purpose of this thesis, property taxes were used because they are the most
factual and readily available indicator of return to the public sector. Other forms of fiscal impact
that require a more complex analysis include sales taxes and income taxes paid by the employees
of the project, and corporate income taxes paid by the tenants of the project.
Leverage of Private Capital
Egleston Center leveraged $0.41 of private financing for every dollar of public subsidy of
the total development cost, and $0.79 when adding the tenants' investment of at least $850,000
for equipment, furniture, inventory and working capital. It should be noted that private financing
was low because the public sector provided substantial debt financing. However, only 43% of
the total development cost was subsidy, with the remaining 57% of project debt requiring
repayment. The table below shows a summary of costs, subsidies and leverage:
Total Development Cost of Project $3,104,000
Private Investment of TDC $900,000
Private Investment as a Percent of TDC 29%/
Leverage Effect of public dollars $0.41
Tenants' Investment (equipment, furniture, inventory, etc.) $850,000
Total Leverage Effect of public dollars $0.79
Impact on Physical Improvement and Revitalization
Sample of Businesses
Twenty of the 89 businesses in Egleston Square were interviewed for this thesis,
representing 23% of all the businesses in the Main Street area. The following table shows the
categories of businesses interviewed, which include 12 of the approximately 29 business
categories in the Egleston Square Main Street Directory:
3Dug Store/hray/
4 Furniture
5 ardwar 1e5
8 estaurants 15/
9Iestauran.s(Qgui ServiceTae-Ot 1u
10 Salons Barber & Beauty 5
Total Sample 20
The sample included two tenants of Egleston Center: McDonald's and Athlete's Foot.
Most of the businesses (17) were established before Egleston Center was built. The youngest
business in the sample is one year old and the oldest is 35. On average, the sampled businesses
have been established for 12 years and most of the owners have been with their business from
the beginning. All businesses are independently-owned, with two established as franchise
operations whose owners are resident of Roxbury. Appendix 3 provides a sample survey with
the tabulated responses. In addition to the survey, the thesis author attended a meeting of the
Egleston Merchant Association, which served as a focus group for the thesis.98 The following
sections summarize the key findings of the interviews.
Impact on Physical Revitalization
Merchants described the high crime at the former MBTA site as a problem that Egleston
Center eliminated. Several said that gangs once used the MBTA station to escape after
committing a crime. When the station was removed, the gangs had no where to hide or escape,
so they took "ownership" of the vacant site. Robert Lawson, whose beauty supply business is
directly across from the former station, summarized the problem by stating:
Crime was high when the station was there, but residents use it and so there were always
customers around, but once the station was removed, the criminals remained and
customers did not want to come to the district...I could see every day gang fights and
assaults at the former station...it was bad for business."99
98 The meeting was held on June 20, 2001 and was attended by 14 businesses.
99 Interview with Robert Lawson.
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A police officer who attended the meeting of the Merchants Association echoed the impact of
Egleston Center in reducing crime. He stated that Egleston Center is a testament to the theory of
"Fixing Broken Windows," 00 which asserts that crime escalates when signs of abandonment and
physical neglect remain. The officer said that the presence of the bank contributes to more
policing and security. Merchants said that the bank made it easier for them to make regular
deposits, reducing their cash holdings at the stores, and increasing their personal safety.
The impact of the project on improving the physical appearance of the district was also
highlighted at the meeting. Meeting members described the building as the focal point of
Egleston Square and praised the rear parking, which makes it look more urbane. A merchant
made a point that, at night, the atrium is illuminated with soft lights reflected against the glass
roof, which creates a nice view of the district. Mario Melendez, a merchant in the district for
nearly thirty years said, "those who saw Egleston Square six years ago can now appreciate the
changes that have occurred."' 0'
Rents have also increased in the district. Most interviewees (85%) rent space and, on
average, they said that rent increased by 39%. Rapid rent increases was identified as one of the
biggest concerns to merchants. Only one of the three merchants that own their properties could
estimate the increase in property values, which was 20%. This could suggest that there are not
many commercial buildings sold in the area. In fact, the three largest commercial property
owners in the area were interviewed and their responses are discussed later in this chapter.
Several merchants also said that Egleston Center encouraged other property owners to fix their
buildings. A summary of merchant views on the perceived impacts of the Egleston Center
project is shown below:
100 This theory was advanced in the early 1980s and was very debated after the publication of the book "Fixing Broken
Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities" by James wilson and George Kelling, (Simon & Schuster,
1996).
101 Interview with Mario Melendez.
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In general what was the impact of the project on the district?
% of Increased or
N sample Improved Decreased Didn't change
Crime.20 100% 0% 18 | 90% 2 10%
Pro~ectite 20 1000/ 20 100/%/ - 0
P-r jt sie2 %0
-.Property value 19 950/ 18 195/o 0/ 1 5/
BusinessRents 19 1
Conditions of buildings in the
district 19 95% 18 95%- 0% 1 5%
Commercial vacancy 20 1000/ 0/ 16 80/ 4 20/
Abandoned properties 20 1000/ 0% 17 85% 3 15% 
Impact on Business Activity
A majority of the merchants (55% to 60%) said that the number of shoppers coming to
the district and the number residents buying in the district "increased a lot." Interestingly, when
asked about the change in their customers, only 35% said that their customers "increased a lot."
Overall, most interviewees said that customers and sales increased and 75% of the interviewees
believe that the project had a "major" or a "moderate" role- in the increase of customers and
sales.
How has the number of shoppers coming into the district changed since the project was completed?
N= Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 1155/ 6 300/ 2 10%o 1 5/
How has the number of residents buyn in the district changed since the project was completed?
N= Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 12 60% 6 30% - 0% 2 10%
How has the number ofyour customers changed since the project was completed? or sinceyou acquired/established the business?
...................................................  . . . . ... .. .. .. ..................................................................................................................................................
N= Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 7 35% 6 30% 4 20% 3 15%
What role doyou think that the project had on this change?
...................... ............................................................................ ......................................................................................... 
... . . . . . .
N= Ma'or Moderate Minor None Not Sure
20 8 40% 7 35% 0% 5 25/ 0%
H ow have sales ofyour business changed since the project was completed? or sinceyou acquired/established the business?
N= Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 7 35% 8 40% 2 10% 3 15%
What role doyou think that the project had on this change?
Major Moderate Minoront
20 8 _40% 7 35% 0% 4 __20% 1 5%
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All the merchants agreed that the variety of products and services available in the district
has increased. Some business owners emphasized that the neighborhood now has a bank, two
pharmacies and three laundromats, as envisioned by the master plan of the early 1990s. Ninety
five percent (95%) said that anchor businesses have increased and 84% said local businesses
have increased. However, various interviewees expressed concern about maintaining a balance
between large and small businesses. They said that Egleston Center made the neighborhood
more attractive to large national retailers-Walgreens and Blockbuster-that compete with
existing local businesses, without adding new product variety. In fact the local pharmacy that
was established after Egleston Center was announced, reduced its space by half because sales
plummeted when Walgreen's opened. At least two other local businesses have cut their spaces
by half and have rented the remaining to start ups. This issue is reflected in the 20% of
interviewees who answered that existing businesses have decreased, rather than expanded, in
size. In fact, the majority of the local businesses have not expanded physically.
In general what was the impact of the project on the district?
% of Increased or
N sample Improved Decreased Didn't change
ariety products & services 19 950 19 100/ 0/
Anchor businesses 20 1000/ 19 95/ 0/ 1 5/o
ndependent businesses 19 95/ 16 0/
Physical expansions of existing
-businesses 20 100/ 2 1 0 4 20/ 14 70/
Business Turnover and Commercial Developments after Egleston Center
A detailed inventory of businesses in Egleston Square immediately before the
development of Egleston Center is not available. Such inventory would have allowed an analysis
of business turnover.102 An important characteristic of the district is that most of the businesses
are relatively young, with the business in the sample at 12 years old. In addition, the majority of
the current owners established their businesses, which shows little ownership turnover.
Nevertheless, some changes in businesses and commercial real estate projects can be described.
Since the announcement of Egleston Center, about 10 new businesses were established in
Egleston Square, excluding those at the Egleston Center. These businesses include two
102 The Application to the Main Street Program from April of 1995 (a year before completion of Egleston Center) has a list of
business categories without business names. The list adds up to 44 businesses. This is not accurate since the number of business
in the district has not doubled.
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laundromats, two pharmacies, one bakery, two communication/beeper stores, one furniture store,
one jewelry store, and one video store. At least two businesses closed down during the last five
years, including a large auto repair business that was located at the current site of Walgreens.
Blockbuster Video also closed during the course of this study after less than a year in
Egleston.103 Four significant commercial projects have taken place in the last six years with an
investment of about $4 million dollars. These projects are:
* Renovation of 3088-3094 Washington Street, which attracted three local retail stores
(owned by Saul Westerman),
* Renovation of the gas station at the corner of Columbus Avenue and Washington
Street, right across from Egleston Center,
e Construction of a new Walgreen's pharmacy,
* Renovation of 3115-3125 Washington Street, which retained four local businesses
(owned by Thomas Welch), and
* Renovation of 3052 Washington Street, a building which attracted two national
retailers (owned by Tula Poulitis) and abuts Egleston Center.
The three largest commercial property owners in Egleston were interviewed for this
thesis, all of whom renovated their properties after Egleston Center was built. 104 Overall, they
felt that Egleston Center had a positive impact on the neighborhood because it improved a
blighted property and made the district look better. However, they claimed that Egleston Center
did not influence their decision to renovate their properties. Further, they did not give credit to
Egleston Center or Urban Edge for the revitalization of the commercial district and expressed
that the neighborhood was already changing when Egleston Center was undertaken.' 0 5
Psychological impact
The overwhelming majority of business owners spoke of the positive impact that
Egleston Center had on restoring the hope of merchants and residents in the ultimate revival of
Egleston Square. Eighty five percent (85%) responded that business owners' confidence in the
103 Karen Sutherland, the Main Street Director, noted several reasons that may have contributed to the closing of Blockbuster.
One is that store did not recruit a manager with good knowledge of the local market. Accordingly, the team responsible for the
store had no experience operating a Blockbuster in the inner city and showed little understanding of the neighborhood. Another
reason was poor security that led to an assault a few weeks before the closing of the store.
10' Based on the square feet of commercial space and the number of store fronts, these are Thomas Welch, Saul Westerman, and
Tula Poulitis. The renovation of Saul Westerman's property at 3088-3094 Washington Street was completed before the starting
of construction of Egleston Center.
105 Poulitis warned that she was biased with respect to Egleston Center because she had issues with Urban Edge during the
development of Egleston Center. Urban Edge had tried to negotiate an agreement with her to develop Egleston Center by
combining the MBTA site and her building.
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commercial district increased. A small majority felt the Merchant Association is stronger,
whereas 75% felt that the Main Street Program is stronger. The difference in perceived strengths
may be due to changes in leadership at both organizations and the fact that that Main Street
Program has a full-time staff person, whereas the Merchant Association relies on a volunteer
board.
In general what was the impact of the project on the district/ neighborhood?
.............. ............................................ ................................................... ..............................................................................................
% of Increased orT sImprasenN ample ImrvdDecreased Didn't change
!usiness owners' confidence in
the commercial district 20 100% 17 85o 1 5/ 2 10%
Merchants Association 17 85% 9 53/ 3 18/ 5 29%
dMain Street Program 16 80% 12 75/o 2 13/ 2 13/
The psychological impact of Egleston Center is reflected in the merchants' expectations
of the neighborhood if the project had not been developed. Forty five percent (45%) answered
that the commercial district would have remained the same as before the development and 50%
said the changes that followed Egleston Center would have taken longer to occur if the project
had not been developed. Only one person said that the changes in the district would have
occurred regardless of Egleston Center. This indicates that merchants see a strong connection
between the development of Egleston Center and the positive changes in the district that
followed.
Which of the following statements best describes whatyou think would have happened if the project was not developed (N=20):
9 4
5
%/ 1 The commercial district would have remained the same as before the pro*ect
1 5% The changes in the district would have happened anyway
10 50% The changes in the district would have taken longer to occur
The answers to the two questions that follow confirmed the impact of Egleston Center on the
well-being of the neighborhood and its businesses. One hundred percent (100%) of the
interviewees felt that the community is better off and 85% said that their businesses 
are better off
since the project was completed.
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on the community (Nz=20):
20 100/% Overall, the communi is better off since the project was completed
-0%___ Overall, the communityis worse off since the projectwas completed
0%_ Overall, the communit is the same since the proje aopleted
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Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact onyour business (N 20):
17 850/ Overall, my business is better off since the projc wscmplee
2 10%/ OverallH, my business is worse o-ff since the project was completed
15%/ Overall, my business is the same since the projetwscopee
Impact on Capacity Building
When Urban Edge undertook Egleston Center, it already had extensive housing
development capacity and the experience of renovating a commercial property for non-profit
tenants. Nevertheless, Egleston Center was the first full commercial real estate project that the
CDC developed. It had a level of complexity that the CDC had not faced before, such as
securing tenants before starting construction and designing a building for which prototypes are
not easily available.
The CDC acquired a great deal of experience throughout the development and enhanced
its capacity to undertake more ambitious commercial projects. Egleston Center proved that
Urban Edge could develop a complex project and attract large anchor tenants under attractive
lease terms for the development. The CDC was able to negotiate lease rates that were above
market rent for the area at that time. The CDC also hired highly qualified staff for its
commercial and economic development activities and maintains a reputation for attracting good
talent. Dick Mason, after a successful private sector career in real estate and commercial
banking, managed the development of Egleston Center and was responsible for other projects
with the organization until recently. Another staff member, Alvaro Lima, oversaw the economic
development program and managed the strategic planning process for the Hyde/Jackson
Revitalization Strategy. More recently, Urban Edge recruited the former project manager of JP
Center in Hyde/Jackson Square. Urban Edge has doubled its staff capacity by hiring consultants
and brokers with sufficient experience and expertise in their respective fields. Rather than
pursuing projects based on intuition, the CDC typically engages consulting firms to research the
feasibility of such projects. For example, Urban Edge used the services of Mount Auburn
Associates to conduct market studies of Egleston Square to determine the most appropriate
tenant mix for the district. Urban Edge also utilized a retail brokerage company that attracted
several tenants.
Urban Edge also draws expertise from its Development Committee which meets on
monthly basis to review the progress of projects and to provide advice to the staff. The
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development committee is integrated by professionals with expertise in legal and zoning aspects,
finance, and development.
Egleston Center increased Urban Edge's capacity in commercial real estate and has
allowed the CDC to get control of other commercial buildings. Further, by pursuing commercial
development, Urban Edge is not only fulfilling a need in the Jamaica Plain and Roxbury
community, but also developing an infrastructure of knowledge, talented professionals, and a
network of support that could benefit other CDCs in Boston. The capacity that the CDC has
built constitutes an asset for the Egleston neighborhood, because the CDC will be able to carry
more projects that will contribute neighborhood revitalization.
The tension between commercial development and local constituents
Chapter 2 discussed the conflictive nature of inner city commercial development, and
avowed that commercial real estate exacerbates the tension between development and
empowerment. On one hand, neighborhoods need a larger variety of products and services at
competitive prices, which is traditionally achieved by attracting more firms that can compete to
entice local consumers. On the other hand, local constituents expect their community
development organizations to empower them politically, socially and economically. Controlling
economic assets, such as owning a business, helps to achieve such empowerment. However, one
of the first priorities of a commercial development is to ensure the stability of the project by
leasing space to financially strong tenants that can pay the highest possible rent. These tenants
are generally large companies whose owners do not reside in the community, which sometimes
has a negative impact on existing locally-owned businesses. Thus, efforts to bring commercial
developments that attract large businesses often faced local opposition, despite the goods and
services that such businesses could provide to local customers. This tension surfaced during the
impact study of Egleston Center. As discussed previously, the overall review of the project was
very positive. Criticisms of Egleston Center, in order of importance, included: (1) the absence of
two-to-three story space for office use, (2) high rents, which prevented local businesses from
leasing space, and (3) the lack of spillover from the building into the district because of the
McDonald's drive-thru. Despite these criticisms, the overwhelming majority of interviewees
acknowledged that the benefits of the project significantly outweigh any shortcomings.
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However, concerns that were frequently mentioned during the interviews were the pattern
of development in the district and the role of Urban Edge in attracting more national tenants into
Hyde/Jackson. "Kmart" was the buzzword in many of the interviews and merchants feared that
large national tenants will "cannibalize" local businesses that have been serving the
neighborhood for a long time.1 06 Mossik Hacobian admitted in an interview that people in the
neighborhood are no longer concerned with deterioration. The concern now is the pace of
development and the rising property values that can displace residents and businesses. Business
owners noted that new commercial developments are not made with the local business
community in mind. The director of the Egleston Square Main Street Program reinforced this
notion by calling the east side of Columbus Avenue "Franchise Alley," referring to the fact that
national tenants have located on that side of Columbus Avenue. This pattern is only the result of
three developments, which have attracted seven national brands. However, in a small district
like Egleston Square, such physical concentration of large companies is significant. By contrast,
the great majority of the local businesses are located on the west side of Columbus Avenue. To
some, this new pattern of development is a concern because Egleston could inadvertently
become two commercial districts. One side could eventually feature neighborhood businesses,
while the other side features only national retailers. Such a result would not be the healthy and
vibrant mix that could be most beneficial to the district. Further, the pattern of development
noted by Karen Sutherland does not create spill-over traffic to existing businesses. Instead, it
simply places all the anchor tenants on one side of the district. To understand this development
pattern, it must be noted that most of the undeveloped land and vacant buildings in Egleston are
on the east side of Columbus Avenue. Naturally, large tenants prefer new facilities where the
space is configured to meet their needs. The argument made by local constituents is that the new
commercial developments should not concentrate all the anchor tenants on one side and that such
developments should include space for smaller businesses. In the case of Egleston Center, Urban
Edge responded to this tension by marrying a local entrepreneur with a national franchise
(Athlete's Foot), and by incubating, financing and leasing space to a smaller business. As stated
previously, this was a commendable effort put forth by Urban Edge and it was a wise approach
from a business standpoint. However, the opening of Athlete's Foot almost three years after the
completion of Egleston Center may not have helped Urban Edge in communicating to the
106 This issue was also frequently mentioned during the interviews in Jackson Square.
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neighborhood that Egleston Center houses both local and national firms. Most merchants
interviewed only seemed to remember two tenants at Egleston Center: the bank and McDonalds.
Urban Edge has done a lot for local businesses in Egleston. As the managing partner of
the CDC Tax Credit Collaborative, Urban Edge created a loan and equity pool of $2 million that
provides debt and equity financing to local businesses. So far, the pool has financed two
businesses in Egleston Square. In addition, the CDC has partnered with other organizations that
can provide business technical assistance and training to local merchants in Egleston who need
access to such services. One such example was the coordination of a 20-week training course
that was attended by over 30 businesses. The CDC was also instrumental in the designation of
Egleston as a Main Street Program and has provided extensive support to such effort. More
recently, Urban Edge created a special loan pool that will be managed by the Main Street
Program and the Merchant Association to provide small working capital loans to area businesses.
Despite all these efforts from Urban Edge, it became clear during the interviews that
there is some tension between the CDC and local constituents. For example, recently the
Egleston Main Street Program partnered with two other organizations outside Egleston for a
funding proposal to Local Initiatives Support Corporation, which was in direct competition with
a proposal submitted by Urban Edge. Local leaders and merchants recognized the good work the
CDC had done so far, but some resented what was described as "a different attitude when
dealing with local constituents, which makes the CDC appear superior and powerful."107 The
battle over the proposal to develop a Kmart in Jackson Square brought these issues to the
forefront. The CDC's proposal did not succeed and more importantly, its three-year community
planning process suffered a setback because of the proposal.
Summary and Conclusion
This chapter describes the development process and the impact of Egleston Center on the
revitalization of Egleston Square. The project was developed by Urban Edge Housing
Corporation with substantial support from the public and private sectors, as well as the active
participation of residents and business owners in the Egleston neighborhood. The project had
various goals, among them, increasing the variety of goods and services in the community,
improving the business climate by making the neighborhood more attractive, and eliminating a
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vacant property that was a focal point of crime and youth violence. Restoring social order and
personal safety in Egleston was the first and most important priority of neighborhood residents
throughout the early 1990s. Egleston Center was not only an effort to create a stronger economic
environment in the district, but also an effort to reduce crime, abandonment, and disinvestment.
Urban Edge executive director described the organization's approach to safety, "there's two ways
you can deal with security. One way is the punitive way. Something happens and you punish it.
The other way is to eliminate the opportunity for it to happen. You prevent it, by enhancing the
things that are safe and instill a sense of community pride."1 08 As this case chapter demonstrates,
all the goals of the project were achieved.
Following the methodology proposed in chapter 3, the benefits of the project are
compared against the public subsidy received using five categories of impact, which are
summarized below.
1. Job and income creation:
Egleston Center created 27 full-time jobs all of which are held by minority residents of
Jamaica Plain, Roxbury, and Dorchester. The estimated annual payroll of $516,000 translates
into wages that are above the minimum federal wage. In addition, the project may have created
another 21 indirect jobs and an indirect payroll of $703,000. The public subsidy per direct full-
time job was $49,541, when considering indirect jobs, the subsidy drops to $27,969 per full-time
job created.
2. Fiscal improvement:
From a fiscal standpoint-as measured by property taxes paid to the City of Boston-the
project does not have a positive impact because it does not pay property taxes due to the fact that
the land is owned by a quasi-public agency, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.
However, as explained in this chapter, property taxes are not the only way to measure the fiscal
impact of a project. Other forms of fiscal impact, which are beyond the scope of this analysis,
include sales taxes and income taxes paid by the employees of the project, as well as corporate
income taxes paid by the business tenants.
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107 Interview with Beatrice McConnie Zapater.
108 Quote printed on Saving Affordable Housing: What Community Groups Can Do & What Government Should Do, by John
Atlas and Ellen Shoshkes, National Housing Institute, 1997.
3. Leverage effect:
The public subsidy represented 43% of the total development cost of the project. The
leverage effect is $0.41 of private financing for every dollar of public subsidy. In addition, the
project leveraged at least $850,000 of private financing that was invested by the tenants of the
building. This increases the leverage effect to $0.79 per dollar of public subsidy.
4. Physical improvement and impact on revitalization:
Egleston Center's impact on the revitalization of Egleston Square was very significant.
The project is today a focal point in Egleston Square. Its design incorporates elements of the
neighborhood's history and enhances the district's character. Interviewees felt that Egleston
Center was a major factor in reducing crime and youth violence in the district, along with other
efforts undertaken simultaneously. The majority of the business owners reported that more
residents and outside customers shop in the district since the project was completed.
Consequently, business sales have increased too and the majority of the businesses attribute this
increase to the project. In addition, the project brought to Egleston a mainstream financial
institution that until then, the district never had. This was one of the most significant
accomplishments of Egleston Center. The other three tenants improved the variety and mix of
goods and services in the district. Egleston Square has gained about 8 new businesses (net).
Moreover, the three types of businesses that the district lacked in the early 1990s (bank,
pharmacy, and laundromat), are now present in Egleston.
The psychological impact of the project was profound. Business owners's confidence
increased. One hundred percent of the merchants affirmed that the community is better off since
the project was completed. Eighty-five percent said that their businesses are also better off. The
psychological impact is reflected in merchants' expectations of the neighborhood if the project
was not developed. Forty five percent answered that the commercial district would have
remained the same as before the development and 50% said the changes that followed Egleston
Center would have taken longer to occur if the project was not developed. Based on merchant's
responses, the linkage between the development of Egleston Center and the changes that
followed in the district was very strong.
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5. Capacity building:
The project significantly increased Urban Edge capacity to undertake other projects.
Evidence of this capacity is that Kmart was willing to have Urban Edge as developer for a new
store in Jackson Square. In addition, the CDC has recently obtained control of the largest
commercial building in Egleston, which will be renovated for retail and office uses. Urban Edge
has attracted qualified staff with experience in commercial development and has doubled the
staff capacity by using private consultants with particular expertise. The capacity that Urban
Edge has built becomes part of a larger network of resources and support for CDCs revitalization
efforts. Further, Urban Edge's work in commercial development has created an attractive
economic environment that makes Egleston a magnet for new investments. As a result, other
property owners have more access to capital for their buildings, which has the desirable effect of
more properties being renovated or developed in the commercial district.
The CDC's efforts in commercial revitalization have brought up the tension between
development and empowerment. There is a sense in Egleston that new commercial development
must encourage new local businesses and directly benefit existing ones. The importance of local
businesses to the commercial district was articulated in the 1995 application to the Boston Main
Street Program:
Many of the leading merchants who operate the going businesses in the commercial
district do not live here, but have clearly demonstrated their commitment and hope for the
future of Egleston Square by staying through the most difficult years, and contributing as
partners in community building efforts.
Urban Edge's commitment to help local businesses has been demonstrated. The creation
of a $2 million business loan pool and the support provided to the Merchants Association and the
Main Street Program serve as testament to that commitment. Yet, the repeated concerns of local
constituents about the role of the CDC in commercial development, suggest that the Urban Edge
needs to better address these concerns in order to strengthen local support for its revitalization
agenda. Nevertheless, Egleston Center stands as another example of an inner city commercial
development that increased the welfare of local residents and business owners. The project
attracted very needed services, increased the confidence of local stakeholders, and transformed
the most dangerous property in the district which allowed the revival of Egleston Square as, once
again, a bustling center of neighborhood commerce.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
How implausible it was that a ragtag bunch of neighbors, in communities deserted by
most mainstream institutions, could make such a difference! It was the very modest of
their ambition-not to save the nation or the world, but a house or a block or a
neighborhood-the very concreteness, the localness of what they set out do-that now
highlight the stunning scope of their achievement.
Paul S. Grogan and Tony Proscio, Comeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban
Neighborhood Revival. Westview Press, (2000).
This thesis began with the argument that community development corporations are often
the only alternative to revitalization in many low-income neighborhoods that have suffered from
disinvestment and blight. The success of CDCs in developing affordable housing and in tackling
many other community issues, coupled with the need for more economic development activities
for these neighborhoods, have led CDCs to undertake commercial real estate development as part
of their comprehensive tools for revitalizing distressed urban communities.
The thesis also describes the three major challenges faced by CDCs when developing
commercial real estate projects: (1) the need for significant public subsidy in the form of grants
to cover the gap between the cost of developing a project and the value after completion, (2) the
difficulty in raising private equity due to the perceived high risk of these projects and the lack of
incentives to entice equity investors, and (3) the difficulty in attracting credit worthy tenants,
coupled with the tension generated with local businesses when attracting national tenants. This
thesis focused on addressing the issue of public subsidy. Specifically, the thesis measures the
extent to which public subsidies are commensurate with the public benefits generated by
commercial real estate projects in distressed neighborhoods.
Chapter 2 makes the case for CDC-sponsored commercial real estate developments. It
discussed the linkage between community development, neighborhood revitalization, and
commercial real estate development. The chapter concludes that neighborhood revitalization
creates the undesirable by-product, known as gentrification. The restoration and upgrading of
deteriorated inner city neighborhoods make them attractive to middle classes, often resulting in
displacement of lower-income people. This displacement occurs to the extent that revitalization
focuses on improving the physical environment without properly enhancing the economic
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opportunities of low-income residents. In other words, gentrification occurs when residents are
not economically empowered and cannot afford to stay in a revitalized community. The
discussion served to underscore the goal of revitalization, which is improving both the physical
condition and human capital of a neighborhood. The chapter reinforced the notion that
commercial real estate development must do its part in contributing to both goals. Otherwise
commercial development will inexorably lead to gentrification. Chapter 2 also reviewed long-
standing debates about the tension between real estate development and community
empowerment, also known as the "process" versus the "outcome" debate. The fundamental
argument is that development, either housing or commercial, does not empower residents
because its focus is on outcomes rather than on process. I argued that commercial real estate
development heightens the tension between CDCs and its local constituency and analyzed each
case study through the prism of such tension. My intension was two-fold. First to draw some
attention to the need for CDCs to address this tension in a proactive way so that they can move
forward their revitalization agenda. Second to propose alternative models for inner city
commercial development, which are presented in this chapter. Clearly, commercial development
is critical for district revitalization to occur; however the tension between commercial
development and local constituents represents a roadblock for CDCs' revitalization efforts. In
fact, chapter five provides an example of how this tension, when left unaddressed, can block the
CDCs' efforts. Urban Edge suffered a major setback to a three-year planning process because of
a proposal to develop a building for Kmart that was strongly opposed by local merchants.
Chapter 3 explained the importance of measuring the impact of commercial projects and
proposes five indicators that are tested in two case studies. Chapters 4 and 5 present the case
studies of JP Center and Egleston Center respectively. The case studies provide the context of
the neighborhood and the CDC, the history of the development, and the cost-benefit analysis
based on the five indicators proposed in chapter 3. Each chapter provides overwhelming
evidence that both projects had net positive impact in their communities. The case studies also
described how commercial development generated some tension between the CDCs and their
local constituents. This tension is at the center of the debate between development and
empowerment discussed in chapter 2.
114
Impact of CDCs-sponsored Commercial Real Estate Projects
The thesis utilized a combination of five quantitative and qualitative indicators to
measure the impact of inner city commercial real estate developments sponsored by community
development corporations. The five indicators were not arbitrarily selected. Rather, reflect the
project goals as stated by community development practitioners and by the public sector that
provided the funds for the projects. The indicators were applied to two case studies in Boston,
which gave strong evidence that the public benefits of the projects surpassed the public
investment. The projects have had a net positive impact in nearly all five indicators, which are
briefly summarized below. It is important to highlight that each project was unique and critical
in their respective neighborhoods. They also had very different scales that account for the
differences in cost and quantitative indicators. Therefore, a comparison of each project is not
appropriate. The following summary is not intended to contrast the public benefits of the two
projects or to establish benchmarks of impact. A larger sample of projects would be needed in
order to determine realistic benchmarks for future projects.
(1) Job and Income Creation
Job and income creation was a one of the stated goals of the projects and an important
outcome of both projects. JP Center created a significant number of entry-level full-time jobs for
residents, many who had no previous working experience. In fact, JP Center increased the
employment based in Hyde/Jackson by approximately 50% (excluding jobs from nonprofits and
other institutions). Similarly, Egleston Center created a good number of jobs relative to the
small size of the project. In fact, the square feet per job created is very low, 260 square feet per
job created indicative of the relative high number of jobs of the project. The average wage of
jobs at Egleston Center was also relatively high. The impact of the projects on creating was a
significant contribution to their communities
JP Center Egleston Center
Direct Full-Time Equivalent jobs 135 27
ISquare Feet per full-time jbcreated 489 SF 259 SF
iDirect Annual Payroll $2,013,975 $516,304.
.Public Subsidy per Direct job dreated (FTE) $28,231 $49,541.
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(2) Fiscal Impact
Fiscal impact in the case of JP Center was positive. Two scenarios were developed, one
that shows a small negative net return to the city, the second scenario-the most realistic-
shows a positive net return. As stated in chapter 4, JP Center does not generate significant
returns on taxpayers' dollars, but it does not represent a taxpayer burden either. Conversely,
Egleston Center does not paid property taxes, therefore it does not have a positive fiscal impact.
However, fiscal impact was measured in this thesis by property taxes paid because it is the most
readily available information, but it is not the only tax contribution of a commercial project.
Commercial projects also generate corporate taxes, individual taxes, and sales taxes which if
considered may show a net positive return on the public investment that both projects received.
JP Center
(Scenario 2) Egle......... ston Center
Public Investment -$3,811,210: -$1,350,000:
1996 Value of Property Taxes paid and to be collected $4,076,651: $0:
Net Return of Public investment (in 1996 dollars) $265,441 -$1,350,000
(3) Leverage of Private Capital
Both projects leverage significant private capital in the total development cost and in the
form of investment made by the tenants of the project. JP Center, the larger project, leveraged
the most private financing. Egleston Center received a combination of public subsidy and public
debt that lower the effect on leverage of private financing.
JP Center Egleston Center
Private Investment as a Percent of TDC 73% 29%
Leverage Effect of public dollars $2.73x $0.41
Total Leverage Effect of public dollars when including N/A $0.79
tenant's investment
(4) Physical Impact and Overall Revitalization
Physical impact and overall revitalization was undoubtedly the most significant impact of
both projects. In fact, in both case studies improving the physical condition of the neighborhood
by removing blight was the foremost objective of the sponsoring CDCs. This indicator was
measured based on interviews with local business owners and with local leaders. The interviews
gauged three areas of impact:
e impact on physical revitalization as measured by changes in vacancies, crime,
property values, rents, and physical appearance of the area,
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* impact on business activity as measured by changes in the number of customers and
business sales, changes in businesses and in the variety of goods and services, and
e psychological impact as measured by changes in the level of confidence of business
owners, expectations of what would have happened in the district if the project was
not developed, and overall well-being of the community.
The results of the interviews provide overwhelming evidence that both projects had
significant impact on changing the physical appearance of the neighborhood, improving
confidence of existing business owners, and on encouraging additional investment in other
properties.
(5) Capacity Building
Both projects built capacity at the local level to further advance the revitalization of the
community. However, the impact on capacity building was different. JP Center created a
Community Trust Fund that it is investing in the social and economic infrastructure of the
community. The project did not build JPNDC's capacity in commercial real estate development.
Instead in built capacity in other areas of equal importance, such as workforce development and
small business development. Egleston Center increased Urban Edge's commercial development
capacity. Since the completion of the project, the CDC has created a pipeline of commercial
properties, hired additional staff, and developed a comprehensive revitalization plan for the
Egleston-Jackson corridor.
Two Models of CDC-sponsored Commercial Real Estate
The case studies present two different models to develop commercial projects in the inner
city. In the first case study, JP Center, the CDC and another non-profit partnered with a for-
profit developer that managed most of the tasks in the development process, such as leasing,
structuring financing, and construction oversight, whereas the CDC acted as an intermediary
between the community and the development team. In doing so, JPNDC organized the
community, coordinated outreach, and established mechanisms for residents to participate and
exert influence in the development process. The CDC also acted as an employment and training
intermediary between the anchor tenant of the project and local residents who wanted to work for
that tenant. Although JPNDC had some commercial development experience, the organization
did not have the experience of developing a ground up 66,000 square feet, $14.2 million project
and did not have the connections with the anchor tenant that the private developer had. Thus, the
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CDC alone may not have been able to develop a project of this scale. By partnering with a for-
profit developer, JPNDC was able to leverage the expertise and networks of the private sector
while channeling the CDC's resources to involve residents in the development process. Further,
JPNDC positioned itself between local residents and Stop and Shop to secure jobs for the
community. As Jeremy Nowack suggested, this role is sometimes more important than
developing the project per se.
The second case study, Egleston Center, presents a more self-sufficient model of
commercial development. Urban Edge was the sole developer of Egleston Center. The CDC's
extensive experience in housing and in developing the YMCA building paved the way to the
undertaking of Egleston Center, which had some complexity but was nevertheless small and
manageable. Urban Edge leveraged the private sector in researching the feasibility of the project
and in leasing space. Egleston Center increased Urban Edge's capacity and credibility in
commercial development to the point that the CDC recruited the national retailer giant, Kmart,
for a development in Jackson Square. Urban Edge also assembled an ambitious master plan for
the Egleston-Jackson Square, which could ultimately attract over $200 millions in investments.
In addition, The CDC is trying to develop other commercial projects along the Washington
Street and Columbus Avenue corridor.
Are any of these models more cost-effective? Are CD C-sponsored projects more expensive
than private projects? Should the CDCs continue developing commercial real estate?
It could not be concluded based on these two case studies that one project was more cost-
beneficial than the other. When comparing the two projects, JP Center generated the most
number of jobs but it is also ten times larger than Egleston Center. This means that JP Center
could generate significant economies of scale that translated into lower public subsidy per full-
time job created. While job creation is a key goal in all these developments, it is not the only
one. Removing physical blight and abandonment, increasing the availability of goods and
services, and increasing confidence so that more investment can occur, are all critical goals of
these projects. Both projects were successful in accomplishing these goals. Further, as Prof.
William Wheaton and CDCs suggest inner cities lack economic leverage because of low
property values. Thus, the public subsidy in a commercial project not only addresses the equity
deficiency of a particular project, but also builds equity in the neighborhood's property market.
In a sense, the return on a project's public subsidy accrues to other property owners and to the
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neighborhood as a whole. As seen in both Egleston and Hyde/Jackson, the development of a
CDC-sponsored project is followed by more private development which typically requires less or
no subsidy. Keith Hunt, the City of Boston's senior underwriter for commercial real estate
projects, alluded to the fact that public investments in CDC-sponsored projects in neighborhoods
such as Egleston, Grove Hall, Blue Hill Avenue and Dudley, have caused a spiral of private
development. These private developments are not seeking public subsidy and if they are, the
amount is rapidly declining with every project. Hunt cited several distressed buildings in these
neighborhoods that sat stagnant for years waiting for some form of public intervention. Today,
the same buildings are being renovated, as Hunt stated "something is happening in these
neighborhoods without additional taxpayer's money." Clearly the private market is now taking
care of the remaining buildings in these neighborhoods.
There is also a notion that CDC-sponsored projects tend to be more expensive than
projects sponsored by the private sector. The 1999 study of Cummings and DiPasquale of the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit confirmed this notion. This is not merely because CDCs are
less efficient than the private sector as Cummings and DiPasquale argue-although more
efficiency and capacity can be achieved. In the case of commercial development, the
fundamental reason that CDC's projects are generally more expensive is that CDCs target the
most distressed, the most polluted, the most problematic commercial property in a neighborhood.
CDCs are obviously driven by different goals than the private sector. They are more interested
in having an impact on neighborhood revitalization than a double-digit financial return. CDCs
are more responsive to the needs of the neighborhood than to financial investors, which does not
mean they are not responsive to their capital providers. This means that they respond to the
issues that the community cares most about. As shown in the case studies of Egleston Center
and JP Center, the CDCs undertook the projects for very similar reasons: revitalize the district by
developing the most distressed property, provide needed goods and services, and create jobs for
local residents. Reducing crime and improving the economic environment of urban
neighborhoods are in the best interest of both the private and public sectors, but the cost of doing
so cannot be borne by the private sector. Even if the private developer is interested in having this
type of impact in a neighborhood, the competitive nature of real estate forces the developer to
seek projects with the highest possible return and the lowest possible risk. A private developer
was very clear about this during an interview, stating that "we have to look for the lowest
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hanging fruit," implying the need for the private sector to seek the least risky projects. Thus, as
argued in the introduction of this thesis, for private investment to take place in the inner city, the
public sector needs to intervene to reduce the imbalance between the risk and return in inner city
commercial real estate. CDCs have proven to be effective and more efficient instruments of
public intervention than say the government itself handling the revitalization efforts. Paul
Grogan and Tony Proscio articulated the advantage of public intervention through community-
based organizations, stating that:
One lesson of the Empowerment Zone experience-in fact, of most government efforts in
behalf of cities in the last twenty years-is that inner-city neighborhoods generally make
the best use of public and private dollars when they are organized around some form of
enterprising, locally-based development corporation intervention. Within manageable
boundaries defined by local residents and businesses, rather than by government fiat,
community development groups typically respond with agility to changing local
opportunities that are different from block to block, and that are mostly invisible from
Washington. 109
Should CDCs pursue more public-private partnerships?
The models utilized by Urban Edge or JPNDC are very specific to the context of the
neighborhood, the capacity of the local CDC, and the ability of the project to lure private
developers. Projects like JP Center have the scale to make them attractive to private developers.
Conversely, small projects like Egleston Center are not as attractive to the private sector. Such
projects may not be able to financially support a public-private partnership. In separate
interviews with Mordachi Levin and Steve Samuels, both private developers in Boston, they
concurred that scale is important in order for private developers to be involved and for a
partnership with a CDC to be worthwhile. They added that even though partnerships with the
private sector should be encouraged, there is not always a role for the private sector, particularly
in smaller projects that CDCs can do alone. Further, both agreed that only large projects are able
to afford a marriage between the profit goals of a private developer and the revitalization goals of
the CDC. Simply put, a small project is less likely to fulfill CDCs' social mission of
revitalization and generate sufficient profit to make the private developer's involvement
worthwhile. Both Levin and Samuels also stated that large projects are not always necessary-
or desirable-to revitalize the inner city. In some cases a series of small CDC-sponsored
109 Grogan, Paul S. and Tony Proscio, Comeback Cities: A Blueprint for Urban Neighborhood Revival. Westview Press (2000).
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projects can have the same effect as a large one, even if such approach takes longer to produce a
discernable impact.
The tension between commercial development and local constituents
One of the issues I address in this thesis is the tension between CDCs' commercial
developments and their local constituencies. Mainly it is a fact that projects that attract national
tenants are beneficial and necessary to create anchor tenants in a district and to increase the
variety of good and services in a neighborhood. Both of these goals were accomplished in JP
Center and Egleston Center. Inevitably efforts to bring national tenants create tension with local
businesses whose survival may be threatened by the presence of a national franchise. This
tension surfaced in both case studies. In Egleston Center the tension was more about the tenant
mix, and less so about having national tenants. Yet, business owners expressed concerns about
future projects sponsored by the CDC, which would attract large national tenants. In the case of
JP Center the tension was about the impact of a large supermarket in a neighborhood that was
characterized by lots of small grocery stores. This thesis measured to what extent the
supermarket in JP Center affected the small grocery stores in Hyde/Jackson. The findings of this
thesis do not support the claim that local grocery stores have been negatively impacted by the
presence of the supermarket. However, the results of the research cannot be used to make the
generalization that national or anchor tenants do not impact local businesses. There is plenty of
anecdotal and empirical evidence about small businesses going out of business when a national
tenant moves into a commercial district. The concern of local businesses in this regard is well
founded and should not be discarded.
Further, small businesses are the defining characteristic of a neighborhood commercial
district. They are have demonstrated an unconditional commitment to inner cities. They swung
against the tide for very long to provide goods and services to residents when the larger stores
were not willing to invest in the inner city. Small businesses are the first ones to come to a
neighborhood and the last ones to leave. They provide jobs for local residents and more
importantly, they create local wealth to the extent their owners reside in the community, which is
often the case. However, inner city neighborhoods need more and better businesses. Limited
competition results in limited variety of products and services, lower quality, and higher prices.
Subsidizing a business during the early stages or during difficult times is necessary to create
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local entrepreneurship. On the other hand, subsidizing or protecting businesses for long periods
of time is counterproductive. Protecting businesses from competition holds back business
growth and entrepreneurial development, which is the opposite of what the inner cities need.
Business by its nature is competitive. Competition benefits local residents as businesses are
encouraged to increase quality and reduce prices of goods and services. That said, competition
also means that some entrepreneurs will succeed while others will not. Inner city neighborhoods
need an opportunistic and entrepreneurial mindset, not one of entitlement.
How can CDCs foster local entrepreneurship without creating dependency? The two case
studies provide some answers. In the case of JPNDC, the organization established a business
development program that provides technical assistance, training and loan packaging services to
local businesses. The program helps businesses apply for business loans from mainstream
commercial banks, or non-profit loan pools as a last resource. In the process, the CDC assist the
entrepreneur in preparing business plans and financial projections, but the CDC does not
guarantee that the loan would be approve, nor does it guarantee the loan itself. The business has
to demonstrate the willingness and ability to repay the loan by having a sound business model
with strong profit potential. Similarly, Urban Edge established a loan and equity pool that
provides business financing at competitive rates. The program provides loans that are
subordinated to commercial banks, which leverage bank financing for local businesses. The pool
also provides direct loans when a business is not eligible for bank financing but demonstrates a
sound business plan. In all cases, the loans are underwriting using commercial banking
standards, which means that entrepreneurs have to contribute their own equity and as well as any
collateral available. The program makes risky loans but the stringent process and the collateral
requirements make clear to the entrepreneur that the loans must be repaid. The efforts of JPNDC
and Urban Edge have contributed to creating the entrepreneurial mindset that inner cities need.
The CDCs show their commitment to help entrepreneurs and they take risks by doing so. But the
relationship is fundamentally an arms-length transaction. The assistance both CDCs provide has
contributed to a better relationship-of different degrees-with local businesses.
One question remains unanswered, that is, how can CDCs develop commercial real estate
that attracts national tenants without displacing local businesses? Again, the role of the CDCs is
to encourage entrepreneurship, not to protect them from competition or failure. However, CDCs
can develop strategies so that their commercial developments attract national tenants as well as
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benefit local business. Urban Edge provides a model in Egleston Center that is replicable in
other projects. The CDC did two things that are worth noting. First, after securing the two
anchor tenants, Urban Edge targeted the third largest space in the building for a local business.
The two anchor tenants provided critical financial stability for the project and generated the foot
traffic that could benefit the local business. Urban Edge did not guarantee the space to any
particular entrepreneur, nor did it subsidize the rent. Instead, the CDC sought the most viable
businesses for the space and the individuals with the entrepreneurial drive to run a successful
business. Second, the CDC connected a local entrepreneur with a national franchise that could
deliver a proven business model, technical assistance, and marketing support. The CDC
provided the entrepreneur with space in the building, a sound business model, and two anchor
tenants that bring potential customers. Needless to say, the local business could fail at any time,
but the important lesson is that Urban Edge connected its commercial development with local
entrepreneurship efforts. How good would it be for local entrepreneurship if CDC's commercial
projects place local businesses between anchor tenants as shopping mall owners do?
Supermarkets for example could have a few retail stores next to each entrance that will provide
those retail stores with priceless foot traffic. Likewise, pharmacies, banks, and about any anchor
tenant could be flanked by a local business. CDCs would not need to subsidize the rents or
protect local businesses from competition. Instead, the CDCs would create the conditions for
local businesses to thrive. Similarly, inner city commercial developments need to carefully
consider how to create the most spill over effects for the rest of the commercial district, which is
a topic not addressed in this thesis.
Other CDCs in Boston have linked the commercial developments to local
entrepreneurship. Codman Square Neighborhood Development Corporation in Dorchester has
successfully developed two commercial buildings each with an anchor tenant and various local
businesses. Nuestra Comunidad Development Corporation in Roxbury has also linked its
commercial development projects to local entrepreneurship, even without the presence of
national anchor tenants. The CDC has also used its commercial real estate capacity to develop
owner-occupied properties. Under this model, Nuestra leverages its knowledge of real estate and
helps a local business own a renovated property. This provides stability to local businesses,
shields them from gentrification, and increases their wealth over time. More over, it provides
local entrepreneurs with a sense of being economically empowered by their local CDCs.
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Commercial developments can combine revitalization goals and economic empowerment
to the extent that residents are direct beneficiaries of the projects. By direct beneficiaries, I
meant that residents not only benefit as consumers of a new anchor tenant, but that they also
benefit by having an economic interest in the development, be that jobs as in the case of JP
Center, business ownership as in Egleston Center, or property ownership as in the case of
Nuestra CDC.
Recommendations and Issues for Further Research
The most important recommendation for CDC-sponsored commercial real estate were
was advanced in the previous section. That is, CDCs should purse commercial projects that
combine a mix of national tenants with local businesses as done by Urban Edge, Codman Square
NDC, and Nuestra CDC. Another recommendation is that CDCs need to improve their data
collection particularly around job creation for local residents. Creating jobs for local residents is
a priority in almost every project, however CDCs defined local residents very loosely when
counting the jobs created by the projects. As discussed in chapter 3, local residents did not mean
residents of the service area of the CDC, instead they include residents from three other inner
city neighborhoods. This is not an issue from a city-wide perspective, but it is important to
demonstrate that projects create jobs, income, and wealth for the communities that CDCs serve,
specially that the communities in question had high unemployment rates.
An issue that frequently brought up during the interviews was that the projects did not
generate significant spillover traffic for businesses nearby. This is one of the project benefits
argued by economic development practitioners and CDCs. However the evidence is not very
clear and business owners interviewed had different opinions on this matter. CDCs, the City of
Boston, and LISC should research how these commercial developments act synergistically with
other retailers and whether or not they generate spillover traffic to businesses in the district.
Thus, a study of shoppers that go from the development into the commercial district will dispel
any differences between the perception and the reality of this issue.
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Concluding remarks
This thesis proposes five quantitative and qualitative indicators to measure the impact of
CDC-sponsored commercial developments: (1) jobs and income creation (2) fiscal impact (3)
leverage of private capital (4) physical impact and overall revitalization, and (5) capacity
building. It also tested these impact indicators in two case studies. The analysis of the case
studies shows that the public benefits of the projects overwhelmingly out weighted the public
subsidy. The projects have had a positive public impact in nearly all five indicators, with the
exception of the fiscal impact indicator for Egleston Center. Over 70 interviews with business
owners, local organizations, private developers, public officials, and CDC staff were conducted
to document the direct and indirect impact of these projects. I heard numerous stories from
people who enthusiastically credited the projects with turning the neighborhoods around. A few
provided a lukewarm review, stating that the projects took advantage of many forces that were
changing these and other inner city neighborhoods in the city. Both of those views have merits.
These two inner city commercial real estate projects do not operate in isolation. Indeed there
have been many forces changing inner cities and they way people think about inner city
neighborhoods.
The projects were completed during a period of unprecedented national economic growth
that reduced unemployment and increased consumer spending. They were also completed right
before a major shift in public policy towards the poor, i.e. the welfare reform. The projects may
have had a big impact on reducing crime by eliminating physical neglect that invite anti-social
activity, but the 1990s mounted a big attack on crime which might be the reason for the decline
in crime. A soaring real estate market in Boston and a shortage in housing may have been the
reasons for the increase in rents and property values. Efforts from public and private sector
organizations may have contributed to a change in perception about the inner city that could have
contributed to more private investment taking place in these neighborhoods. And the list of
factors goes on. The impact indicators suggested in this thesis do not take into account all of
these or other factors that may have contributed to inner city revitalization more than the projects
themselves. The only evidence of direct link between the project and the changes in the
neighborhood is people's perceptions of what they think would have happened if they projects
were not developed. In both case studies the majority said that the neighborhood would not have
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changed or that the changes would have taken longer to occur. Furthermore, each neighborhood
had a local CDC with the entrepreneurial capacity-albeit lacking the commercial development
experience-to capitalize in a favorable economic environment and to undertake the riskiest
projects, which in turn made the neighborhood more attractive for other investments. Without
the actions of the local CDCs, Hyde-Jackson and Egleston Square may have been overlooked by
the private market, as stated before a rising tide lifts only those boats that are in the water. By
sponsoring the development of JP Center and Egleston Center, the CDCs put the Hyde-Jackson
and Egleston Square neighborhoods in a position to benefit from a rising economic tide.
William Walczak believes that the dominoes effect explain how cities rise and fall. One
positive or negative event is followed by a chain of events of the same characteristic creating
cycles of investment or disinvestment. Sometimes it is not clear what was the first event that
caused a consecutive chain of events. It could the case that one particular event stands out more
than others in people's mind. Distressed commercial properties in inner cities, like the shoe
factory site in Jackson Square, or the MBTA station site in Egleston, stood as symbols of blight
and abandonment. They were emblematic of everything that was wrong with inner city
neighborhoods. Once those symbols of blight were removed, revitalization followed.
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List of Interviewees
Community Development Corporations:
1. Mossik Hacobian, Executive Director, Urban Edge Housing Development Corp., 4/3/2001
2. Dick Mason, former Senior Project Manager, Urban Edge Housing Development Corp.,
4/12/2001
3. Richard Thal, Executive Director, Jamaica Plain Neighborhood Development Corporation,
3/21/2001
4. Sarah Griffen, former Director of Economic Development, Jamaica Plain Neighborhood
Development Corporation, 6/22/2001
5. Luz Torres, Director of Economic Development, Jamaica Plain Neighborhood
Development Corporation, 6/22/2001
6. Virginia Morrison, Executive Director, Neighborhood Development Corporation of Grove
Hall, 6/19/2001
7. Gail Lattimore, Executive Director, Codman Square Neighborhood Development
Corporation, 4/6/2001
8. Marie-Rose Murphy, Deputy Director, Codman Square Neighborhood Development
Corporation, 4/6/2001
9. Marcia Thornhill, Project Manager, Nuestra Comunidad Development Corp., 6/15/01
10. Robert McArthur, Project Manager, Nuestra Comunidad Development Corp., 6/15/01
Other Community-Based Organizations:
11. Colin Riley, Executive Director, Uphams Corner Main Streets, 5/3/2001
12. Tony Barros, Executive Director, Hyde/Jackson Square Main Streets, 5/4/2001
13. Karen Sutherland, Executive Director, Egleston Square Main Streets, 5/14/2001
14. Bill Walcsak, Executive Director, Codman Square Health Center, 6/15/01
15. Beatrice McConnie Zapater, Principal, Egleston Community High School, 6/21/01
16. William Morales, Director, YMCA, Egleston Square, 6/7/01
17. Dr. Fernando Milan, Board Member of the Hyde/Jackson Community Trust Fund, 7/9/01
18. Juan Lopez, Board Member for 24 years of the Martha Elliot Health Center, 7/9/01 (T)
19. Francine Azzara, Director of Operations, Martha Elliot Health Center, 7/19/01 (T)
Private Developers and Real Estate Brokers:
20. Morty Levin, Developer and Property Owner in Jamaica Plain, developer and managing
partner of the JP Plaza in Jackson Square, 6/22/01 (T)
21. Steve Samuels, President, Samuels & Associates (Developer of the South Bay Shopping
Center in Roxbury, developed the Grove Hall Mall in Dorchester in partnership with the
Grove Hall Neighborhood Development Corporation), 6/19/2001
22. Richard J. Lundgren, President, Hunneman Commercial Company, 6/28/01 (T)
23. Tom Welch, President, Thomas Welch & Associates, property owner and developer in
Egleston Square, 6/18/2001
24. Toula Politis, property owner and developer in Egleston Square, 6/20/01 (T)
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Public Sector and other Institutions:
25. Alvaro Lima, Managing Director, Boston Advisors-ICIC (on-going)
26. Andre Porter, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Business Development, Department of
Neighborhood Development, 3/13/2001
27. Liora Beer, Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Business Development, Department
of Neighborhood Development, 3/13/2001
28. Andy Waxman, Project Manager, Office of Business Development, Department of
Neighborhood Development, 3/13/2001
29. John Avault, Senior Economist, Boston Redevelopment Authority, 6/27/01
30. Bruce Lyon, Retail Specialist, Local Initiative Support Corporation, 6/27 and 7/5/01 (T)
31. Keith Hunt, Assistant Director, Office of Business Development, Department of
Neighborhood Development, 7/9/01 (T)
Businesses in Hyde/Jackson Square (all between May and June 2001).
32. Rafael Benzan, Tropical Market, 280 Centre St.
33. Huascar Castillo, Angela Unisex Salon, 296 Centre St.
34. Rafael Mejia, Evelyn's Market, 298 Centre St.
35. Frank M. Penzo, Countrywide Home Loan, 315 Centre St.
36. Ash Katib, 99 Cent Shop, 315 Centre St.
37. Omedis Tejeda, La Gran Via Men's Fashions, 306 Centre St.
38. Franklin Cabral, Franklin's CD, 314 Centre St.
39. Luis Guerrero, Pimentel Market, 340 Centre St.
40. Freddy Cabral, Freddy's Market Bodega, 302A Centre St.
41. Felix Del Valle, Del Valle's Children's Fashion, 360 Centre St.
42. Hugo Damm, Rizzo's Pizza, 347 Centre St.
43. Eduardo Vassallo Jr., V Discount Auto Parts, 342 Centre St.
44. Bill Jordan, Hi-Lo Foods Supermarket, 413 Centre St.
45. Ramon Asuncion, Hyde Square Wine Co, 391 Centre St.
46. Rudy Castillo, Centre Street Tailor Shop, 366B Centre St.
47. Angel Castillo, Anibal Market, 331 Centre St.
48. Manuel Espaillat, Estrella Bakery, 333 Centre St.
49. Vendol Ryan, Payless Shoes, 315 Centre St.
50. Skippy White, Skippy White's Records, 315 Centre St.
51. Santiago Rodriguez, Gentileza's Market, 371 Centre St.
Businesses in Egleston Square (all in June 2001):
52. Robert Lawson, Lawson Bros. Hairstyling, 1979 Columbus Ave.
53. Mario Melendez, 4M Market 3114 Washington St.
54. Charles Latour, The Athletes Foot, 3070 Washington St.
55. Franklin Dunker, Pro-Image Photography, 3115 Washington St.
56. Luisa Javier, Latino Beauty Salon, 3125 Washington St.
57. Ivan Betances, Egleston Square True Value, 3121 Washington St.
58. Nelson Correa, La Personalidad, 3119 Washington St.
59. Ed Ruffin, Ed's Barber Shop 3120 Washington St.
60. Pedro, P.G. Communications, 3084 Washington St.
61. Elaine Wallace, Elaine's Bakery, 3029 Washington St.
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62. Aloysius Nsohwu, Egleston Square Pharmacy, 3090 Washington St.
63. Orlando Pena, La Peravianna Market, 3095 Washington St.
64. Jim Roberts, McDonald's Express, 3064 Washington St.
65. Tony Aquino, Tony's Travel & Communications, 3108 Washington St.
66. Jose Rojas, Alberto's Hair Salon, 3135 Washington St.
67. David Martinez, D&D Communications, 3142 Washington St.
68. Victor Nunez, Bani Groceries, 3145 Washington St.
69. Saul Westelman, Chauncy Liquor Mart, 3100 Washington St.
70. Simone Moreno, Moreno's Unisex Salon, 3099 Washington St.
71. Ylde Sosa, Sosa's Furniture, 3158 Washington St.
72. Yanira Nova, International Restaurant, 3160 Washington St.
73. Milagros Pascual, Sovereign Bank, 3060 Washington St.
Other:
74. Jose Abreu, owner of La Borinquefia Grocery on Dudley Street, telephone interview about
EBT Cards, 6/24/01, (T)
75. Ricardo Austrich, President, Latino Grocers Association-LAGA and owner of Maracas (a
food distributor), 6/25/01 (T)
(T) indicates telephone interview
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Appendix 1 Impact Survey of Businesses in Hyde/Jackson Square
Business Information
Name of Business
Type of Business 
Date
Contact Name Title
Number of Surveys = 20
How long have your business been in this neighborhood? N=19 Average Years= 18
How long have you owned or managed the business? N=19 Average Years= 9
If you were in the neighborhood before the development of JP Center, skip question 3
Were you familiar with the conditions of the commercial district and the neighborhood prior to the
development ofJP Center? Yes 100% No
Descrnption of District and Overall District Impact
What was the commercial district/neighborhood like and the JP Center site before the project was
developed?
How has the district/neighborhood changed in the last 5 years? How has the district/neighborhood changed
since the project was completed? What role do you think that the project had on these changes?
In general what was the impact of the project on the district/neighborhood?
% of
sample
Increased or
Improved Decreased Didn't change
lNumber of Customers 20 100%/ 17 85/o 1 5/ 2 10/
Sales 18 90% 13 72% 1 6% 4 22%
Business owners' confidence
1n the commercial district 16 80% 12 75% 2 13% 2 13%
Crime 18 90% - 0% 17 94% 1 6%
IProject Site 20 100%/ 20 10/0/ 0/
Proerty values 19 95% 19 100%| 0% 0%
Business Rents 19 95% 19 100/ 0% 0%
Conditions of buildings in the
district 19 95% 19 100% 0% 0%
Anchor businesses 16 80% 11 69% 0% 5 31/
!Independent businesses 18 190%/ 9 150%o 2 11%/ 7 39/
Physical expansions of
existin businesses 17 85% 4 24/ 0% 13 76%
Commercial vacancy 19 95% 1 5% 12 63% 6 32%
Abandonedproperties 18 90% 1 6% 10 56% 7 39/
Variety products & services 18 90% 17 94% 0% 1 1 6/
Merchants Association 14 70% 10 71% 1 7/ 3 21%
Main Street Program 9 45% 8 89% 0% 11%
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How has the number of shoppers coming into the district changed since the project was completed?
N= Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 1 10 5 0 %/~ 7 35%/ 3 15% -0/
How has the number of residents buying in the district changed since the project was completed?
N= Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't~ chag Decreased
20 7 35%/ 7 35% 5 25% 1 5/
How has the mix of products or services sold in the district changed since the project was completed?
Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 8 40% 6 30%| 6 30% -. 0%
What impact has the project had on existing businesses, excluding yours?
Which of the following statements best describes what you think would have happened if the project was not
developed:
N=20
11 55%/ The commercial district would have remained the same as before the project
2 10% The changes in the district would have happened anyway
7 35% The changes in the district would have taken longer to occur
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on the community:
N=19
18 95%/. Overall, the community isbetter off since the project was completed
1 5% Overall, the community is worse off since the project was completed
0 % Overall, the community is the same since the project was completed
Project Impact on Your Business
(For businesses that were established after the project was completed) How did the project
decision to locate in the district?
How has the number of your customers changed since the project was completed?
acquired/established the business?
influence your
or since you
N Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 9 45% 6 30% 2 10% 3 15%
What role do you think that the project had on this change?
N- Major Moderate Minor None Not Sure
20: 111 55% 5 25% 0% 4 20% 0%
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How have sales of your business changed since the project was completed? or since you acquired/established
the business?
N Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
....................... ......................................... . . . . . . .. .............................. . 
W .... .......................  . ........... . ......................................
20: 7 35%; 7 1 35%/o 2; 10%/& 41 20%
What role do you think that the project had on this change?
N= Mao Moderate . Minor None Not Sure
20: 9;~ 45%1 4; 20%o 0% 7 35% 0%
Do you rent or own the property where the business is located?
N- Rent Own
19 10 53%/ 9 47%/
If you rent, by what percentage has the rent increased since the project was completed or since you acquired
or established your business?
N=10 rent increased by 98%
If you own, by what percentage do you think that the property value has increased since the project was
completed or since you acquired the property?
N=6 value increased by 84%
Have you physically expanded the business since the projected was completed? or since you
acquired/established the business? Yes No _ Please describe the expansion.
Have you changed the product mix of your business since the project was completed? Yes __ No _ If
yes, how and why?
N=Yes N
20 211 55/% 98 950%
What other impact has the project had on your business?
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on your business:
N=18
16 8 9 %/ Overall, my business is better off since the project was completed
2 11% / Overall, my business is worse off since the project was completed
0%/ Overall, my business is the same since the project was completed
134
Appendix 2 Impact Survey of Grocery Stores in Hyde/Jackson Square
Business Information
Name of Business
Type of Business 
Date
Contact Name Tide
Number of Surveys = 6
How long have your business been in this neighborhood? N=6 Average Years= 28
How long have you owned or managed the business? N=6 Average Years= 11
If you were in the neighborhood before the development of JP Center, skip question 3
Were you familiar with the conditions of the commercial district and the neighborhood prior to the
development ofJP Center? Yes 100% No
Descrption of District and Overall District Impact
What was the commercial district/neighborhood like and the JP Center site before the project was
developed?
How has the district/neighborhood changed in the last 5 years? How has the district/neighborhood changed
since the project was completed? What role do you think that the project had on these changes?
In general what was the impact of the project on the district/neighborhood?
% of Increased or Decreased or
N= smpe Improved Worsened Didn't change
Number of Customers 6 100% 3 50% 1 17% 2 33%
Sales 4 67% 1 25% 1 25% 2 50%
.Business owners' confidence
in the commercial district 4 67/ 1 25%/ 2 50%0/ 1 25/
Crime 4 67% 0% 4 100% 0%
Pr oect S es 6 100% 6 100% 0% 0%
Prpert5y.values........5 83% 5 1100%/ 0/ 0%/
Business Rents 5 83% 5 100% 0% 0%
Conditions of buildings in the
district 5 83% 5 100% 0/ 0/
Anchor businesses 4 67% | 2 50% 0/ 2 50%
Independent businesses 5 83/ 3 60/ 0/% 0
Physical expansions of
existing businesses 4 67% 1 25% 0 3 75/
Cormercial vacancy 6 100% 0% 4 67% 2 33/
Abandoned properties 6 100% 0% 6 00
Variety products & services 6 100% 6 100 0%0
Merchants Association 6 100% 4 67% 0% 2
ain StreetProgram 4 67% 4 100/% - 0
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How has the number of shoppers coming into the district changed since the project was completed?
N= Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't changye - Decreased
6 1 17% 2 33% | 3 50% - |0%
How has the number of residents buying in the district changed since the project was completed?
N= Increased a lot .Increased a little Didn't changeceae
6 - 0% 2 33% 1 3 50% 1 17%
How has the mix of products or services sold in the district changed since the project was completed?
NIncreased a lot Increased a little Didn't change - Decreased
6 0% 1~ 4 67%/ 2 33%/ - 0% t
What impact has the project had on existing businesses, excluding yours?
Which of the following statements best describes what you think would have happened if the project was not
developed:
N=5
2 40%/ The commercial district would have remained the same as before the project
1 20% The changes in the district would have happened anyway
2 40% The changes in the district would have taken longer to occur
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on the community:
N=54 80% Overall, the community isbetter off since the project was completed
1 20% Overall, the community is worse off since the project was completed
0% Overall, the community is the same since the project was completed
Project Impact on Your Business
(For businesses that were established after the project was completed) How did the project influence your
decision to locate in the district?
How has the number of your customers changed since the project was completed? or since you
acquired/established the business?
N Increased a lot Increased a little Didn t change Decreased
6 1 17% 1 17% 1 17% 1 3 50%
What role do you think that the project had on this change?
Major Moderate Minor None Not Sure
6 3 50%/ 2 33/% 0/ 1 17/% 0%/
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How have sales of your business changed since the project was completed? or since you acquired/established
the business?
N Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't, change Decreased
....................... ....................... . . . . . . . ...................................................................................
a  ........................ .....
6 1 170/% 1 17% 1 170/% 3 50%/o
What role do you think that the project had on this change?
N= Major Moderate | Minor None Not Sure
6 3 0/o 2 33%! /1 1/ - 0
Do you rent or own the property where the business is located?
N= Rent Own
4 1 25% 1 3 75/
If you rent, by what percentage has the rent increased since the project was completed or since you acquired
or established your business?
N=1 rent increased by 17%
If you own, by what percentage do you think that the property value has increased since the project was
completed or since you acquired the property?
N=3 value increased by 50%
Have you physically expanded the business since the projected was completed? or since you
acquired/established the business? Yes ___ No _ Please describe the expansion.
N=Yes No
6 1 0% 6 1100/
Have you changed the product mix of your business since the project was completed? Yes
yes, how and why?
NYes No
6 5 83%/ 1 1 17/
What other impact has the project had on your business?
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on your business:
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No If
N=5
3 60% Overall, my business is better off since the project was completed
2 4 0 % Overall, my business is worse off since the project was completed
0% Overall, my business is the same since the project was completed
Appendix 3 Impact Survey of Businesses in Egleston Square
Business Information
Name of Business
Type of Business Date
Contact Name Tide
Number of Surveys = 20
How long have your business been in this neighborhood? N=20 Average Years= 12
How long have you owned or managed the business? N=20 Average Years= 11
If you were in the neighborhood before the development of Egleston Center, skip question 3
Were you familiar with the conditions of the commercial district and the neighborhood prior to the
development of Egleston Center? Yes 100% No
Descrption of District and Overall District Impact
What was the commercial district/neighborhood like and the Egleston Center site before the project was
developed?
How has the district/neighborhood changed in the last 5 years? How has the district/neighborhood changed
since the project was completed? What role do you think that the project had on these changes?
In general what was the impact of the project on the district/neighborhood?
Number of Customers
% of
sample
100%/
Increased or
Improved
80%/
Decreased or
Worsened Didn't change
3 15%/
Sales 20 100% 16 80% 1 5% 3 15/
Business owners' confidence
in the commercial district 20 02
rime 20 100% 0/ 18 90 2 10/
Project Site 20 100% 20 100% - 0%- 0%
Pr oerty values 19 95% 18 95% 0% 1 5/
Business Rents 19 95% 18 95% 0% 1 5/
Conditions of buildings in the
district 19 95% 18 95% 0% 1 5%
Anchor businesses 20 100% 19 95/ 0/ 1 5/
Independent businesses 19 95% 16 84% 0% 3 16%
Physical expansions of
existing businesses 20 100% 2 10% 4 20% 14 70%
Commercial vacancy 20 100%/ 0% | 16 80% 4 20/
- -
15%/
-Abandoned properties 20 100%/ 0%/ 7 5/ 3 
ariety products& services 950 1 10 0/%
Merchants Association 17 85/ 9 53% 3 18% 5 29/
.Main Street Pro~ram 16 80/ 12 750/ 2 130/ 2 13/
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..................................................................................................................................... :  ? .......................   F .........................
How has the number of shoppers coming into the district changed since the project was completed?
N= . nrae o nrae ite Didn't change Decreased
20 | 11 55% 6 30% 2 10% 1 5%
How has the number of residents buying in the district changed since the project was completed?
N= Increased a lot . Increased a little Didn't~ chang Decreased
20 12 60%/ 6 30%/ 0%/ 2 10/
How has the mix of products or services sold in the district changed since the project was completed?
.......................I ................................................................................................................................................................ ..........................................................
NIncreased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 9 45% 10 50% 1 5% - 0%
What impact has the project had on existing businesses, excluding yours?
Which of the following statements best describes what you think would have happened if the project was not
developed:
N=20
9 4-5% The commercial district would have remained the same as before the project
1 5/% The changes in the district would have happened anyway
10 50% The changes in the district would have taken longer to occur
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on the community:
N=20
20 100% Overall, the community is better off since the project was completed
0%............................... Overall, the.community.is.worse.off.
0% Overall, the community is worse off since the project was completed
-0%/ Over all, the community isthe same since the project was completed
Project Impact on Your Business
(For businesses that were established after the project was completed) How did the project influence your
decision to locate in the district?
How has the number of your customers changed since the project was completed? or since you
acquired/established the business?
Nr Increased a lot Increased a little Didn't change Decreased
20 7 35%/~ 6 130%/ 1 4 20%/ 3 15%/o
What role do you think that the project had on this change?
N Major Moderate Minor None Not Sure
20 8 40% 7 35% 0% 5 25% 0%
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How have sales of your business changed since the project was completed? or since you acquired/established
the business?
0 Increased a lot Increased a little 10Didn't chan Decreased
20 130 ~ . 4% 2 l 0%o 3 15%/
What role do you think that the project had on this change?
N= Major Moderate Minor None Not Sure
20 1 8 40%/ 7 35%/ 0%/ 4 20%i 5%/
Do you rent or own the property where the business is located?
N= Rent Own
20 17 85%/ 3 115%"
If you rent, by what percentage has the rent increased since the project was completed or since you acquired
or established your business?
N=17 rent increased by 39%
If you own, by what percentage do you think that the property value has increased since the project was
completed or since you acquired the property?
N=1 value increased by 20%
Have you physically expanded the business since the projected was completed? or since you
acquired/established the business? Yes No ___ Please describe the expansion.
N Yes No
20 7 35%/ 13 65/
Have you changed the product mix of your business since the project was completed? Yes ___ No __ If
yes, how and why?
N Yes No
20 11 55%/ 1 9 45%/
What other impact has the project had on your business?
Which of the following statements best reflects the project impact on your business:
N=18
17 85% Overall, my business is better off since the project was completed
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2 10% Overall, my business is worse off since the project was completed
1 5% Overall, my business is the same since the project was completed
...................................... ........................................................................................
Appendix 4 Aerial Photo of the JP Center site prior to development
Source: MIT Digital Orthophoto Browser, MassGIS
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Appendix 5 Aerial Photo of Egleston Center site prior to development
Source: MIT Digital Orthophoto Browser, MassGIS
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Appendix 6 Photos of JP Center
Stop & Shop Supermarket, photo courtesy of JPNDC
Martha Elliot Health Center, photo courtesy of JPNDC
143
View of JP Center parking and Bromley Heath Housing from Centre Street
JP Plaza
144
Appendix 7 Photos of Egleston Center
Atrium of Egleston Center, with Sovereign Bank (left) and McDonald's (right)
View from corner of Washington and Columbus Avenue
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Appendix 7 Photos of Egleston Center
View of Egleston Center from Columbus Avenue w H&R Block (lett) and Athlete's 1 oot (rignt)
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